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A Letter from the Editor
I
n this issue, I would like to share the following news items with you concerning the
development of this Journal.
Firstly, we are very pleased that several outstanding colleagues Tamás Fleiner (Eötvös Loránd
University), Paul Goldberg (Oxford University), Yuichiro Kamada (University of California,
Berkeley), Bettina Klaus (University of Lausanne), Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University),
and Guoqiang Tian (Texas A&M University) have joined our editorial board over the last
year. They have strengthened our editorial team and improved our services.
Secondly, I can report that we continue to make good progress in attracting high quality sub-
missions to the Journal. For the first few issues, regular submissions have been supplemented
by invited ones from supporters of the Journal, but the success of the Journal depends on the
constant support of professional colleagues as authors and as readers, alongside the work of
our editorial board. Our first and last goal is and will always be the same: To publish the
best possible papers and to provide the best possible services to the profession for the public
interest.
Thirdly, the Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design which owns
and publishes the Journal has been approved by the UK Charity Commission as a charity.
This is an independent learned society and a not-for-profit, unincorporated association. The
charity’s objects are to advance education for the public benefit in the subject of mechanism
and institution design by
1. managing the flagship journal of the Society: Journal of Mechanism and Institution
Design;
2. promoting scientific research on designing, improving, analysing and testing economic,
financial, political or social mechanisms and institutions;
3. encouraging the development of mechanisms and institutions that improve efficiency,
equality, prosperity, stability and sustainability in society;
4. supporting and organising lectures, workshops and conferences on mechanism and in-
stitution design;
5. fostering exchanges and discussions among academics, practitioners and policy makers
and disseminating the scientific knowledge of the field.
Fourthly, the Society will hold its inaugural conference on Saturday-Sunday, 12th-13th May
2018. It will be hosted by the Business School, Durham University, the third oldest and pres-
tigious university in England. Durham is a beautiful small town with a magnificent Cathedral
on the top of a hill, a world heritage site.
Lastly but not least, we wish to thank all editorial members and referees who have provided
their timely and valuable reports and all authors who have submitted their papers to the Jour-
nal.
Zaifu Yang, York, 7th December, 2017
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ABSTRACT
We examine a spontaneous decentralized market process widely observed in
real life labor markets. This is a natural random decentralized dynamic compet-
itive process. We show that this process converges globally and almost surely
to a competitive equilibrium. This result is surprisingly general by assuming
only the existence of an equilibrium. Our findings have also meaningful policy
implications.
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2 Spontaneous Market Process
“Every individual endeavors to employ his capital so that its pro-
duce may be of greatest value. He generally neither intends to
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting
it. He intends only his own security, only his own gain. And
he is in this led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he
really intends to promote it.” Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
(1776).
1. INTRODUCTION
O
ne of the central issues of economic research is to study market processes
by which equilibrium prices or wages can be formed. The basic idea
of market processes can be traced back at least to Smith (1776), who used his
famous metaphor ‘the Invisible Hand’ to describe the self-regulating nature of
a decentralized free market where the spontaneous action of rational economic
agents driven by self-interest will produce a socially desirable outcome.
Walras (1874) suggested a price adjustment process known as the taˆtonnement
process. In it, a fictitious auctioneer announces a price for one good, collecting
all the demands for the good, adjusting the price by the law of demand and
supply until an equilibrium in this single good market is reached. The same
procedure applies to the remaining goods successively one by one. This se-
quential procedure is, however, very restrictive. A major improvement was
made by Samuelson (1941, 1948) who proposed a simultaneous taˆtonnement
process. Arrow & Hurwicz (1958), Hahn (1958), and Arrow et al. (1959)
proved that Samuelson’s process converges globally to an equilibrium pro-
vided that all goods are perfectly divisible and substitutable. Scarf (1960)
showed by examples that this process, however, does not work if the goods are
complementary.1 More recently, efficient market processes such as auctions
and job matching have been developed to deal with more realistic markets
that permit indivisibilities; see Crawford & Knoer (1981), Kelso & Crawford
(1982), Gul & Stacchetti (2000), Milgrom (2000, 2004), Ausubel & Milgrom
(2002), Perry & Reny (2005), Ausubel (2004, 2006), and Sun & Yang (2009,
1 Scarf (1973) proposed a procedure for computing equilibrium prices in markets with perfectly
divisible goods.
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 2(1), 2017
Satoru Fujishige, Zaifu Yang 3
2014) among others.2 All these processes are deterministic and taˆtonnement,
and are adjusted by an auctioneer in an orderly manner.
Departing from the deterministic market processes, we will examine a
random decentralized dynamic competitive market process widely observed in
real life labor markets. Although this is a natural spontaneous market process,
there has been no formal analysis on it in the literature. The first and foremost
important question arises here: will this process generate a desirable economic
outcome? This is a significant question as it concerns whether decentralized
and uncoordinated markets, notably labor markets, can be operated efficiently
or not. Our major finding is that starting from an arbitrary market state this
process converges with probability one to a competitive equilibrium in finite
time, yielding a Pareto optimal outcome. To our surprise, this result holds true
by requiring only a minimal assumption that the market has an equilibrium. It
does not rely on any particular condition on the underlying market structure and
can therefore admit every possible existence condition. It can accommodate
indivisibility, complementarity, and uncertainty or randomness, which are
prominent features of the market.
The spontaneous decentralized market process under consideration has the
following basic features. Firstly, in the market firms and workers are hetero-
geneous and inherently indivisible, and workers meet directly and randomly
in pursuit of higher payoffs over time. Each firm hires as many workers as
it wishes, having a revenue value for each group of workers. Each worker
has preferences over firms and salaries but works for at most one firm. When
employees work for a firm, they generate a joint revenue which is then split
among the firm and its employees.
Secondly, all agents (firms or workers) are driven by self-interest and make
their own decisions independently and freely and their activities are neither
coordinated nor organized. A firm and a group of workers may form a new
coalition if they can divide their joint payoff among themselves to make no
member of the coalition worse off and at least one member strictly better off.
In this process, the firm will probably dismiss some of its own workers and
recruit workers from other firms to be called deserted firms, and every deserted
firm will at least temporally not change its contracts for its remaining workers.
This process is called a coalition improvement with the status quo maintaining
rule.
This status quo maintaining rule reflects a common practice in real life
2 See Bajari and Hortac¸su (2004) for a survey on internet auctions.
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business. For instance, if a star professor moves from university A to university
B, the former will not alter its contracts with the remaining faculty members
at least for a short period of time. This process is only assumed to occur
with a positive probability conditional on the current state and time. The
assumption on such a probability is intended to capture significant uncertainty
about market opportunities due to the nature of decentralized decision-making;
see e.g., Kelso & Crawford (1982) and Roth & Vande Vate (1990). For
example, even a most confident employer, say, a top academic department,
cannot be 100% certain that its vacancies would be fully filled. Furthermore,
the assumption is a natural requirement that although information about the
market is dispersed and incomplete, it should flow freely enough so that all
market participants are sufficiently well informed and can therefore have a
chance to respond to newly arrived opportunities. The assumption of a positive
probability could be viewed as a degree of market transparency.
Thirdly, this process is spontaneous in the sense that it is the result of human
self-interested action but not of conscious human design such as auction or
matching design.3 In Hayek (1988), this kind of market process is called a
spontaneous order and is a natural free market process. This process is not,
however, a taˆtonnement4 because trading is permitted even if the market is not
in equilibrium. In other words, at each time, if a worker is matched with a
firm, this worker will provide service for the firm in exchange for a wage from
the firm whether it is an equilibrium wage or not. As long as the market has
not reached an equilibrium, it will create incentives for some agents to deviate
from the current state. This type of deterministic non-taˆtonnement process has
been studied by Hahn (1962), Hahn & Negishi (1962), Negishi (1961, 1962),
Uzawa (1962), Arrow & Hahn (1971, Chapter XIII), and Fisher (1972, 1974,
1989).
Fourthly, this process is not monotonic and permits chaotic, cyclic and my-
opic behaviors. In the process deserted firms and dismissed workers generally
become worse off and thus the total welfare need not be monotonic. A worker
may sequentially work for several firms because a latter firm offers a better
salary or the worker may have been fired previously; conversely, the same
firm hires different workers over time for the same positions as workers who
3 Besides those auction mechanisms mentioned previously, see also Roth & Sotomayor (1990),
Hatfield & Milgrom (2005), Ostrovsky (2008), and Kojima & Pathak (2009) for a variety of
matching models.
4 Recall that a taˆtonnement process permits trade to take place only at equilibrium prices.
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come later may either work more efficiently or demand lower salaries. It is not
uncommon to see that a worker eventually returns to her previous employer but
with a different contract. It is also possible that in the process a worker may
get a remarkably attractive position at one time but get fired at another time.
The process can be chaotic and occasionally cyclical as firms and workers
meet directly and randomly, haggling for better deals, and coalitions can be
formed hastily and can also dissolve instantly whenever better opportunities
arise. Yet, the rules of this spontaneous process are simple, transparent, and
detail-free according to the doctrine of Wilson (1987).
Our main result demonstrates that, starting from an arbitrary market state
of a matching between firms and workers with a system of salaries, the above
random decentralized dynamic process, where every possible coalition im-
provement with the status quo maintaining rule conditional on the current state
and time occurs with a positive probability, almost surely converges in finite
time to a competitive equilibrium of the market consisting of an efficient match-
ing between firms and workers and a scheme of supporting salaries (Theorem 1
and Corollary 1), resulting in a Pareto optimal outcome. This result holds true
for any market environment as long as there exists a competitive equilibrium
with an integral vector of equilibrium salaries or prices.5 The consideration of
such equilibrium prices is very natural and practical, because any transaction
in real life business can only happen in integer number of monetary units. A
number of sufficient conditions are known to ensure the existence of such an
equilibrium.6 Among them, the Gross Substitutes condition given by Kelso
& Crawford (1982) has been widely used and requires every firm to view
all workers as substitutes, subsuming the assignment model by Koopmans &
Beckmann (1957), Shapley & Shubik (1971), Crawford & Knoer (1981), and
Demange et al. (1986) as a special case.7 A crucial step toward establishing the
major result of the paper is to prove that the spontaneous decentralized random
process does not get stuck in cycles endlessly. To this end, we develop a novel
5 In contrast, to our best knowledge, in the deterministic settings there is no general existing
process that guarantees to find a competitive equilibrium in an economy with indivisibilities
if one assumes only the existence of an equilibrium; see those references mentioned in the
second paragraph.
6 See Kelso & Crawford (1982), Ma (1998), Sun & Yang (2006), Milgrom & Strulovici (2009),
Baldwin & Klemperer (2013), Fujishige & Yang (2015), and Murota (2016).
7 Such models are also called unit-demand models where every consumer demands at most one
item (see also Shapley & Scarf (1974)) or every person needs only one opposite sex partner
(see Gale & Shapley (1962)).
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technique to show the existence of a finite sequence of successive coalition
improvements with the status quo maintaining rule from any initial market
state to a competitive equilibrium in the market (Theorem 2).
The current study on the spontaneous decentralized market process may
help deepen our understanding of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand in complex
economic environments and offer a theoretic explanation as to why the spon-
taneous decentralized market process widely observed in labor markets can
perform well and thus justify its very existence. Our findings might also have
some interesting policy implications: in general, free markets can work well as
Hayek (1944) had passionately advocated, almost surely resulting in socially
efficient outcomes in a self-interested and law-abiding but seemingly chaotic
and random economic environment, and in particular the price system can
marvellously aggregate and communicate information “in a system in which
the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people” as Hayek
(1945) had believed.8 A caveat is that free markets cannot unconditionally
function properly, and in order for them to work well, the government should
promote and improve market transparency so as to facilitate the convergence
of such market processes.9 We also discuss (in Section 5) under what circum-
stance firms can avoid (sometimes controversial) massive dismissals.
We conclude this introductory section by reviewing several related studies.
In a pioneering study Kelso & Crawford (1982) introduced a general job
matching market where each firm can hire several workers and each worker is
employed by at most one firm. They developed a salary adjustment process
that converges to an equilibrium provided that every firm treats all workers
as substitutes. Although they stress that pervasive uncertainty is an essential
feature of the labor market, they do not deal with uncertainty and their process
is a deterministic market process. In a seminal article Roth & Vande Vate
(1990) reexamined the marriage matching model of Gale & Shapley (1962)
in which each man tries to marry his favorite woman and vice versa, and
established a decentralized random process for the model; see Ma (1996)
for a further study on this process. Kojima & U¨nver (2008) generalized the
marriage model in a substantial way to allow for instance each college to
8 See a recent article on the decentralization of stated-owned enterprizes in China by Huang et
al. (2017).
9 Since 1980s, indeed many governments around the world require every employer to publicly
announce its job openings at least several weeks or months in advance before the closing date.
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admit many students and each student to attend several colleges.10 They
investigated a decentralized random process for a pairwise stable matching
outcome and established a probabilistic convergence. Chen et al. (2016)
examined a random decentralized process for the assignment market, as a
counterpart of the deterministic processes proposed by Crawford & Knoer
(1981) and Demange et al. (1986). Nax & Pradelski (2015) discussed a similar
issue from the viewpoint of evolutionary dynamics. Ma & Li (2016) studied a
decentralized probabilistic double auction process for a financial market.
A crucial and well-recognized difference between the matching models11
and the competitive market models12 is that the matching models do not
involve (or have flexible) prices nor have a system of competitive prices to
support a stable matching outcome, which is the often-used notion of solution
to matching models and generally weaker than the concept of competitive
equilibrium (see Quinzii (1984)). Feldman (1974) and Green (1974) studied
deterministic decentralized processes for certain subclasses of non-transferable
utility games. Their approaches do not apply to the labour market or matching
models where indivisibility is involved. Chung (2000), Diamantoudi et al.
(2004), Klaus & Klijn (2007), and Biro´ et al. (2014) investigated random
processes for roommate and marriage matching models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and basic concepts. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 introduces
the thought experimental procedure for proving the key result (Theorem 2).
Section 5 examines the case of Gross Substitutes which can help firms avoid
massive dismissals. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a general labor market with a finite number of heterogeneous firms
and workers. Formally, let F be the set of m firms andW the set of n workers,
respectively. We assume that each firm can hire as many workers as it wishes
10They assume that agents on one side of the market have substitutable preferences and those on
the other side have responsive preferences.
11Studied by Gale & Shapley (1962), Roth & Sotomayor (1990), Roth & Vande Vate (1990),
and Kojima & U¨nver (2008) among others.
12Studied by Koopmans & Beckmann (1957), Arrow & Hurwicz (1958), Shapley & Shubik
(1971), Shapley & Scarf (1974), Kelso & Crawford (1982), Gul & Stacchetti (1999), Ausubel
(2006), and Sun & Yang (2006, 2009).
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but each worker can work for at most one firm. Each firm j ∈ F has an integer-
valued and weakly increasing revenue function R j : 2W → Z with R j( /0) = 0.
Namely, when firm j hires a group B ⊆W of workers, it has a revenue of
Ri(B) in units of money thus being an integer value. Given a scheme of
salaries s j = (s ji | i ∈W ) ∈ IRW+ for firm j ∈ F , firm j’s net profits are given
by pi j(B,s j) = R j(B)−∑i∈B s ji . Each worker i ∈W has quasi-linear utility in
money and has an integer minimum wage requirement w ji ≥ 0 for being willing
to work at firm j ∈ F . Because of the minimum wage requirement, for the
same salary worker i may prefer to be hired by firm j rather than by firm k.
The integer value assumption of R j and w ji is quite natural and standard, as for
example we cannot specify a monetary payoff more closely than to its nearest
penny.13 The information about R j and w ji can be private, as explained in the
next section. We use (F,W,(R j | j ∈ F),(w ji | i ∈W, j ∈ F)) (or (F,W,R j,w ji ),
in short) to represent this economy. In addition, for any F ′ ⊆ F andW ′ ⊆W ,
let (F ′,W ′,R j,w ji ) be the economy only consisting of firms in F
′ and workers
inW ′. In the sequel a worker or firm may be simply called an agent.
A matching µ in the labor market is a correspondence such that
• for all i ∈W , either µ(i) = i or µ(i) ∈ F ,
• for all j ∈ F , µ( j)⊆W , and
• for all i ∈W and j ∈ F , µ(i) = j if and only if i ∈ µ( j).
At matching µ , for any worker i ∈W , if µ(i) ∈ F , then µ(i) represents the
firm to which worker i is assigned. If µ(i) = i, then worker i is not assigned
to any firm and we will say that such worker i is unemployed or self-matched.
For any firm j ∈ F , µ( j) stands for the set of workers hired by firm j. If µ( j)
is empty, then firm j does not employ any worker.
A salary scheme system S= (s j | j ∈F) consists of salary schemes s j ∈ IRW+
of all firms j ∈ F . A state or allocation of the market consists of a salary
scheme system S = (s j | j ∈ F) and a matching µ . At allocation (µ,S), if
µ(i) = j ∈ F for any worker i ∈W , then worker i works for firm j and receives
salary s ji ; if µ(i) = i, then worker i does not work for any firm and receives no
salary, and firm j hires the group µ( j) of workers and pays the total amount
s j(µ( j)) = ∑i∈µ( j) s
j
i of salary. An allocation (µ,S) induces a payoff vector
13See e.g., Demange et al. (1986), Roth & Sotomayor (1990), Ausubel (2006), and Sun & Yang
(2009).
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u ∈ IRF∪W such that for every worker i ∈W , ui = sµ(i)i −wµ(i)i when µ(i) ∈ F ,
and ui = 0 when µ(i) = i, and for every firm j ∈ F , u j = pi j(µ( j),s j). In this
way, the state (µ,S) can be alternatively written as (µ,u). Observe that at
every state (µ,u) we have u j+∑i∈µ( j) ui = R j(µ( j))−∑i∈µ( j)w ji for every
firm j ∈ F and uk = 0 for every worker k ∈W with µ(k) = k.
A state (µ,u) is individually rational if no agent is worse than she stands
alone, i.e., uk ≥ 0 for every k ∈ F ∪W . A nonempty group B ⊆ F ∪W of
workers and firms is called a coalition. Following Kelso & Crawford (1982,
p. 1487), we say that a coalition B is essential if it contains either only one
worker or only one firm with any number of workers. (Note that we make this
definition slightly more general than theirs by including the case of either a
single firm or a single worker to cover individual rationality.) In the following
any coalition means an essential coalition. Sometimes it is convenient to use
( j,B) to express a coalition in order to distinguish the firm and workers, where
j ∈ F or j = /0, and B⊆W .
A state (µ,u) is weakly blocked by an individually rational coalition
B ⊆ F ∪W (or simply weakly blocked by a coalition) (i) if there exists one
firm j ∈ B with a nonnegative payoff vector r ∈ IRB+ such that
rk ≥ uk for every k ∈ B, and (1)
∑
k∈B
rk = R
j(B\{ j})− ∑
k∈B\{ j}
w
j
k (2)
with at least one strict inequality for (1), or (ii) if the coalition B contains
only one worker i with ri = 0> ui. Notice that all members in the coalition
B are individually rational, i.e., rk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ B, and that in case (i), if
B contains only a firm j, then r j = 0 > u j. The definition says that at least
one member in B would be better off and none in B would be worse off if
firm j hires only workers i ∈ B and every worker i ∈ B works for firm j, or it
would be strictly better for the single firm not to hire any worker or for the
single worker i not to work at firm µ(i). Such a B is called an individually
rational weakly blocking coalition (or simply a weakly blocking coalition).
An (individually rational) strongly blocking coalition is defined in the same
manner as a weakly blocking coalition, except that (1) is now strengthened as a
strict inequality for every member in B. Throughout the paper every (weakly or
strongly) blocking coalition means an individually rational blocking coalition
unless stated otherwise. With respect to a blocking coalition ( j,B) of (µ,u),
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we say that a firm k(6= j) is deserted if B contains at least one worker from
µ(k), and that a worker w ∈ µ( j) is dismissed if B does not contain w. A firm
k(6= j) is unaffected if B does not contain any worker from µ(k).
A state is a core allocation if it is not strongly blocked by any coalition.
Clearly, a state is a core allocation if and only if it is individually rational and
is not strongly blocked by any firm with at least one worker. A state is a strict
core allocation or a competitive equilibrium if it is not weakly blocked by any
coalition.14 Observe that unemployment is allowed in equilibrium. It is well
known from Kelso & Crawford (1982, p. 1487) that the set of competitive
equilibria in this market coincides with the set of strict core allocations.15
The following definition describes how the market will transfer from a
disequilibrium state to another state through a blocking coalition.
Definition 1 Let B ⊆ F ∪W be a blocking coalition against the state (µ,u)
with the associated payoff vector r ∈ IRB. A new state (µ ′,u′) is said to be a
coalition improvement of the state (µ,u) through B with every deserted
or unaffected firm maintaining the status quo for its remaining employ-
ees (or simply a coalition improvement with the status quo maintaining
rule) if the new state is constructed as follows:
(1) if there exists one firm j ∈ B, let
(1a) µ ′(i) = j and u′i = ri for every worker i ∈ B,
(1b) µ ′( j) = B\{ j} and u′j = r j,
(1c) µ ′(i) = i and u′i = 0 for every worker i ∈ µ( j)\B,
(1d) µ ′(i) = µ(i) and u′i = ui for every worker i ∈W \ (B∪µ( j)),
(1e) µ ′(k) = µ(k)\B and
u′k = R
k(µ(k)\B)− ∑
i∈µ(k)\B
(wki +ui)
for every firm k ∈ F \{ j}; or
14We point out that in the definition of a blocking coalition we ignore those nonessential blocking
coalitions in which some members may have negative payoffs. However, doing so does not
lose any generality. See the appendix of this paper for a detailed discussion.
15Perry and Reny (1994) provide a noncooperative foundation for this fundamental cooperative
solution-the core.
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(2) if the coalition B consists of only one worker i, let
(2a) µ ′(i) = i and u′i = 0,
(2b) µ ′(k) = µ(k) and u′k = uk for every worker k ∈W \{i},
(2c) µ ′(µ(i)) = µ(µ(i))\{i} and
u′µ(i) = R
µ(i)(µ(µ(i))\{i})− ∑
k∈µ(µ(i))\{i}
(w
µ(i)
k +uk),
(2d) µ ′(k) = µ(k) and u′k = uk for every firm k ∈ F \{µ(i)}.
By definition, at the new state (µ ′,u′), if B contains a firm j, then firm j
will hire all workers i ∈ B\{ j} and share the revenue according to the given
specification r ∈ IRB, whereas workers in µ( j) not in B will be dismissed by
firm j and become unemployed to get a payoff of zero and all other workers
outside B∪µ( j) will maintain the status quo of (µ,u). Observe that every firm
k ∈ F \ { j} will continue to hire those workers who are not in the blocking
coalition B and who were hired by firm k at (µ,u), and that a deserted firm
k’s payoff may be negatively affected because firm k will keep the same
contract with each of its remaining workers as in the state (µ,u), and that every
unaffected firm and its employees will not be affected and thus preserve the
status quo of (µ,u). With respect to a coalition improvement with the status
quo maintaining rule through the blocking coalition B, we also distinguish
weak coalition improvement from strong coalition improvement, depending on
whether the associated blocking coalition B is weak or strong.
The weak coalition improvement with the status quo maintaining rule
imitates real life business practices. When a firm and a group of workers
find an opportunity to form a weakly blocking coalition, the firm and hired
workers are better off but the deserted firms and dismissed workers are usually
worse off. Therefore coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining
rule are just local not global improvements for the market. In other words,
during this process, the overall welfare of the market is not monotonic and
can be increasing or decreasing. If an employee leaves a firm for a better
offer from another firm, the abandoned firm will usually not change contracts
immediately for its remaining employees and needs time to adapt to the new
situation. It is fairly common that such a firm will continue to operate for a
period of time even if it is in debt. If a worker is fired by a firm, she needs
time to find a new job. In such processes, it is not unusual to observe that as in
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reality, a worker may jump from one position to another and may eventually
return to her previous employer, but with a different contract. Weak coalition
improvements also allow a firm in debt to be adjudicated bankrupt by firing all
its employees, or continue to run by taking no action, or reorganize by hiring
and firing, as in real life business.
Observe that we define all concepts such as a blocking coalition and a
competitive equilibrium on the basis of real numbers. However, most real
life market processes work only on rational or integral salaries or prices.
The following lemma shows that, assuming integrality of revenue functions
and minimum salary requirements, an integral state (µ,u) is a competitive
equilibrium within the domain of real payoffs if (and only if) it is not weakly
blocked by any coalition with integral payoffs. It should be noticed that this
result holds true without requiring any other extra conditions.
Lemma 1 Let R j and w
j
i for all i ∈W and j ∈ F be integral. If a state (µ,u)
with u ∈ ZF∪W is not weakly blocked by any coalition B with integral payoffs
vi ∈ Z for all i ∈ B, then it cannot be blocked by any coalition T with real
payoffs u′i ∈ IR for all i ∈ T . Consequently, (µ,u) must be a competitive
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that an integral state (µ,u) with u ∈ ZF∪W
which is not blocked by any group of firm j and workers Bwith integral payoffs
v j,vi ∈ Z for all i ∈ B, is blocked by a group of firm k and workers T with real
payoffs u′k,u
′
i ∈ IR for all i ∈ T . Because the coalition T ∪{k} blocks (µ,u),
then we have
u′k+ ∑
i∈T
u′i = R
k(T )−∑
i∈T
wki , (3)
u′k ≥ uk and u′i ≥ ui for all i ∈ T (4)
with at least one strict inequality. Let K = {i ∈ T | u′i > ui and u′i 6∈ Z}∪{k |
u′k > uk and u
′
k 6∈ Z}. If K is empty, we have a contradiction. If K is not empty,
it follows from (3) and the integer number Rk(T )−∑i∈T wki that K contains
at least two elements. Take any element i∗ ∈ K. Then let u¯i = ui(∈ Z) for
every i ∈ K with i 6= i∗ and u¯i = ui(∈ Z) for every i ∈ (T ∪ {k}) \K, and
u¯i∗ = R
k(T )−∑i∈T wki −∑i∈(T∪{k})\{i∗} ui(> ui∗). u¯i∗ is an integer. Because ui
for all i ∈ F ∪W , R j for all j ∈ F , and w ji for all j ∈ F and i ∈W are integers,
we have the coalition T ∪{k} with integer payoffs u¯k and u¯i for all i ∈ T that
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blocks (µ,u), yielding a contradiction. The case of a singleton coalition is
easy to verify. This completes the proof. 
For convenience, a state (µ,u) with an integral payoff vector u ∈ ZF∪W
or equivalently integral salaries or prices will be called an integral state. We
are particularly interested in integral states because transactions in real world
business can happen only in integral or rational numbers of monetary units.
The above lemma shows that it is sufficient to concentrate on integral states.
There are several major sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of an
integral competitive equilibrium. The most well-known of these conditions is
the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982), which will be
introduced shortly.
Given a salary scheme s j ∈ IRW , let D j(s j) be the set of solutions to
max
T⊆W
pi j(T,s
j)
D j(s j) is the collection of those groups of workers which give the firm the
highest profit at the offered salaries s j.
Definition 2 Firm j satisfies the Gross Substitutes condition if for every pair
of salary schemes s j and t j with s j ≤ t j and for every A ∈ D j(s j), there exists
C ∈ D j(t j) such that {i | i ∈ A and s ji = t ji } ⊆C.
This condition states that if a firm j hires a group A of workers at salaries s j
and if the salaries are now increased to the new levels t j, the firm will still
want to hire those workers in A whose salaries do not increase.
It is well known that this job matching market admits at least one com-
petitive equilibrium and that the set of strict core allocations coincides with
that of competitive equilibria (Kelso & Crawford (1982)). In addition, as
all valuations w ji and R
j are integers and every firm satisfies the Gross Sub-
stitutes condition, the labour market must have at least one strict core allo-
cation with an integral payoff vector u ∈ ZF∪W or an integral salary system
S = (s1,s2, · · · ,sm) ∈ ZW×F ; see Gul & Stacchetti (1999), Ausubel (2006),
and Sun & Yang (2009). Notice that the celebrated assignment market of
Koopmans & Beckmann (1957) and Shapley & Shubik (1971) automatically
satisfies the Gross Substitutes condition and thus has an integral equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper in order to avoid repetition, every (market) state is taken
to mean an integral (market) state unless stated otherwise.
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3. SPONTANEOUS DECENTRALIZED MARKET PROCESSES
In this section we address the central issue whether a spontaneous decentralized
random market process can settle the market in a competitive equilibrium or
not. Suppose that the market starts at time 0 with an arbitrary state. It is
plausible to assume that information about the market is dispersed among
all the market participants and no single agent or organization commands
complete knowledge of the market. For instance, each firm j possesses private
information about its own revenue function R j and each worker i knows her
own minimum wage requirement w ji privately. Because firms and workers
are self-interested, any individual or group of agents will be willing to grasp
any opportunity to improve their wellbeing by forming a new coalition within
which the firm may fire some of its workers and hire some workers from other
firms, and some workers may abandon their employers. Deserted firms will at
least temporarily maintain the status quo for their remaining employees. The
formation of the new coalition is a weak coalition improvement against the
current state with the status quo maintaining rule. Because the market is totally
decentralized and uncoordinated and agents are not assumed to have complete
knowledge of the market, such coalition improvements with the status quo
maintaining rule cannot be expected to occur with absolute certainty but with
a positive probability. Moreover because real life transactions take place only
in an integral number of monetary units, it suffices to work with only integral
weak coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining rule. Obviously,
this spontaneous decentralized random process will continue to move from
one disequilibrium state to another until a competitive equilibrium is reached.
A natural and fundamental question arises here: will such a spontaneous
decentralized random market process converge to a competitive equilibrium
eventually? The following theorem gives an affirmative answer by showing
that this general process will almost surely converge to a competitive equilib-
rium in finite time, provided that at any point in time, every weak coalition
improvement with the status quo maintaining rule conditional on the current
market state arises with a positive probability bounded away from zero. The
assumption of a positive probability for every weak coalition improvement is
intended to capture pervasive uncertainty about opportunities in decentralized
and uncoordinated markets. For instance, in academic markets, even a top
department with attractive offers cannot guarantee to fill its vacancies. This as-
sumption also implies that although information about the market is dispersed
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among all the agents involved, job-related information flows smoothly enough
so that agents can grasp newly arrived opportunities in the market at least with
a positive probability.
As it will be clear in the following proof of Theorem 1, the requirement
of the positive probability being no less than any fixed small number ε > 0
is really minimal. This probability could be viewed as a measure of market
transparency. The magnitude of this positive number ε will not affect the
convergence of the decentralized random competitive process but it does have
an impact on the convergence speed. In general, the bigger ε is, the faster the
process will be.
Theorem 1 Assume that the labour market (F,W,R j,w
j
i ) has a competitive
equilibrium. Then, starting with an arbitrary market state, any random and
decentralized process in which every weak coalition improvement with the
status quo maintaining rule occurs with a positive probability conditional
on the current state and time bounded away from zero, will converge with
probability one to a competitive equilibrium in finite time.
Several remarks are in order. First, the market has an infinite number of
(integral) market states amongst which there are only a few equilibrium states
and the rest are all disequilibrium states. Each disequilibrium state can be
blocked by at least one coalition and is therefore associated with at least one
coalition improvement with the status quo maintaining rule. Second, at each
disequilibrium state there exists a finite number of coalition improvements
with the status quo maintaining rule. Third, as it will be shown in Lemma 2,
starting from any given market state, the set of market states that can be
generated through all possible successive coalition improvements with the
status quo maintaining rule is finite. This means that the assumption of a
positive probability in the theorem is actually imposed only upon a finite
number of market states which can be historically linked with the initial market
state via coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining rule.
Corollary 1 Assume that every firm in the market (F,W,R j,w
j
i ) satisfies
the Gross Substitutes condition. Then, starting with an arbitrary market
state, any random and decentralized process in which every weak coalition
improvement with the status quo maintaining rule occurs with a positive
probability conditional on the current state and time bounded away from zero,
converges almost surely to a competitive equilibrium in finite time.
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The proof of the theorem above relies on the following crucial mathemat-
ical result, which establishes a link between any initial market state and a
competitive equilibrium through only a finite sequence of successive weak
coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining rule. The distinguish-
ing feature of finite successive weak coalition improvements with the status
quo maintaining rule is essential to capture the decentralized nature of the
random market process. Any other path which does not exhibit this feature but
may still connect the initial market state with a competitive equilibrium will
not achieve the goal. It is also worth pointing out that the proof of Theorem 1
depends critically on the statement of Theorem 2 but not on its proof technique
or procedure.
Theorem 2 Assume that the labour market (F,W,R j,w
j
i ) has a competitive
equilibrium. Then there exists a finite number of successive weak coalition
improvements with the status quo maintaining rule linking an arbitrary market
state with a competitive equilibrium.
We now discuss how to establish Theorem 1 via Theorem 2. As pointed
out in the previous section, it is sufficient and also natural to confine ourselves
to integral market states. We first demonstrate the following lemma, which
provides an important insight into the spontaneous market process under
examination, i.e., starting from any initial market state, the number of market
states that can be possibly generated by successive coalition improvements
with the status quo maintaining rule is finite.
Lemma 2 For any given initial market state (µ0,u0), the set A(µ0,u0) of all
market states that can be attained through successive coalition improvements
with the status quo maintaining rule is finite.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary firm j ∈ F . Let S( j,0) be the total salaries that
firm j paid to its employees µ0( j) at the initial market state (µ0,u0). Let
M =max j∈F R j(W ) be the maximum among all firms’ revenues. Let (µ t ,ut),
t = 0,1,2, · · · , be any sequence of states that begins with (µ0,u0) and can
be possibly generated through coalition improvements with the status quo
maintaining rule. Observe that this process moves from one disequilibrium
(µ t ,ut) to another state (µ t+1,ut+1), because a coalition ( jt ,Bt) weakly blocks
the state (µ t ,ut), where jt ∈ F or jt = /0 and Bt ⊆W . Now we prove that
the payoff of every agent k ∈ F ∪W is bounded at any time. By coalition
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improvement with the status quo maintaining rule (Definition 1), as long as any
firm j is deserted or unaffected, its net profit cannot be less than −S( j,0)−1
(< R j( /0)−S( j,0) =−S( j,0) which is the worst case for firm j that still pays
S( j,0) but receives no revenue). When any firm j emerges in a blocking
coalition, its net profit will be weakly increasing and cannot be below zero,
and after such adjustments even when it becomes deserted or unaffected or
emerges in a blocking coalition again and again, its net profit cannot be less
than −R j(W ), because firm j will never pay more than R j(W ) for any group
of workers. Firm j′s net profit is equal to R j(T )−∑i∈T s j,ti , where T is the
group of workers hired by firm j at time t and ∑i∈T s
j,t
i is the salaries paid
by firm j at time t. Obviously, firm j′s net profit can never be above R j(W ).
Thus firm j′s payoff is always between −min{R j(W ),S( j,0)+1} and R j(W ).
Every worker i′s payoff is clearly between min{0,u0i } andM, and therefore is
also bounded. This shows that the sequence (µ t ,ut), t = 0,1,2, · · · , is bounded.
Observe that the bounded set A(µ0,u0) is finite, because every state is integral
and the number of matchings is finite. 
It may be obvious but important to note that starting from any point in the
set A(µ0,u0), any sequence of market states that can be generated through
coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining rule lies also in the set
A(µ0,u0).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. Suppose that the market starts
with the initial market state (µ0,u0) and operates at discrete time t = 1, 2, · · · .
Consider a general decentralized random market process in which every time-
dependent transition probability from a disequilibrium state in A(µ0,u0) at
any time t to another state in A(µ0,u0) at time t+1 is no less than a fixed (but
sufficiently small) number ε ∈ (0,1), namely, every possible weak coalition
improvement with the status quo maintaining rule occurs with a positive prob-
ability bounded away from zero. With only two classes of states (equilibrium
and disequilibrium), it follows that starting from any state (µ,u) in A(µ0,u0),
the process either terminates in an equilibrium state and remains in equilibrium
afterwards, or continues to move from one disequilibrium state to another
disequilibrium state in A(µ0,u0), as the random process by construction al-
ways arrives at a state in A(µ0,u0). Suppose that the random process does not
converge to an equilibrium state with probability one in the limit. This implies
that, starting from a disequilibrium state in A(µ0,u0), the random process
almost surely moves around within a (finite) set of disequilibrium states in
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A(µ0,u0) forever and therefore some of these disequilibrium states could be
visited an infinite number of times. Since each possible weak coalition im-
provement with the status quo maintaining rule is chosen with a probability no
less than ε at each point of time, there is then some state (µ ′,u′) in A(µ0,u0)
from which no finite path of weak coalition improvements with the status quo
maintaining rule toward equilibrium exists, no matter how the associated weak
coalition improvements are chosen, yielding a contradiction to Theorem 2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
4. THE EXISTENCE OF A DESIRED PATH TO EQUILIBRIUM
We will prove Theorem 2 in this section. The main difficulty is to show the
existence of a finite sequence of successive weak coalition improvements with
the status quo maintaining rule linking an arbitrary initial integral market state
with a competitive equilibrium. This sequence is our desired path and any
other path which does not generate successive weak coalition improvements
with the status quo maintaining rule but still leads to a competitive equilibrium
will not help to establish the theorem.
Because the labor market (F,W,R j,w ji ) is assumed to have a competitive
equilibrium with integral equilibrium payoffs, we can regard any such com-
petitive equilibrium (µ∗,u∗) as a reference equilibrium point. The idea of
using a reference point is a conventional thought experiment method and can
avoid many practical issues and has been used in theoretical physics. Biro´ et al.
(2014) apply this idea to the unit-demand models such as roommate matching
and assignment problems. For our purpose, the real challenge lies in how to
construct a desired path from any initial state to a competitive equilibrium by
using a reference point. It is, however, insufficient to just construct a path from
any initial state to a competitive equilibrium by using a reference point without
requiring that the path should be a path of successive weak coalition improve-
ments with the status quo maintaining rule. It is also worth pointing out that
our method of constructing a desired path is very general in the sense that it
works for any market as long as the market has an equilibrium. We will use
the reference (µ∗,u∗) and an arbitrary initial market state (µ,u) to construct a
desired path, denoted by P((µ∗,u∗),(µ,u)). The path P((µ∗,u∗),(µ,u)) thus
exists and can be seen as a function of the reference point and the initial state.
Thus the reference point plays a role as a variable, which means that we do not
need to know any specific or precise reference point in order to establish the
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existence of a desired path from any initial state to a competitive equilibrium.
This thought experiment method serves the purpose of proving Theorem 2 but
is not a practical economic adjustment process.
Given a state (µ,u), an agent i ∈ F ∪W is underpaid (overpaid ) at (µ,u)
with respect to the reference point (µ∗,u∗) if ui ≤ u∗i (ui > u∗i ). Given any
U ⊆W and j ∈ F , we define u(U) = ∑i∈U ui and w j(U) = ∑i∈U w ji . For
convenience we also use pi j to stand for the payoff u j of firm j ∈ F in a state
(µ,u).
We will describe a general procedure that, starting from any initial market
state (µ,u), generates a finite number of weak coalition improvements with
the status quo maintaining rule leading to a competitive equilibrium. We first
give a subroutine UPDATE which will be repeatedly used in the procedure.
The subroutine UPDATE tells us how to adjust a state (µ,u) weakly
blocked by the coalition ( j,U) to a new state (µ ′,u′). It specifies one type of
weak coalition improvement with the status quo maintaining rule.
UPDATE(µ,u, j,U)
(a) Start from an integral market state (µ,u) weakly blocked by ( j,U). Go
to Step (b).
(b) If j = /0, go to Step (e). If j ∈ F , let F ′ = {k ∈ F \{ j} | µ(k)∩U 6= /0}
and F∗ = {k ∈ F \ { j} | µ(k)∩U = /0}. Make workers in µ( j) \U
unemployed and their payoffs at zero, i.e., let µ ′(i) = i and u′i = 0 for
every i ∈ µ( j)\U . Firm j hires all workers inU , i.e., let µ ′( j) =U . Go
to Step (c).
(c) If there exists an overpaid worker i ∈U , then increase one such u′i so
that
u′i+ ∑
l∈U\{i}
ul = R
j(U)−pi j−w j(U),
let u′l = ul for every l ∈U \ {i} and pi ′j = pi j, and then go to Step (e).
Otherwise, go to Step (d).
(d) There exists no overpaid worker inU . Increase all underpaid workers’ u′i
as much as possible in such a way that u′i ≤ u∗i with u′i ∈ Z and u′(U)≤
R j(U)−pi j−w j(U). If u′(U) = R j(U)−pi j−w j(U), let pi ′j = pi j and
go to Step (e). Otherwise let pi ′j = R
j(U)− u′(U)−w j(U) and go to
Step (e).
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(e) For each k ∈ F ′, letUk = µ(k)\U . Every firm k ∈ F ′ continues to hire
all remaining workers in Uk under the same contract as in (µ,u), and
adjusts its net profit, i.e., let u′i = ui for every i ∈Uk, µ ′(k) =Uk and
pi ′k = R
k(Uk)−u(Uk)−wk(Uk). For each k ∈ F∗, let pi ′k = pik and u′i = ui
for every i ∈ µ(k). Go to Step (f).
(f) Set (µ,u) = (µ ′,u′) and get a new integral market state (µ,u).
The process comprising Steps (a), (b), (c) and (d) is calledReshuffle(µ,u, j,U)
while the process consisting of only Step (e) is called Retention(µ,u, j,U).
If a state (µ,u) is weakly blocked by a coalition ( j,U) with j ∈ F and
U ⊆W , by definition we have
R j(U)−w j(U)> pi j+u(U).
Since (µ∗,u∗) is a competitive equilibrium, it follows that
pi∗j +u
∗(U)≥ R j(U)−w j(U)> pi j+u(U).
This implies that UPDATE can be executed.
Lemma 3 After UPDATE, if firm j’s payoff pi ′j increases, we have u
′
i = u
∗
i for
all i ∈U and also pi ′j ≤ pi∗j .
Proof. Note that pi ′j gets increased only if Step (d) is executed, i.e., pi
′
j =
R j(U)− u′(U)−w j(U) and u′i = ui for all i ∈U . Since pi ′j + u∗(U) = pi ′j +
u′(U) = R j(U)−w j(U)≤ pi∗j +u∗(U), we have pi ′j ≤ pi∗j . 
Note that ifU contains at least one overpaid worker, after the execution of
UPDATE firm j’s payoff remains the same as in the state (µ,u).
We are now ready to describe the procedure which, starting from an ar-
bitrary integral market state, will generate a finite sequence of successive
coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining rule leading to a
competitive equilibrium.
The Procedure for Constructing a Desired Path to Equilibrium
Step 0 Let (µ∗,u∗) be a reference equilibrium of the market. Start with an
arbitrary integral market state (µ,u). Go to Step 1.
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Step 1 If there exists a weakly blocking coalition ( j,U) with j ∈ F and U ⊆
µ( j)∪µ∗( j) against the current state (µ,u), choose one such j and go
to Step 2. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 2 Find an optimal solutionU∗ to the following problem
max R j(X)−u(X)−w j(X)
s.t. X ⊆ µ( j)∪µ∗( j).
Perform UPDATE(µ,u, j,U∗) and get a new state (µ,u). Go to Step 1.
Step 3 If the state (µ,u) is weakly blocked by a coalition ( j,U), perform
UPDATE(µ,u, j,U) by giving a new state (µ,u) and go to Step 1.
Otherwise stop with the current state (µ,u), which is a competitive
equilibrium.
For convenience, the process that the Procedure from Step 0 goes through
Step 1 and Step 2 before moving into Step 3 is called Phase 1, while the
process that the Procedure from the beginning of Step 3 goes through Step 3
before returning to Step 1 is called Phase 2.
The following observation is simple but crucial to the convergence of the
Procedure and follows immediately from the construction of the UPDATE
process.
Observation 1: In the entire Procedure, every underpaid worker will always
remain underpaid. If an overpaid worker becomes underpaid, she will remain
underpaid afterwards.
Before proving the convergence of the procedure it is helpful to demonstrate
how the procedure works by an example.
An Illustrative Example: Suppose that in a market, there are three firms f1,
f2, f3 and four workers w1, w2, w3, and w4. Every worker i’s minimum wage
w
j
i equals zero for all firms j. Every firm’s value over each group of workers
is given in Table 1. Notice that in the table, w12 means the group of workers
{w1,w2}.
It is easy to verify that although this market does not satisfy any known
condition imposed on each individual such as the Gross Substitutes condition
of Kelso & Crawford (1982), it does have a unique efficient matching µ∗ which
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Table 1: Firms’ values over each group of workers.
w1 w2 w3 w4 w12 w13 w14
f1 2 2 1 1 7 3 2
f2 2 2 7 1 3 7 3
f3 2 2 2 6 5 3 7
w23 w24 w34 w123 w124 w234 w1234
f1 4 3 2 7 7 4 9
f2 7 2 7 7 3 7 10
f3 3 6 7 6 7 7 8
is supported by many competitive equilibrium price vectors, where µ∗( f1) =
{w1,w2}, µ∗( f2) = {w3}, µ∗( f3) = {w4}, µ∗(w1) = µ∗(w2) = f1, µ∗(w3) =
f2, and µ∗(w4) = f3. We will take (µ∗,u∗) as a reference equilibrium with
u∗f1 = 1, u
∗
f2
= 4, and u∗f3 = u
∗
w1
= u∗w2 = u
∗
w3
= u∗w4 = 3, or s
j = (3,3,3,3) for
j = 1,2,3.
In Table 2 we show how a desired path is generated by the procedure. The
procedure starts with the state (µ0,u0) and ends up with an equilibrium state
(µ5,u5) = (µ∗,u∗). Note that in Table 2 ‘opt’ means ‘optimal’, ‘state’ means
‘market state’ and ‘coalition’ means ‘weakly blocking coalition’. For each
matching µk we only write down the group of workers hired by each firm.
For instance, µ1 = (w12, /0, /0) means that firm 1 hires workers w1 and w2, and
firms 2 and 3 hire no worker, and workers 3 and 4 are unemployed. For each
payoff vector uk, its first three components indicate the payoff of the three
firms respectively while its last four components specify the payoff of the four
workers respectively. In the table ( f1,w12) is a blocking coalition of (µ0,u0),
and (µ1,u1) is the coalition improvement with the status quo maintaining
rule of (µ0,u0) through ( f1,w12). Initially, at (µ0,u0) worker 2 is overpaid
but workers 1, 3 and 4 are underpaid. Observe that in the entire process an
underpaid worker will always remain underpaid, and an overpaid worker may
become underpaid and thereafter will always be underpaid.
Lemma 4 Let (µ,u) be the current state of the market with which Step 3 of
the Procedure begins. Then for all j ∈ F, µ( j) is a maximizer of R j(X)−
u(X)−w j(X) in X ⊆ µ( j)∪ µ∗( j) and there exists no subset X of the set
µ( j)∪µ∗( j) such that ( j,X) weakly blocks (µ,u).
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Table 2: A desired path generated by the procedure.
state coalition optU∗ matching payoff
(µ0,u0) ( f1,w12) {w12} µ0 = (w1234, /0, /0) u0 = (0,0,0,1,4,2,2)
(µ1,u1) ( f2,w3) {w3} µ1 = (w12, /0, /0) u1 = (0,0,0,1,6,0,0)
(µ2,u2) ( f3,w4) {w4} µ2 = (w12,w3, /0) u2 = (0,4,0,1,6,3,0)
(µ3,u3) ( f1,w1) {w1} µ3 = (w12,w3,w4) u3 = (0,4,3,1,6,3,3)
(µ4,u4) ( f1,w2) {w12} µ4 = (w1,w3,w4) u4 = (0,4,3,2,0,3,3)
(µ5,u5) µ5 = (w12,w3,w4) u
5 = (1,4,3,3,3,3,3)
Proof. By Step 2 and UPDATE, for every j ∈ F , µ( j) is a maximizer of
R j(X)−u(X)−w j(X) in X ⊆ µ( j)∪µ∗( j). Hence,
pi j = R
j(µ( j))−u(µ( j))−w j(µ( j))≥ R j(X)−u(X)−w j(X),
for all X ⊆ µ( j)∪µ∗( j). It follows that there exists no X ⊆ µ( j)∪µ∗( j) such
that ( j,X) weakly blocks (µ,u). 
Lemma 5 Every worker i ∈ µ( j)\ (U∗∪µ∗( j)) that leaves firm j in Step 2
of the Procedure will never return to the firm afterward before the Procedure
goes to Step 3.
Proof. Each worker i ∈ µ( j)\ (U∗∪µ∗( j)) before the UPDATE in Step 2
becomes self-employed and disappears from µ( j)∪ µ∗( j) for the new µ( j)
after the UPDATE in Step 2. Since during the repetition of Step 1 and Step 2
sets µ( j)∪ µ∗( j) for all j ∈ F do not get enlarged, such a worker i remains
unemployed before Step 3 is invoked. 
Lemma 6 Every worker i ∈ (∪k∈F\{ j}µ(k))∩U∗ that moves to firm j in
Step 2 of the Procedure will never return to her previous firm afterward
(but possibly becomes unemployed by being fired by firm j) before the Proce-
dure goes to Step 3.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of the previous lemma, it follows from the
definition of the UPDATE process. 
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Observe that every worker i ∈ (µ( j)∩µ∗( j))\U∗ gets ui = 0 and this will
remain the same afterward before the Procedure goes to Step 3. Also note
that if the set µ( j)∪µ∗( j) remains the same after UPDATE, i.e., only some
workers in µ( j)∩ µ∗( j) leave firm j, there is no weakly blocking coalition
( j,U) with U ⊆ µ( j)∪ µ∗( j) after the UPDATE, which can be shown by
argument as similar to the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 7 Let (µ,u) be the current state of the market with which Step 3 of
the Procedure begins. Then it holds
pi∗j +u
∗(µ∗( j)) = pi∗j +u
∗(µ( j)) = pi j+u(µ∗( j)) = pi j+u(µ( j)) (5)
for all j ∈ F.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4 that for every firm j ∈ F
pi∗j +u
∗(µ∗( j)) = R j(µ∗( j))−w j(µ∗( j))
≤ R j(µ( j))−u(µ( j))−w j(µ( j))+u(µ∗( j))
= pi j+u(µ
∗( j)). (6)
On the other hand, since (µ∗,u∗) is a competitive equilibrium, we have for all
j ∈ F
pi∗j +u
∗(µ( j)) ≥ R j(µ( j))−w j(µ( j))
= pi j+u(µ( j)). (7)
It follows from (6) and (7) that
∑
j∈F
(pi j+u(µ( j))) ≤ ∑
j∈F
(pi∗j +u
∗(µ( j)))
≤ ∑
j∈F
(pi∗j +u
∗(µ∗( j)))
≤ ∑
j∈F
(pi j+u(µ
∗( j)))
≤ ∑
j∈F
(pi j+u(µ( j))). (8)
Hence every inequality in (6)–(8) hold with equality. This leads to
pi∗j +u
∗(µ∗( j)) = pi∗j +u
∗(µ( j)) = pi j+u(µ∗( j)) = pi j+u(µ( j)) for all j ∈ F.
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
The above proof and lemma also imply the following result.
Lemma 8 Let (µ,u) be the current state of the market with which Step 3 of
the Procedure begins. Then it holds that
ui = 0 for all i ∈W \
⋃
j∈F
µ∗( j) and u∗i = 0 for all i ∈W \
⋃
j∈F
µ( j).
Now, we examine the behavior of Step 3 of the Procedure. Take any
weakly blocking coalition ( j,U) and define F ′ = {k ∈ F | U ∩ µ(k) 6= /0}.
Because of the definitions of ( j,U) and (µ∗,u∗) we have
pi j+u(U)< R
j(U)−w j(U)≤ pi∗j +u∗(U). (9)
If j /∈ F ′, let F ′ = F ′∪{ j}. Then from (5) we have
∑
k∈F ′
(pik+u(µ(k)))
= ∑
k∈F ′\{ j}
(pik+u(µ(k)\U))+u(µ( j)\U)+(pi j+u(U))
= ∑
k∈F ′
(pi∗k +u
∗(µ(k))). (10)
It follows from (9) and (10) that for some firm k ∈ F ′ \{ j}
pik+u(µ(k)\U)> pi∗k +u∗(µ(k)\U) (11)
or
u(µ( j)\U)> u∗(µ( j)\U). (12)
Case (I): (11) holds. It follows from (11) and the equilibrium (µ∗,u∗) that we
have
pik+u(µ(k)\U)> pi∗k +u∗(µ(k)\U)≥ Rk(µ(k)\U)−wk(µ(k)\U). (13)
Then by Step (e) of UPDATE we have
pi ′k = R
k(µ(k)\U)−wk(µ(k)\U)−u(µ(k)\U).
Hence pi ′k, the new pik, strictly decreases compared with previous pik in (13).
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Case (II): (12) holds. Then there exists at least one overpaid worker in µ( j)\U .
By Step (b) of UPDATE all workers i ∈ µ( j)\U become unemployed and at
least one overpaid worker in µ( j)\U becomes underpaid.
We can now establish the following major convergence result of this section
and thus prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 The Procedure generates a finite sequence of weak coalition
improvements with the status quo maintaining rule leading to a competitive
equilibrium.
Proof. Recall that the number of integral feasible market states in A(µ0,u0)
with the initial allocation (µ0,u0) is finite, due to Lemma 2. Furthermore, every
market state generated by the Procedure is an integral feasible state satisfying
(∗∗) because of Step 2 and Step 3 of the Procedure. If the Procedure does
not produce a finite sequence of weak coalition improvements with the status
quo maintaining rule leading to a competitive equilibrium, it must yield a
finite cycle. The Procedure would repeat the cycle forever. Without loss
of generality we assume that at least one Phase 1 is executed before the
Procedure reaches the cycle.
Notice that Case (II) in Phase 2 never occurs along the cycle, because
there are at most n overpaid workers and if any overpaid worker becomes
unemployed, it will remain underpaid forever by Observation 1. Thus only
Case (I) may occur in Phase 2 along the cycle. Then, since in Case (I)
pik strictly decreases, pik should be increased to recover the loss along the
cycle, which can only be done by Reshuffle(µ,u,k,U) in Phase 1 whenU(=
µ(k) later) does not contain any overpaid workers. Note that each Retention
in Phase 1 makes the value of pik less than or equal to that of pik given at the
end of the previous Phase 1, since at the end of Phase 1 then obtained µ(k)
for every k ∈ F is a maximizer obtained in Step 2, so that removing some
workers from µ(k) results in a lower revenue than that given at the end of the
previous Phase 1 for firm k, while Retention in Phase 2 may only reduce pik
because of the same reason. Also note that after the Reshuffle(µ,u,k,U) we
have pik ≤ pi∗k due to Lemma 3 and comments right after that and then keep
pik ≤ pi∗k thereafter. On the other hand, if pik ≤ pi∗k , then because of (11) in Case
(I) in Phase 2 there must be at least one overpaid worker in µ(k)\U , where
we update µ(k) by setting µ(k) = µ(k)\U . Hence along the cycle there exists
at least one overpaid worker i who becomes unemployed and thus remains
underpaid thereafter forever by Observation 1. But this is impossible along the
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cycle, because there are only at most n overpaid workers. In other words, there
will be no overpaid worker along the cycle, yielding a contradiction. Hence the
Procedure terminates (in a finite number of successive integral weak coalition
improvements with the status quo maintaining rule) with a final integral state
(µ,u) that has no integral weak blocking, which is a competitive equilibrium
due to Lemma 1. 
It should be noted that the above proof implies that if there exists a com-
petitive equilibrium, then for every initial state (µ0,u0) there also exists a
competitive equilibrium within A(µ0,u0).
5. THE BENCHMARK CASE OF GROSS SUBSTITUTES
Weak coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining rule cover all
kinds of hiring and firing procedures and some of these procedures could be
too general and too complicated for firms to handle, for instance, in practice
sometimes it can be very difficult and even controversial for a firm to dismiss a
large number of employees at one time. However, under the Gross Substitutes
condition it is possible to obtain the following much easier, more intuitive and
more well-behaved form of hiring and firing procedure.
A weakly blocking coalition ( j,B) against a state (µ,u) is called a basic
weakly blocking coalition if j = /0 or if j ∈ F and one of the following holds:
(1) B= µ( j)∪{k} for k ∈W \µ( j);
(2) B = (µ( j)∪ {l}) \ {k} for some worker k ∈ µ( j) and some worker
l ∈W \µ( j);
(3) B= µ( j)\{k} for some worker k ∈ µ( j).
A weak coalition improvement with the status quo maintaining rule (µ ′,u′)
of (µ,u) through ( j,B) is called a basic weak coalition improvement with the
status quo maintaining rule if ( j,B) is a basic weakly blocking coalition. With
respect to ( j,B), in Case (1), firm j hires a new worker, in Case (2), firm j
simultaneously dismisses a worker and hires a new worker, and in Case (3),
firm j fires a worker.
It is immediately clear that a basic weakly blocking coalition ( j,B) against
a state (µ,u) occurs if and only if j = /0 or if j ∈ F and one of the following
occurs:
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(1) For a firm j ∈ F and a worker k ∈W \µ( j),
u j+ ∑
i∈µ( j)
(ui+w
j
i )+u(k)+w
j
k < R
j(µ( j)∪{k}).
(2) For a firm j ∈ F , a worker k ∈W \µ( j), and a worker l ∈ µ( j),
u j+ ∑
i∈µ( j)\{l}
(ui+w
j
i )+u(k)+w
j
k < R
j((µ( j)∪{k})\{l}).
(3) For a firm j ∈ F and a worker k ∈ µ( j),
u j+ ∑
i∈µ( j)\{k}
(ui+w
j
i )< R
j(µ( j)\{k}).
The following important characterization is called the Single Improvement
(SI) property and shown by Gul & Stacchetti (1999, 2000) to be equivalent to
the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso & Crawford (1982).
Definition 3 Firm j satisfies the Single Improvement property if for every
salary scheme s j and A 6∈ D j(s j), there exists B ∈ D j(s j) such that R j(B)−
∑i∈B s
j
i > R
j(A)−∑i∈A s ji , |A\B| ≤ 1 and |B\A| ≤ 1.
Next we show that under the Gross Substitutes condition it is indeed
sufficient to consider only basic weakly blocking coalitions.
Theorem 4 Under the Gross Substitutes condition, if there is a weakly
blocking coalition, there must be a basic weakly blocking coalition.
Proof. It suffices to consider blocking coalitions ( j,B) with j ∈ F . Suppose
we are given a weakly blocking coalition ( j,B) for some firm j ∈ F and
worker group B⊆W . By definition, there exists a salary scheme t j such that
t
j
i −w ji ≥ sµ(i)i −wµ(i)i for every i ∈ B and pi j(B, t j)≥ pi j(µ( j),s j) with at least
one strict inequality.
Now define a new salary scheme t˜ j ∈ IRW by
t˜
j
i = s
µ(i)
i −wµ(i)i +w ji , ∀i ∈W. (14)
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Observe that t˜ ji = s
µ(i)
i −wµ(i)i +w ji = s ji for every i ∈ µ( j), and t˜ ji = sµ(i)i −
w
µ(i)
i +w
j
i ≤ t ji −w ji +w ji = t ji for every i ∈ B. Then we have
pi j(B, t˜
j)≥ pi j(B, t j)≥ pi j(µ( j),s j) = pi j(µ( j), t˜ j). (15)
It follows from the definition of ( j,B) that at least one of the two inequalities
in (15) is strict, i.e.,
pi j(B, t˜
j)> pi j(µ( j), t˜
j). (16)
Hence from (16) we have µ( j) 6∈ D j(t˜ j). Now because of the GS condition it
follows from the SI property one of the three cases must occur:
(4) there is a worker k ∈W \µ( j) such that
R j(µ( j)∪{k})− ∑
i∈µ( j)∪{k}
t˜
j
i > R
j(µ( j))− ∑
i∈µ( j)
t˜
j
i .
(5) there are a worker k ∈W \µ( j) and a worker l ∈ µ( j) such that
R j((µ( j)∪{k})\{l})− ∑
i∈(µ( j)∪{k})\{l}
t˜
j
i > R
j(µ( j))− ∑
i∈µ( j)
t˜
j
i .
(6) there is a worker k ∈ µ( j) such that
R j(µ( j)\{k})− ∑
i∈µ( j)\{k}
t˜
j
i > R
j(µ( j))− ∑
i∈µ( j)
t˜
j
i .
Note that t˜ ji −w ji = sµ(i)i −wµ(i)i = ui for all i ∈W due to (14). We first
consider case (4). Since ui = t˜
j
i −w ji = s ji −w ji and t˜ ji = s ji for every i ∈ µ( j),
and u j = R j(µ( j))−∑h∈µ( j) t˜ ji = R j(µ( j))−∑h∈µ( j) s ji , we have
R j(µ( j)∪{k})− ∑
i∈µ( j)
t˜
j
i − t˜ jk > u j
which can be written as
u j+ ∑
i∈µ(i)
(ui+w
j
i )+u(k)+w
j
k < R
j(µ( j)∪{k})
This corresponds to case (1).
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Similarly, using u j = R j(µ( j))−∑h∈µ( j) t˜ ji = R j(µ( j))−∑h∈µ( j) s ji , one
can show that case (5)
R j((µ( j)∪{k})\{l})− ∑
i∈(µ( j)∪{k})\{l}
t˜
j
i > R
j(µ( j))− ∑
i∈µ( j)
t˜
j
i ,
implies case (2)
u j+ ∑
i∈µ( j)\{l}
(ui+w
j
i )+u(k)+w
j
k < R
j((µ( j)∪{k})\{l}),
and that case (6) implies case (3). 
Under the Gross Substitutes condition we can establish the following major
refinement of Theorem 2.
Theorem 5 For the labour market (F,W,R j,w
j
i ) under the Gross Substi-
tutes condition, there exists a finite number of basic weak coalition improve-
ments with the status quo maintaining rule from an arbitrary market state to a
competitive equilibrium.
From this result one can easily write down the corresponding refinement
of Theorem 1 under the Gross Substitutes condition. The proof of the above
theorem follows from the Procedure in the previous section, Theorem 3 and
the next lemma.
Lemma 9 In Step 2 of the Procedure, there exists a finite sequence of basic
weak coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining rule from the
current µ( j) to a maximizer U∗ within µ( j)∪µ∗( j).
Proof. Let pk = uk+w
j
k for every k ∈ µ( j)∪µ∗( j). Consider the following
problem
max R j(X)−u(X)−w j(X) = R j(X)−∑k∈X pk
s.t. X ⊆ µ( j)∪µ∗( j)
Let D j(p) be the collection of optimal solutions to the problem. Since D j(p)
satisfies the Gross Substitutes condition, it satisfies the Single Improvement
property. Consequently, there exists a finite sequence of basic weak coalition
improvements with the status quo maintaining rule from the current µ( j) to a
maximizerU∗ within µ( j)∪µ∗( j). 
It is also possible to obtain a refined version of Theorems 1 and 2 under the
Gross Substitutes and Complements condition of Sun & Yang (2006, 2009).
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6. CONCLUSION
Economic processes are fundamental instruments by which markets are oper-
ated and equilibrium prices or salaries are generated. Such processes can be
roughly classified into two major groups. One group comes out from deliberate
human design, such as auctions, which have been widely used to sell mobile-
phone licenses, electricity, treasure bills, mineral rights, keywords, pollution
permits, and many other commodities and services involving a staggering
value of hundreds of billions of dollars (see Krishna (2002), Klemperer (2004),
and Milgrom (2004)). In some sense, a conscious human design market pro-
cess like auction, matching and school choice design can be regarded as a
visible hand. The other are spontaneous market processes which arise naturally
from human economic action but are not designed by human beings. They
are perhaps literally the “true” invisible hand as conceived by Adam Smith.
Uncoordinated decentralized markets, notably labor markets, are of this nature.
While many important results have been obtained for the first type of market
processes, we have far less understanding of the second. This paper shed light
on the second type of processes—spontaneous market processes—for a large
class of decentralized and uncoordinated markets.
In the paper we have analyzed a general decentralized and uncoordinated
labour market where heterogeneous self-interested firms and workers meet
directly and randomly in pursuit of higher payoffs over time. Each firm hires
as many workers as it wishes. Each worker has preferences over firms and
salaries but takes at most one position. Each economic agent makes her
own decision independently and freely. The information of the market is
dispersed among all separate market participants. In other words, information
is incomplete to every individual. At any time any firm and any group of
workers can form a new coalition if all members in the coalition divide their
joint payoff in such a way that makes no member of the coalition worse off
and at least one member strictly better off. In the process, the firm may
fire some of its own workers and hire workers from other firms and each
deserted firm will at least shortly maintain the status quo for its remaining
workers. An important feature is that in the process the total welfare need not
be monotonic, because every abandoned firm and dismissed worker could be
worse off. As information is incomplete and decision-making is decentralized,
it is natural to assume that this coalition improvement with the status quo
maintaining rule occurs only with a positive probability conditional on the
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current state and time. This spontaneous random decentralized competitive
dynamic process exhibits several salient features that are widely observed in
real life decentralized markets. We have shown that starting with any initial
market state, the spontaneous market process converges almost surely in finite
time to a competitive equilibrium, thus resulting in an efficient allocation of
resources. The result holds true for any competitive market as long as there
exists an equilibrium with an integral vector of equilibrium salaries or prices.
An important example for equilibrium existence is the well-known Gross
Substitutes condition of Kelso & Crawford (1982).
Our study provides a theoretical foundation for affirming Adam Smith’s
Invisible Hand in complex economic environments involving uncertainty, in-
divisibility and incomplete information and sheds new light on a large class
of spontaneous decentralized, random and dynamic market processes. This
study also has interesting and meaningful policy implications: Free markets
can in general achieve an efficient distribution of resources even in a chaotic,
random and imperfect information environment. More specifically, the price
system can play a vital role in efficiently communicating information “in a
system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many
people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different people in
the same way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts
of his plan” as Hayek (1945, pp. 525-527) had believed. A word of caution is
that in order for free markets to perform well, the government should improve
market transparency and offer some coordination among market participants.
Our model is very general and natural in almost all respects but its zero
search cost assumption. An important direction for future research is to
relax this assumption. For instance, firms and workers do not and cannot
always make contact with one another immediately. Firms are trying to find
workers and workers are looking for jobs. This search process usually requires
resources and time, thus creating frictions in the market; see e.g., Diamond
(1971, 1981). How will such search frictions affect efficiency of the market
and convergence of the spontaneous process? Another important question is
to address the computational complexity issue of the random decentralized
dynamic process studied in the current paper.
We hope that the current study will prove to be useful in understanding
fundamental issues concerning spontaneous random decentralized market
processes in the complex world.
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Appendix
A state (µ,u) is weakly blocked by a general coalition B ⊆ F ∪W (i) if
there exists one firm j ∈ B with a payoff vector r ∈ IRB such that
rk ≥ uk for every k ∈ B, and (17)
∑
k∈B
rk = R
j(B\{ j})− ∑
k∈B\{ j}
w
j
k
with at least one strict inequality for (17), or (ii) if the coalition B contains only
one worker i with ri = 0> ui. B is called a general weakly blocking coalition.
Notice that this definition does not require every member of the coalition B to
be individually rational, i.e., rk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ B.
A state is a strict core allocation or a competitive equilibrium if it is not
weakly blocked by any general coalition. See Kelso & Crawford (1982, pp.
1487-1488) for this conventional definition. Below we show that using indi-
vidually rational weakly blocking coalitions can achieve the same competitive
equilibrium.
Lemma 10 If a state (µ,u) is weakly blocked by a general coalition B, it must
be blocked by an individually rational coalition.
Proof. Because B weakly blocks (µ,u), there exists r ∈ IRB such that rk ≥ uk
for every k ∈ B with at least one strict inequality. If rk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ B, we
are done. If there is some rk < 0, then the state (µ,u) is weakly blocked by
the individually rational coalition {k} with the payoff r¯k = 0. 
Lemma 11 A state is a competitive equilibrium if it is not weakly blocked by
any individually rational coalition.
Proof. Let (µ,u) be a market state that is not weakly blocked by any indi-
vidually rational coalition. Suppose that (µ,u) is weakly blocked by a general
coalition B. There exists some k ∈ B such that uk ≤ rk < 0. Then the state
(µ,u) must be weakly blocked by the individually rational coalition {k}, yield-
ing a contradiction. We have shown that (µ,u) is not weakly blocked by any
general coalition and thus must be a competitive equilibrium. 
The above results demonstrate that it is sufficient to focus on individually
rational weakly blocking coalitions.
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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates two hitherto unexplored dimensions inherent in online
sequential auctions, namely, how the time elapsed between the end of an
auction and the end of the next one and the order of presentation on the website
affect prices. Using a state-of-the-art-dataset on train-ticket auctions with a
particular institutional design feature that enables a causal interpretation of
these dimensions, it is demonstrated that both dimensions have a significant
impact on price formation in sequential auctions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
S
equential auction formats are commonly adopted when selling multiple
units of a good within a predetermined time frame. Examples include the
selling of flowers, highway paving contracts, school milk contracts, timber,
and wine Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003). There are several reasons for
the popularity of the format. Firstly, it requires relatively little information
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exchange among the buyers and the auctioneer. Secondly, it easily accom-
modates scenarios in which buyers enter and leave the market. Thirdly, it
allows the auctioneer to allocate items incrementally (Bae et al., 2009). A
formal theoretical analysis of the auction format is, however, not straightfor-
ward. Consequently, much of the attention in the literature has been restricted
to the case when items are identical and buyers have unit-demand. In this
setting, Milgrom & Weber (1982) show that expected prices in a sequence of
second-price auctions (Vickrey, 1961) with identical items should be equal.
The empirical literature has, however, refuted this prediction by showing that
prices are decreasing in rank order, i.e., the order in which the auctions in
the sequence are terminated (see, e.g., Ashenfelter, 1989; McAfee & Vincent,
1993; van den Berg et al., 2001).1 This decreasing price anomaly has been
coined “the afternoon effect” because auctions later in a sequence typically
took place in the afternoon whereas early auctions typically took place in the
morning. Evidence of increasing price sequences has been observed by Raviv
(2006) and Gandal (1997).2 Hence, the phenomenon does not seem universal.
Studying the rank order effect on prices of identical items in sequential
auctions is natural as this is the most easily observed variation in happenstance
auction data; see e.g., van den Berg et al. (2001). This paper takes one step
further and utilizes a state-of-the-art data set on online train-ticket auctions
in Sweden to investigate two hitherto unexplored dimensions inherent in
sequential auctions. The first concerns the order in which the auctioned items
are presented on the website and the second concerns the time elapsed between
auction terminations. Using a particular institutional design, random variation
in these dimensions are exploited to make causal inference of their effect on
prices. In sum, it is found that both these dimensions have a significant impact
on prices.
It has previously been demonstrated that the time elapsed between auctions
in a sequence may affect prices. For example, Andersson et al. (2012) find that
when auction ends are identical, considerable price heterogeneity is observed
1 Ashenfelter (1989), Beggs & Graddy (1997) and Hong et al. (2015) found that this observation
also holds for heterogeneous items. Decreasing price sequences have also been found in
auction formats where auction winners have the option to buy items in subsequent auctions
(Fe´vrier et al., 2007) or when they have the option to place the first bid in subsequent auctions
(Lambson & Thurston, 2006).
2 Ginsburgh (1998) and Deltas & Kosmopoulou (2004) find both increasing and decreasing
price sequences. They argue that these observations could be due to non-strategic absent
bidders who submit their bids previous to the auction start.
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between auctions, and Zeithammer (2006) shows that bids are lower when
similar items are being auctioned off in the near future. On the other hand,
Anwar et al. (2006) observe that bidders are less likely to bid on identical items
if their respective auction end times are far apart. Hence, the time elapsed
between auctions may be an important factor for price formation in sequential
auctions, which calls for further studies. In sequential auctions the time elapsed
between the auctions is, typically, held constant, but the difference between
auction formats could be considerable ranging from just a few minutes up to
several days apart. Typically, however, the exact timing of auctions has seldom
been recorded in previous studies which makes it hard to study the timing effect.
To the contrary, the data investigated in this paper include exact recordings of
auction ends and, moreover, exhibit a random variation between auction ends
(exact details to be described below). This gives a unique possibility to study
the timing effect.
Regarding the presentation order, note that choices in Milgrom & Weber
(1982) are modeled from the perspective of a set of items being auctioned
off. Yet, bidders, in real life, typically face lists of items being auctioned
off and the presentation order on the list may influence their decisions. This
may create a “primacy effect”, i.e., items with a high position on a list are
more prominent than items with a low position. A reversed “recency effect”
means that items placed low are more prominent than items placed high(see,
e.g., Rubinstein & Salant, 2006, for a discussion).3 Deltas & Kosmopoulou
(2004) study sequential auctions of rare books. The books are described
in an auction catalogue and placed in alphabetical order so, although being
heterogenous items, they are seemingly randomly placed. They find an overall
increasing price pattern and, furthermore, that books described further down in
the catalogue receive fewer bids from e-mail bidders.4 This suggests a primacy
effect. However, in their data, the rank order is identical to the presentation
order and, as a consequence, their result may also be due to a rank-order effect
effect or a combination of the two. This paper seeks to separate the effect of
rank order to that of the timing and presentation order.
3 In the literature on sponsored search (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2011) and position auctions (e.g.,
Edelman et al., 2007), evidence of a primacy effect, from the perspective of the seller, is found.
Recently, a primacy effect has been found in terms of downloads of new working papers from
the NBER website (Feenberg et al., 2015).
4 Bids could be submitted by e-mail before the auction start or placed “on the floor” during the
auction.
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This paper uses data from more than 42,000 online train ticket auctions
grouped into 7,200 sequential auctions.5 From the perspective of the bidders,
each ticket in a sequential auction is completely homogenous in terms of its
characteristics (route, class, and time of departure), its seller (the state-owned
train company), its reserve price (1 SEK), and its transaction cost (literally
zero as tickets are delivered by an SMS text message to the buyer). This
feature is quite rare in the literature on sequential auctions. In fact, the only
variables that vary within an group of sequential auctions are the termination
time of the auctions, i.e., their rank order (the first auction has rank order
one, the second two, and so on), and the order in which they are presented
on the auction website, i.e., presentation order (the auction presented at the
very top of the website has presentation order one, and so forth). In every
sequential auction sequence, each ticket is assigned an auction number which
determines the presentation order on the auction website. Moreover, each ticket
auction in a sequence is set to end within a given hour. However, the exact
ending minute of each auction is determined by a random draw. Consequently,
the rank order is different from the presentation order and the time elapsed
between two consecutive auction ends is random. These novel design features
are used to identify and separate the effect of rank order to that of the timing
and presentation order (i.e., it is a natural field experiment in the terminology
of Harrison & List, 2004). To the best of our knowledge, this article is the
first to make this separation and causally estimate how these dimensions affect
prices in sequential auctions.6
The analysis reveals that the presentation order has a non-linear impact on
prices, so that it pays off to be first or last in the list. Moreover, if ending times
of two consecutive auctions are close, this has a negative impact on prices
in both auctions. However, the relationship shows substantial non-linearities
so being placed far apart also depresses prices. From an auction-designer’s
perspective, these insights are important when trying to curb the afternoon
effect to secure higher revenues. Finally, in line with the bulk of the previous
empirical literature, a negative rank order effect (i.e., an afternoon effect)
is found. We also note that the rank order effect is essentially unchanged
when controlling for presentation order and timing and, hence, a substantial
part of the anomaly persists indicating that further research is needed to fully
5 See Bajari & Hortacsu (2004) for an excellent summary of internet-auction studies.
6 However, using field experiments to study behavior in auctions is not new. See, for example,
Lucking-Reiley (1999), List & Lucking-Reiley (2000), or Grether et al. (2015).
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understand the afternoon effect.
The remaining part of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 describes
the sequential online auction format. The data are described and analyzed in
Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 concludes that paper. The Appendix
contains some additional estimations.
2. THE SEQUENTIAL TRAIN TICKET AUCTION
Statens Ja¨rnva¨gar (SJ, henceforth) is a publicly owned company that mainly
runs passenger trains in Sweden. In 2007, they began to auction train tickets on
the eBay-owned website Tradera which is the leading auction site in Sweden.7
This section describes the sequential auction mechanism that was adopted by
SJ on November 15, 2010 and for the duration of the collected data.
Before introducing the notion of a sequence of auctions, it is noted that
each train ticket is auctioned off in a separate auction. More specifically,
each ticket is displayed on the website of Tradera exactly at 9pm at date t,
and the following information is available for potential bidders; (i) date of
departure, (ii) the “time block” when the train departures (05:00am–09:59am,
10:00am–02:59pm, or 03:00pm–08:59pm), (iii) departure station, and (iv) final
destination. The reserve price of a ticket is always set to 1 SEK (approximately
0.11 USD). Bidders place bids by entering a maximum amount that they are
willing to pay for the ticket. An automatic bidder (a proxy bidding agent)
places bids on behalf of the agent using an automatic bid increment amount
which depends on the current standing bid. The proxy bidder will only bid as
much as necessary to make sure that the bidder remains the highest bidder up
to the bidder’s maximum amount (note that a bidder’s maximum willingness
to pay is kept confidential until it is exceeded by another bidder). The winner
is the bidder with the highest bid when the auction ends, and the winner pays
one bid increment above the highest losing bid. In this sense, each train ticket
auction resembles a second-price auction (Vickrey, 1961) even if it can be
argued that it is a hybrid between a second-price and a first-price auction due to
the role of the bid increment (see Hickman, 2010).8 Upon winning an auction,
7 Because the train ticket auctions are organized by SJ, the tickets are not resales. See Yoshimoto
& Nakabayashi (2016) for a recent paper on resales of train tickets in Japan.
8 It has also been noted by Hickman (2010), Hickman et al. (2011) and Tukiainen (2013) that
bid shading may be optimal when the price is set to one increment above highest loosing bid.
However, we conjecture that this issue is orthogonal to what we study here as the bid shading
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the winning bidder is directly asked to fill in his name and cell phone number,
and the ticket is subsequently sent as a personal ticket by an SMS text message.
This final feature makes it hard to resell a previously-won ticket, if the name
and phone number of that buyer were not available to the auction winner at the
time of winning the auction.
Two tickets are considered to be identical if conditions (i)–(iv) from the
above are identical as there is no way of distinguishing between the tickets.
A set of auctions with identical tickets is called a sequential auctions (SA,
henceforth). Each ticket auction in a SA is given an auction number which
determines the presentation order on the website, i.e., the auction with the
lowest number is displayed highest up on the website and has presentation
order 1, the auction that is displayed second highest up has presentation order
2, and so on.
The rank order of an auction within a given SA is defined as the order in
which the auction is terminated, i.e., the auction that terminates first in a given
SA has rank order 1, the auction that terminates second in the same SA has
rank order 2, and so forth. Each auction in a SA ends on date t+2 between
9pm and 10pm, but more importantly, the exact ending minute of the auction
is determined by a random draw from a uniform distribution on [0,59] that is
made before the auction is announced on the website. As a consequence, the
rank order and the presentation order for a ticket in a given SA may differ, and,
moreover, the time span between two consecutive auctions in a SA is random.
Hence, this allows us to disentangle the effect of timing and presentation order
from that of the rank order effect. Yet, we note that the presentation order
is based on the default ordering on the website and a bidder may alter this
ordering by using different filters (e.g., auction ending time) which may put a
downward bias on how our definition of presentation order affects prices.
3. DATA DESCRIPTION
The data set consists of all train tickets sold by SJ on Tradera during the
period 2010–11–15 to 2011–06–14. In total, 42,007 tickets were sold for 42
different departure–destination routes during this period. These tickets can
be partitioned into 7,202 sequential auctions with a total of more than 15,000
participating bidders.
will be constant within an auction sequence.
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Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of interest by route. As can
be seen from Table 1, some routes, usually from and/or to small communities,
contain very few observations. These may be routes where auctions failed to
generate enough bidding or “trial routes” that were discontinued. In addition,
some particular routes, typically only the most popular ones (e.g., Go¨teborg C
– Stockholm C), contain a few sequential auctions with very long sequences.
In the empirical analysis, we exclude the 10 routes with fewer than 100 tickets,
and all sequential auctions containing more than 15 tickets. We also exclude
auctions with only one bidder. Given these restrictions, the reduced dataset
still contains 5,999 sequential auctions with a varying number of bidders and
tickets.
Table 1: Summary statistics for the considered departure–destination routes.
Departure – Destination #A #B/A (mean) #B/A (sd) #SA Price (mean) Price (sd) Min price Max price
Arvika stn – Stockholm C 13 2.2 1.3 5 51.8 114.2 1.0 330.0
Duved stn – Stockholm C 166 2.5 1.2 41 72.4 87.9 1.0 350.0
Falun C – Stockholm C 2393 3.5 1.5 433 70.5 51.9 1.0 263.0
Go¨teborg C – Kalmar C 5 1.2 0.4 5 1.2 0.4 1.0 2.0
Go¨teborg C – Koebenhavn H 470 4.0 1.8 119 63.2 51.4 1.0 235.0
Go¨teborg C – Malmo¨ C 885 3.6 1.7 184 68.5 55.1 1.0 265.0
Go¨teborg C – Oesterport 559 3.8 1.8 103 56.8 50.4 1.0 280.0
Go¨teborg C – Stockholm C 5385 5.5 2.6 480 188.2 141.2 1.0 900.0
Go¨teborg C – Sundsvall C 2 1.0 0.0 1 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Halmstad C – Stockholm C 111 5.0 2.4 27 213.0 147.2 1.0 500.0
Hudiksvall stn – Stockholm C 3 1.7 1.2 1 2.3 2.3 1.0 5.0
Kalmar C – Go¨teborg C 2 1.0 0.0 2 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Karlstad C – Stockholm C 2548 3.3 1.7 564 81.7 82.9 1.0 460.0
Kiruna C – Lulea˚ C 416 2.2 1.1 177 50.0 61.5 1.0 245.0
Koebenhavn H – Go¨teborg C 281 4.1 1.6 70 75.1 51.0 1.0 250.0
Koebenhavn H – Stockholm C 147 5.9 2.2 44 193.9 117.0 1.0 560.0
Lulea˚ C – Kiruna C 400 2.3 1.2 169 60.3 67.7 1.0 280.0
Lulea˚ C – Narvik 379 2.2 1.1 158 51.5 62.8 1.0 389.0
Malmo¨ C – Go¨teborg C 951 3.6 1.7 217 67.7 59.6 1.0 305.0
Malmo¨ C – Stockholm C 3219 5.6 2.3 437 205.9 124.9 1.0 710.0
Mora stn – Stockholm C 3 1.7 0.6 1 6.7 8.1 1.0 16.0
Narvik – Lulea˚ C 370 2.1 1.2 161 45.8 59.6 1.0 327.0
Odense – Stockholm C 23 5.3 2.3 5 144.9 114.6 7.0 370.0
Oesterport – Go¨teborg C 925 3.5 1.7 152 54.1 48.1 1.0 231.0
Oesterport – Stockholm C 219 6.4 2.3 53 264.5 141.8 4.0 630.0
Stockholm C – Borla¨nge C 392 3.0 1.5 105 50.8 47.3 1.0 260.0
Stockholm C – Duved stn 178 2.8 2.0 50 85.0 121.9 1.0 491.0
Stockholm C – Falun C 2098 3.3 1.7 447 63.1 56.5 1.0 295.0
Stockholm C – Go¨teborg C 5411 5.0 2.8 469 169.1 157.2 1.0 1075.0
Stockholm C – Halmstad C 45 3.3 2.5 14 122.0 153.1 1.0 598.0
Stockholm C – Karlstad C 2582 3.1 1.6 487 70.6 79.2 1.0 510.0
Stockholm C – Koebenhavn H 224 5.7 2.3 73 240.6 130.8 1.0 667.0
Stockholm C – Malmo¨ C 1931 5.8 2.2 347 234.7 136.8 1.0 1225.0
Stockholm C – Odense 4 4.3 0.5 1 169.8 65.6 105.0 261.0
Stockholm C – Oesterport 786 4.9 2.3 166 193.9 147.8 1.0 1125.0
Stockholm C – Sundsvall C 3176 3.8 1.8 451 104.5 96.5 1.0 550.0
Stockholm C – A˚re stn 508 3.3 1.8 106 117.4 121.1 1.0 550.0
Stockholm C – O¨stersund C 597 3.5 1.4 158 129.6 120.6 1.0 760.0
Sundsvall C – Stockholm C 3095 4.2 1.9 449 119.2 95.8 1.0 600.0
A˚nge stn – Stockholm C 1 1.0 – 1 1.0 – 1.0 1.0
A˚re stn – Stockholm C 379 3.7 2.0 84 126.0 115.3 1.0 580.0
O¨stersund C – Stockholm C 725 4.0 1.9 185 150.7 132.4 1.0 810.0
Total 42007 4.3 2.3 7202 129.6 125.8 1.0 1225.0
Notes: A set of auctions with identical tickets is called a sequential auctions or SA for short.
#A = number of auctions, #B/A = number of bidders per auction, #SA = number of SA, and
sd = standard deviation.
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Table 2: The effects of rank order, presentation order, and timing on prices.
Dependent variable: Price Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Rank order -3.863*** -3.837*** -4.133***
(0.850) (0.850) (0.840)
Rank order2 0.140* 0.138* 0.159**
(0.0739) (0.0740) (0.0732)
Presentation order -1.260*** -0.988**
(0.461) (0.460)
Presentation order2 0.0815** 0.0644*
(0.0383) (0.0380)
Minutes to previous 2.802***
(0.224)
Minutes to previous2 -0.0964***
(0.0108)
Minutes to next 1.615***
(0.215)
Minutes to next2 -0.0568***
(0.0104)
Constant 154.0*** 157.2*** 141.8***
(2.079) (2.329) (2.513)
Observations 18,718 18,718 18,718
R-squared 0.011 0.012 0.031
Number of SA 5,036 5,036 5,036
Notes: Sample restricted by excluding first and last auction to make samples in the three
models identical. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
4. ANALYSIS
A linear fixed effects model where each SA is treated as an unbalanced panel
is estimated in the sample. The chosen specifications are quite flexible as
we allow for quadratic terms in all variables of interest. Table 2 shows the
main estimation results. Model (1) is the baseline model in which no controls
for presentation order and timing are included. Model (2) includes a control
for presentation order, and Model (3) also includes controls for timing by
measuring the distance, in minutes, to the previous (“Minutes to previous”)
and next (“Minutes to next”) auction in a SA.9 Model (1) confirms the existence
9 Note that the sample is kept constant in Models (1)–(3), i.e., since the first and last auctions
in a SA must be excluded in Model (3), to include the timing variables, these auctions are
also absent in Models (1) and (2). Table 4 in the Appendix reports the results where Models
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of an afternoon effect when not controlling for timing and presentation order.
This is in line with previous findings in the literature, e.g., Ashenfelter (1989),
McAfee & Vincent (1993), and van den Berg et al. (2001).
The left panel in Figure 1 shows the estimated average marginal effect of
rank order on prices for Model (3) in Table 2, and it illustrates that the negative
price trend continues to hold also for high rank orders even though the effect
is diminishing as the rank order increases. The right panel in Figure 1 shows
the estimated marginal effect of presentation order on prices for Model (3) in
Table 2. From the figure, it can be seen that the optimal placement, from the
perspective of the seller, is at the top of the website. This indicates a primacy
effect and corroborates previous findings from sponsored search literature
(see, e.g., Agarwal et al., 2011). However, in contrast to the literature on
sponsored search, where the items are heterogenous and their position usually
is determined by a position auction (see, e.g., Edelman et al., 2007; Varian,
2007), the train tickets in a given SA are completely homogenous. Note also
that even though there is a negative effect associated with presentation order,
the effective size is less than half the effect of the rank order of the auction. As
noted earlier, this may be partly explained by bidders using filters to re-order
the presentation of tickets.
The left panel (right panel) in Figure 2 shows the distribution in minutes to
the next (previous) auction, and the right panel (left panel) in Figure 3 shows
the estimated average effect of time from subsequent (previous) auction on
prices for for Model (3) in Table 2. As can be seen in the figure, there is
an upward sloping trend for small time differences. This trend can, at least
partly, be explained by the results in Andersson et al. (2012) and the theoretical
predictions in Zeithammer (2006). The former suggests that if auction ends
are identical, bidders may have problems cross bidding, i.e., it may be difficult
for bidders to coordinate bids between auctions with similar termination times.
The latter, on the other hand, suggests that bidders are more likely to be forward
looking when subsequent auctions are closer which makes bidders less willing
to place high bids in the current auction.
In general, the timing effect shows an inverted U-shape to the previous
(subsequent) auction. One potential explanation for this price hike is that
the more time that has passed since the previous auction ended, the more
(1) and (2) include the first and last auction in a SA. The results are qualitatively similar but
coefficients on rank order is smaller. The model is also estimated using the full sample in
Table 5 in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of rank order.
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bidders have been able to enter and place bids in the current auction. The fact
that timing seems to matter for the evolution of price sequences is interesting
and we have not found any such result in the literature. According to the
estimations, the optimal timing is to have auction ends approximately 15
minutes apart, which may counteract the rank order effect.
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of timing.
4.1. Unit-demand Bidders
The previous analysis shows that both the time elapsed between auction ends
and the presentation order are important for price formation in sequential
auctions, but that they cannot fully explain the negative rank order effect (i.e.,
the afternoon effect). One possible explanation of the latter finding is that
the analysis in Milgrom & Weber (1982) explicitly considers unit-demand
bidders. Unfortunately, as in many real-world applications and all empirical
studies on sequential auctions, it is not possible to observe whether bidders
have unit-demand or not. What is possible to observe in the current study,
however, is the number of tickets within a specific SA that a particular bidder
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has won.10
Table 3: The effects of rank order, presentation order, and timing on prices
(unit demand).
Dependent variable: Price Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Rank order -1.551* -1.529* -4.720***
(0.897) (0.893) (1.522)
Rank order2 0.162 0.161 0.270*
(0.0995) (0.0991) (0.143)
Presentation order -1.590** -1.020
(0.792) (0.993)
Presentation order2 0.130 0.0825
(0.0833) (0.0988)
Minutes to previous 3.151***
(0.343)
Minutes to previous2 -0.104***
(0.0148)
Minutes to next 1.978***
(0.360)
Minutes to next2 -0.0618***
(0.0165)
Constant 165.4*** 168.5*** 149.5***
(1.676) (2.231) (4.559)
Observations 14,035 14,035 7,463
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.031
Number of SA 3,496 3,496 2,661
Notes: Sample restricted to SA’s where each bidder won at most one ticket. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
In Table 3, the same set of regressions as in Table 4 are run but restricting
the sample to situations where each bidder in the SA only won at most one
auction. As can be seen from the table, the rank order effect is still negative
but smaller and now only significant at the ten percent level for Models (1)
and (2). Model (3) is more inline with its full-sample counterpart, displaying
a sizable negative rank order effect. Results from the first two specifications
10 In the investigated auction, it was possible to buy multiple train tickets. However, it should be
noticed that each ticket was personal and a ticket holder may have had to show identification
when validating the ticket with the conductor. It is, however, unknown to the authors whether
this institution was strictly enforced or not. Another possibility to buy multiple tickets was to
place bids using different accounts on the auction platform.
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suggest that multi-unit demand may partly help to explain the decreasing price
anomaly. Yet, the third specification suggests not. What is special with this last
specification, except for controlling for timing effects, is that it excludes the
first and the last auction in a SA. If the price drop is most notable in the very
first auction, then this may explain the effect but there is no way to tell if this is
true or not given the limitations of the data. Finally, note that the coefficients on
timing are intact to the sample restriction. The size of the effect of presentation
order are similar albeit insignificant under the third specification, which may
be explained by the smaller sample.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated how prices are affected by the time elapsed be-
tween auction ends and the presentation order on the website. It has been
demonstrated that the presentation order on the auction website has a signif-
icant impact on prices. Yet, the effect follows a U-shape. Hence, it pays off
to be one of the first or last auctions presented. When it comes to the effect
on prices of the time elapsed between two consecutive auctions, it is found
that having closeness in the time dimension has a negative impact on prices in
both auctions. Consequently, the policy implication for the auction designer is
that one should be careful in posting two auctions “too close” to each other
as it may result in lower prices for both items. Moreover, by randomizing the
presentation order, the primacy effect may be down-played, but as it is hard to
inherently control this order, its effect on prices may be small.
Received theory predicts that prices in a sequence of auctions with identical
items should be equal. Yet, even when controlling for presentation order, the
timing of auctions, and by restricting the dataset to unit-demand bidders, it
is found that average auction prices are declining in a sequence. This further
strengthens the anomalous findings (i.e., the afternoon effect) in the existing
empirical auction literature. Given this insight, it is logical to search for a
theoretical explanation of this phenomenon that can be empirically tested.
Unfortunately, none of the theoretical explanations that we are aware of (e.g.,
Ashenfelter, 1989; McAfee & Vincent, 1993; von der Fehr, 1994; Mezzetti,
2011; Rosato, 2014) have predictions that can be tested empirically unless esti-
mates of the risk preferences, loss aversion or participation costs are available.
The problem of finding alternative theoretical explanations to the afternoon
effect is left for future research.
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6. APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL ESTIMATIONS
Table 4 describes the re-estimation of the models in Table 2 but allowing the
sample to vary over the three models. Table 5 replicates the estimation in Table
2 but using the full sample.
Table 4: The effects of rank order, presentation order, and timing on prices.
Dependent variable: Price Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Rank order -2.788*** -2.767*** -4.133***
(0.566) (0.567) (0.840)
Rank order2 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.159**
(0.0542) (0.0543) (0.0732)
Presentation order -0.966** -0.988**
(0.404) (0.460)
Presentation order2 0.0531 0.0644*
(0.0347) (0.0380)
Minutes to previous 2.802***
(0.224)
Minutes to previous2 -0.0964***
(0.0108)
Minutes to next 1.615***
(0.215)
Minutes to next2 -0.0568***
(0.0104)
Constant 154.5*** 157.0*** 141.8***
(1.199) (1.470) (2.513)
Observations 29,927 29,927 18,718
Number of SA 5,999 5,999 5,036
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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Table 5: The effects of rank order, presentation order, and timing on prices.
Full sample.
Dependent variable: Price Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Rank order -3.235*** -3.209*** -4.094***
(0.237) (0.237) (0.258)
Rank order2 0.0335*** 0.0329*** 0.0473***
(0.00554) (0.00556) (0.00679)
Presentation order -0.527*** -0.318***
(0.117) (0.121)
Presentation order2 0.00204 -0.00126
(0.00313) (0.00315)
Minutes to previous 3.173***
(0.190)
Minutes to previous2 -0.113***
(0.00933)
Minutes to next 1.729***
(0.182)
Minutes to next2 -0.0620***
(0.00884)
Constant 144.4*** 146.9*** 132.9***
(1.084) (1.186) (1.620)
Observations 42,007 42,007 27,778
R-squared 0.033 0.034 0.076
Number of SA 7,202 7,202 6,145
Notes: Full sample. In Model (3) first and last auction in SA is excluded due to timing
variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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ABSTRACT
We examine Kindergarten allocation practices in an Estonian municipality,
Harku. Based on our recommendations, the allocation mechanism in Harku
was redesigned in 2016. The new mechanism produces a child-optimal stable
matching, with priorities primarily based on siblings and distance. We evaluate
seven policy designs based on 2016 admission data in order to understand
efficiency and fairness trade-offs. In addition to the descriptive data analysis,
we conduct a counter-factual policy comparison and sensitivity analysis using
computational experiments with generated preferences. We fix the allocation
mechanism to be the child-oriented Deferred-Acceptance algorithm, but we
vary how the priorities are created by altering sibling and distance factors.
Different lotteries are included for breaking ties. We find that different ways
of considering the same priority factors can have a significant aggregate effect
on the allocation. Additionally, we survey a dozen special features that can
create significant challenges (both theoretical and practical) in redesigning the
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allocation mechanism in Estonian Kindergartens, and potentially elsewhere as
well.
Keywords: Kindergarten allocation; policy design; mechanism design
JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D47, D50, H75
1. INTRODUCTION
F
amilies have become a much-debated issue in all developed countries
and they form the focal point of debates about “new risks” and the much
needed “new policies” for Western welfare states. The questions of who should
care for children, to what extent and for how long, lie at the centre of conflicts
about the values that shape not only policies and struggles around policies, but
also individual and family choices (Saraceno, 2011). Moreover, in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet legacy has paved the way for the dominance of publicly
provided care, but in many countries, including the case examined here, there is
a shortage of early childhood care places for children aged 18 months to three
years. This shortage of places has forced municipalities, who are the main
providers, to set priorities for the allocation of these places. Priorities are aimed
not only at solving the problem of oversubscription, but also at implementing
social goals. Thus, we conceptualise the process of implementing priorities
accompanied with allocation principles (matching design) as policy design.
Policy design entails taking the approach of a matching mechanism design
in order to propose a good way to allocate children to Kindergartens. There are
process descriptions about the (re-)design of school choice mechanisms, e.g.
in various cities in the US (Pathak & So¨nmez, 2013; Pathak & Shi, 2013; Ergin
& So¨nmez, 2006) and in Amsterdam (de Haan et al., 2015). Nevertheless, to
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to report such a redesign of a
Kindergarten place allocation mechanism. However, our theoretical foundation
relies on the mechanism design literature motivated by related applications,
such as school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 2003; Abdulkadirog˘lu et
al., 2005a), college admissions (Biro´ et al., 2010b; S.-H. Chen et al., 2012)
and job assignments (Roth, 2008). Mechanism design provides methods for
allocation under given welfare criteria and selection priorities, but it does not
prescribe the way in which these priorities should be applied. The general
policy considerations for school choice are the allocation of siblings to the
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same school and the proximity of the school. Some countries also use some
affirmative action measures, e.g. prioritising children of low socio-economic
status. Similar principles are applicable to our Kindergarten policy design case
study while aiming for the clear-cut implementation and operationalisation
of policies. The latter not only concerns a clear definition of proximity as
a priority (i.e. defined as a walk-zone (Shi, 2015) or a continuous cardinal
measure (West et al., 2004)) or the ordering of priority classes but also allows
for the implementation of welfare considerations in policy evaluation.
Our welfare considerations aim at two social goals: efficiency and fairness.
We define efficiency as the ability of a policy to meet predefined goals, the
utility of families (high rank in their preferences and siblings in the same
Kindergarten) accompanied with social goals such as minimising the travel
distance or time to Kindergartens. Defining fairness is more problematic and
entails more uncertainty. Our definition of fairness is based on the idea of
equal access. It is operationalised by the probability that the child is assigned
to her first preference.
Our study considers a local municipality Harku, in Estonia. Instead of
implementing certain social goals by policy design, the most commonly used
priority in Estonian municipalities is the date of application, while in limited
cases, catchment areas are applied to ensure proximity. Children are ordered
on the basis of the application date in a manner similar to a serial dictatorship
mechanism, thus forcing one-sided matchings without enabling the imple-
mentation of affirmative action policies or social goals, such as fairness. In
addition, parental preferences are either not considered or have been limited.
In the Harku case, the number of preferences was bounded by three until 2015.
The latter restriction implies that preferences are not revealed truthfully and
moreover, the matching has been done manually.
Between 2014 and 2016, as part of an Estonian project we collaborated with
representatives of the Harku municipality. We monitored their 2015 allocation
practice and suggested a revision which led to a transitory system in 2016.
In the 2016 allocation, the standard student-proposing Deferred-Acceptance
mechanism was used under a special priority setting which is described in
detail in Section 2.2. This mechanism is known to be strategy-proof, and the
parents were encouraged to submit full preference lists, so we can expect the
submitted applications to be truthful. We made a comparative assessment of
policies using the 2016 data. As an input we used preference data collected
from 152 families who have the right to a Kindergarten place.
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In the assessment, we proposed seven different policies which consist of
different metrics of indicating distance (as absolute, relative or binary mea-
sures), siblings, quotas; and their priority order. Ties are broken by assigning
random numbers either with a single or with multiple lotteries. Our research
methods are partially inspired by Shi (2015), but we investigated some novel
policies as well. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these policies is the
way that distance is used in the priorities.
The classic way of creating proximity priorities is the catchment area
system, where the city is partitioned into areas and the students living in an
area have the highest priority in all schools in that area. This simple method can
be seen as unfair, as one student can have a higher priority than another student,
even though the actual distance of her location to the school is greater than
for the other child. Therefore instead of catchment areas, most applications
have switched to absolute or relative distance based priorities. The simplest
absolute distance based policy is the walk-zone priority scheme, used in many
US cities (e.g. New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a)), where the children
living within a well-defined walking distance are in the high distance priority
group for that school and the ties are broken by lottery. Strict priorities based
on absolute distances are used in Sweden as well (Andersson, 2017). However,
there were also discussions and court cases about the fairness of such absolute
distance based priorities1.
The absolute distance based priority schemes can be unfair for those living
far from all (or most) of the (good) schools, therefore the so-called relative
distance based methods are also commonly used in many applications (e.g.
Calsamiglia & Gu¨ell (2014); Shi (2015)). The relative distance priority means
that we give the highest priority to all children for their closest Kindergarten,
no matter how far that is, and the children will be in the second priority group
in their second closest Kindergarten, and so on. A rough version of this rule is
to give high priority for all children in a given number of closest schools.
Barcelona changed its catchment area systems to a relative distance system
in 2007. After the change, students have priority in at least six of their closest
1 In the city of Lund parents have challenged allocation decisions in court based on an alternative
option distance argument. The city used the absolute distance priority in their allocation, but
some parents have found this policy unfair, as they would have to travel 1000m more to their
second choice school than to their first choice school, whilst there was another student who
would only need to travel 650m more if allocated to their second choice school rather than
their first choice school. The court accepted this argument and gave a seat to the appealing
student in their first choice school.
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schools (Calsamiglia & Gu¨ell, 2014, Section 5.1)2. In Boston, another relative
distance policy was proposed recently by Shi (2015), mainly in order to reach
the city’s aim to cut down busing costs.
Note that there are also applications where the distance based priorities are
considered unfair, as they can limit equal access to good schools. The Ams-
terdam school choice system (de Haan et al., 2015) does not use any distance
based priority, only a pure lottery. In the Harku case, where Kindergartens are
of more or less the same quality, the authority was in favour of using the dis-
tance based priorities in order to decrease the overall commuting costs and also
to satisfy the preferences of the parents (typically for nearby Kindergartens).
Based on the unfairness of the catchment area system described above, we
only considered absolute and relative distance based priority approaches. We
explain the distance-based priorities that we studied in more detail in Section 3
with examples.
Besides the distance, we also investigated different ways of taking the
sibling priorities into account and also the way the lotteries are conducted
in case of ties. The way the distance and sibling factors are considered has
already been studied in the literature (Dur et al., 2013). The particular solution
chosen for the 2016 transitory system is an interesting rotation priority scheme,
which can lead to a well-balanced solution with respect to the two factors.
Regarding the lotteries, we analysed the effects of using a single lottery for all
Kindergartens compared to using multiple lotteries (one at each Kindergarten),
and we have seen results similar to other research papers (Ashlagi & Nikzad,
2015).
As the second main contribution of our paper, we present a sensitivity
analysis of various metrics of fairness and efficiency of policy designs based
on counter-factual preference profiles. The policies that provide the best
solutions for the current Harku data may not be ideal for other applications or
robust for Harku, where the preferences of the parents are different. This can
be the case in cities, or in other countries with different Kindergarten/school
qualities, or for applications at different education levels (e.g. primary and
2 “Before 2007, the city was divided into fixed neighbourhoods. The neighbourhoods varied
in size for semi-public and public schools, but were conceptually the same. For semi-public
schools, the neighbourhood coincided with the administrative district. For public schools, the
neighbourhoods were smaller areas within the administrative district. The new neighbourhoods
are based on distance between schools and family residences. An area (specifically, a minimum
convex polygon) around every block of houses in the city was established to include at least
the six closest schools (three public and three semi-public).”
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secondary schools). Therefore, we found it important to investigate the effects
of changes in priorities in the performance of different policies (i.e. different
priority structures for the student-optimal Deferred-Acceptance mechanism).
As a novel approach, we studied the fairness (or equal access) of the allocations
measured by the probabilities of getting placed in the first choice schools.
In general our results indicate that preference structures, more precisely
their endogeneity with respect to proximity, influence policy design. However,
we advocate a relatively simple policy that prioritises siblings first and relative
distance second. Relative distance gives all children priority in the closest
Kindergarten independently of absolute distance from it. This policy is superior
to others by our fairness criteria, especially when preferences of the families
are aligned with policy priorities.
We structure our paper as follows. In Section 2 we review the practices
and processes of Kindergarten choice of an Estonian municipality, Harku,
before the process was redesigned on the basis of our recommendations in
2016. In Section 3 we define seven alternative policies and the descriptive
statistics of our data, including our results from computational experiments.
Finally, we discuss additional mechanism design challenges with some policy
recommendations in Section 4 and give conclusions in Section 5.
2. MATCHING MECHANISM DESIGN
The design of an allocation mechanism is usually based on a two-sided match-
ing market model, in this case between 1) families and 2) Kindergartens.
Participants on both sides have linear orderings over the participants on the
other side. Families have preferences over Kindergartens and they seek to get
places at their most preferred Kindergartens. Kindergartens have a priority
ranking over children. Priorities become important if there are fewer places
available in a particular Kindergarten than the number of families who would
like to be allocated to that Kindergarten. In those circumstances, Kindergartens
accept children who are higher on their priority list, which in practice usually
means children who live closer and/or who have a sibling in the Kindergarten.
Kindergartens do not seek to admit higher priority children. This practice is
different from some applications of two-sided markets. In college admissions
for example (Gale & Shapley, 1962), both students and colleges seek to get
more preferred matches, therefore they might act strategically in the allocation
mechanism.
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There are two prominent strategy-proof mechanisms for solving matching
problems, the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) and the Top-Trading Cycles (TTC)
mechanisms (Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 2003). The DA mechanism guaran-
tees that no preferences and priorities (policies in our case) are violated, and
there is no child who could get a place in a more preferred Kindergarten by
priority, so there are no blocking pairs. A matching with no blocking pairs is
called stable. A blocking pair can also be seen as a child having justified envy,
since there is a family that would prefer a Kindergarten that either has free
places or has accepted a child with lower priority. These kinds of justified envy
situations are not tolerated in most applications (Pathak & So¨nmez, 2013), and
are sometimes even prohibited by law. Thus, stability is a crucial property for
most applications.
While there are potentially a number of stable allocations (Knuth, 1997),
the child-proposing DA mechanism that is usually implemented results in the
best possible preference for all families among the stable solutions, and this
option also makes it safe for the families to reveal their true preferences.
The theoretical properties and disadvantages of DAwere studied by Haeringer
& Klijn (2009), backed by evidence from laboratory experiments (Calsamiglia
et al., 2010) and by practical applications across the world (Pathak & So¨nmez,
2013). In addition to advocating DA, the main policy implications of these
studies indicate that for an efficiency gain, it is advised to increase the bounds
on the number of collected preferences or to abolish the limit on the number
of submitted preferences.
Before its redesign, the application process of the Harku municipality had
many design features, but it was not a transparent system. Families could
submit up to three ordered choices. The application date and the home address
were also collected. The application date was relevant for the allocation, as
families with an earlier application date had higher priority. Therefore, families
tended to submit their applications as early as possible, usually a few weeks
after the birth of the child. The application data typically remained unchanged
until the actual allocation occurred, which could make the originally true
preferences out of date (e.g. it was possible that the family moved to a different
place or their older sibling has received a place in a different Kindergarten
during the waiting period). The address could be a factor, as some heads of
Kindergartens considered it when assigning places. Secondly, a qualifying
condition for a Kindergarten place is that the parents have to be registered
residents in Harku, and residency is based on where local taxes are collected.
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Moreover, the matching was done manually using the following procedural
rules. First, the number of vacant places was settled by January of each year,
when the allocation process started. Place offers were made to families by the
heads of Kindergartens if their Kindergarten was the first choice of the family.
Second, if there were more families than places, then priority was given to
the applications with earlier registration dates, although proximity or siblings
could also be occasionally relevant. Third, if an offer was accepted, the child
became assigned to the Kindergarten, otherwise that place was offered to the
subsequent family on the waiting list.
In the case of unassigned children, the procedural rules where complicated
and discretionary. Generally the heads of the Kindergarten communicated
with each other to find a place for the children who remained unassigned. In
the case of families who ordered popular Kindergarten at the top of their list
and remained unassigned in the first round, their second or third choice was
considered, although these could already be full. If that was the case, the
families with an earlier application date would be rejected from their second
choice because the children already assigned there had listed that Kindergarten
as their first preference, irrespective of their application dates. Thus, some
children were allocated to a less preferred Kindergarten, simply because of
how the family ordered their preferences. This is a well-known property of
the Immediate-Acceptance mechanism (e.g. Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 2003)
and the procedure that had been used in Harku until 2015 was very similar to
this.
2.1. Building a mechanism for Kindergarten seat allocation
Our redesign of the Harku Kindergarten allocation mechanism inspired by
the literature has four main areas as described in Table 1. The application
procedure before 2016 which was initiated by collecting preferences had
several drawbacks. First, since parents could get higher priority if they applied
earlier, they tended to apply soon after the birth of their child. However, during
the subsequent three years, the preferences of the families could change. This
situation was usually not reflected in the application data, thus resulting in a
high number of cancellations. Second, families could only list their top three
choices. Limited preference not only created a large number of unassigned
children, but also manipulation with the revelation of preferences.
Our design changed the data collection procedure and the number of
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Table 1: Redesign of Harku mechanism
2015 2016
Application procedure
Applications are collected after the
birth of the child due to prioritising
according to application dates
Applications are collected from 1
January until 1 February for allocat-
ing places from 1 September of the
same year
Limited preference lists
Limited to three Kindergartens
List all Kindergartens they are will-
ing to attend (no limit)
Priorities (policies)
Not clearly defined
See Section 3.2 for policy design al-
ternatives
Matching mechanism
Decentralised mechanism which
has some properties of Serial dic-
tatorship and Boston (Immediate-
Acceptance)
Deferred-Acceptance
preferences collected. Families make application in the matching platform3
during monthly period six months before the service delivery (1. September)
and list all their preferences. Giving up application date as a priority will be a
necessary result of the procedural amendments.
Finally, the central allocation mechanism applied until 2016 was not trans-
parent, the priorities were not clearly defined or adhered to by the heads of the
Kindergartens. The first priority of the application date was sometimes violated.
Children with siblings were usually considered to have higher priority, but not
always. Our design introduces clearly defined priority metrics and a centralised
allocation system that ensures that the criteria are always followed. Moreover,
instead of an unstable and manipulable Immediate-Acceptance mechanism we
propose the child-proposing DA. This is a standard method for school choice
(Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 2003), which eliminates justified envy, and gives
incentive for the families to state their true preferences.
3 https://www.haldo.ee/
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2.2. Particularities of the 2016 system
Before the final implementation of our platform-based matching design, there
was a transitory system in place in Harku in 2016 that partially applied our de-
sign recommendations, but experimented with priorities. Families were asked
to rank all seven Kindergartens. Additionally, the home address, application
date, status of siblings and the child’s birth date were collected. The allocation
process was designed on the basis of the DA mechanism with slots (Dur et
al., 2013) while policy transformation regarding fixing priorities was more
complex. There were four types of priorities that are defined per position as
follows, in the order of precedence:
1. siblings, distance, age, application date
2. distance, age, application date, siblings
3. application date, siblings, distance, age
4. age, application date, siblings, distance
5. siblings, distance, age, application date
6. distance, age, application date, siblings
...
The positions are considered in order, with families first applying to the
first position, then the second position, etc. This can also be thought of as
each Kindergarten being split into a number of seats, with each seat potentially
having a unique priority criteria. Then, the preferences of the families are
modified so that within each Kindergarten, they rank the position with the
higher precedence more highly. If the number of available places is not exactly
divisible by four, then some type of priorities might have more positions
available than others.
The main reason for the complicated policy design or for considering
the four types of priorities rotationally was backed by the argument of equal
treatment. Granting equal opportunity to all ”types of families” (the ones that
have siblings; those living nearby; early applicants; and families with an older
child) was the preference of the local municipality. In future allocations, the
application date will not be used. It was used here as some families still had
the expectation of being allocated by the application date.
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The precedence order of priority classes matters in the allocation procedure,
as shown by Dur et al. (2013) by demonstrating that a simple priority scheme
might be discriminating for some groups. For instance, let us assume there
are five seats with siblings and distance priority and a further five seats with
only distance priority. There are more than five children with a sibling and in
total more than ten children. If for the first five positions we would consider
children with siblings and then by distance, this would be disadvantageous for
children with siblings compared to first only considering distance and then
siblings as well as distance. In the latter case, some children with siblings
might already be allocated by distance alone, so other children with siblings
have lower competition and a better chance of getting a desired place. On
the other hand, it might occur that some children living closer have an unfair
disadvantage. The aim of the rotating scheme is to balance these two effects.
That leads us to the equal treatment issues related to policy design.
3. POLICY DESIGN
3.1. Efficiency and fairness
In mechanism design the goals are usually related to designing an allocation
method that maximises a form of efficiency, while not violating some con-
straint(s). In the matching domain, the usual criterion is selecting a Pareto
optimal matching among a set of stable matchings. In a public resource two-
sided matching setting, e.g. school seats, usually in fact two selections are
made: first, the priorities of applicants and second, the mechanism. In a school
choice setting, the priorities are often based on siblings and distance, although
there are other alternatives (MatchinginPractice, 2016). However, in designing
the allocation mechanism these priorities are usually treated as a given.
When evaluating the allocation methods we concentrate on two main
criteria: efficiency and fairness. Efficiency characterises the level at which we,
as designers, can satisfy the preferences of the applicants. Thus, we look at
the average allocated preference. We also include the percentage of applicants
receiving their first preference as this is often the case and the average might
not always be a good indicator.
In addition to efficiency and stability (lack of envy), our policy design is
driven by equality concerns. In the literature on distributive justice, discussion
on fairness (fair access in our case) is often accompanied by discussion on
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the principles of affirmative action, i.e. the Rawlsian difference principle
(Rawls, 1971). In our case, fair access is defined as the chance for the family to
access their most preferred Kindergarten. Moreover, we include in our design
some positive discrimination, or controlled choice, through policies such as
prioritising siblings.
Fair access is essentially different from the efficiency metrics for the
priorities of local municipalities and the preferences of families. The goal of
fair access is to provide an opportunity for every child to get a place at their
most preferred Kindergarten. As some families might live far away from all
Kindergartens (see Appendix C), they would always be low on the priority list
for any Kindergarten. We measure fair access as the proportion of families
placed in their most preferred Kindergarten on two levels, at least 10% chance
and 50% chance. This is similar to access to quality in (Shi, 2015) where
quality, in addition to being ranked high, contains an objective quality metric.
Since there is no quality ranking for a Kindergarten in our case and only a
small number of Kindergartens we look at the probability of being allocated
to the first choice. Since not all policy designs use lotteries, some will be
inherently unfair in terms of fair access.
The mechanism also allows the local authorities to have social objectives,
which are usually, but not always aligned with the preferences of the parents.
The two most prominent goals are
• having siblings in the same Kindergarten, and
• placing children in a Kindergarten near their home.
Prioritisation of proximity and siblings is also recommended by the regula-
tions responsible for the allocation of Kindergarten places (“Preschool Child
Care Institutions Act”, 2014). While prioritising proximity and siblings is
common practice in the case of school and Kindergarten choice design, being
favoured as the means to sustain community cohesion and avoid unreasonable
transportation costs (see Shi, 2015, for instance), this practice may cause var-
ious concerns. The proximity principle may lead to problems in segregated
areas, where it may result in the concentration of children from a similar socio-
economic background into the same Kindergartens. Further social objectives
could be the prioritisation of disadvantaged families or children with special
needs, but there was no access to this kind of information in the data, so those
goals were disregarded in this study. However, the main goal is still to provide
families with a place at their most preferred Kindergartens.
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3.2. Operationalisation of policy designs
A short list of social objectives indicated in the previous section does not mean
that policy designs are limited to two alternatives, as the priority structures
for siblings and proximity have many variants. Children with siblings might
always have priority over others, or might only be prioritised over families
living further away. Proximity can also be considered in many different ways,
such as a walk-zone or a catchment area or a geographical distance.
A simple way to consider geographic aspects is to define catchment areas
for each Kindergarten, and prioritise the children living in the catchment area
where the Kindergarten is located. The drawback of this method is that these
priorities may not reflect the personalised distances, as a Kindergarten might be
relatively far from an address in the same area, whilst another Kindergarten in a
different area can actually be nearby. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to
use personalised distances. We can use continuous (real) distances or discretise
them somehow, for instance giving priority to a Kindergarten within a 10-
minute walking distance, or giving priority to the closest, or several closest
Kindergartens. Another option is to give high priority to a child in a number
of nearby Kindergartens. A special version of the latter so-called menu system
has been evaluated and used in Boston school choice (Shi, 2015). Below we
specify the distance-based priorities that we used in our policies.
• Absolute: Strict priorities based on the personalised absolute distances
between the child’s location and the school, measured in walk time or
kilometres.
• Walk-zone: Coarse priorities based on the above-described absolute
distance. A child is in the high priority group for a school if she lives
within a 10-minute walking distance to this school.
• Relative: Every child is in the highest distance-based priority group
in her closest school, she is in the second highest priority group in the
second closest school, and so on.
• 3 closest: A binary variant of the above-defined relative distance policy,
where every child is in the high priority group of a school, if this school
is among the three closest schools for this child.
When we consider the children in walk-zones to have a higher priority,
followed by children with siblings, the following priority groups are obtained:
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1. siblings in walk-zones, 2. children in walk-zones, 3. siblings, 4. the rest.
Siblings could also be considered to have a higher priority, which would result
in the priority groups: 1. siblings in walk-zones, 2. siblings, 3. children in
walk-zones, 4. the rest. This simple classification is used in many US cities,
such as New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a) and Boston (Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al., 2005b), together with a randomised lottery for breaking ties. The lottery
can also be conducted in two ways, either as a single lottery which is used
in all Kindergartens, or as multiple lotteries, one for each Kindergarten. The
typical choice, used in most US school choice programmes and also in Irish
higher education admissions (L. Chen, 2012), is the single lottery. We will
investigate both in our computational experiments. This question is discussed
further by Ashlagi & Nikzad (2015) and Pathak & Sethuraman (2011).
If it is considered undesirable that a high proportion of children get admitted
by sibling priority, then one option is to set a quota for siblings, for example
50% of the places. In this case, there is high priority for siblings for only some
proportion of the places available, and the remaining places are prioritised by
distance only. In such a setting, how the allocation is implemented is crucial.
It can be done by allocating the places for siblings first and then the remaining
seats or in reverse. Dur et al. (2013) showed that the reverse approach can
benefit children with siblings, and Hafalir et al. (2013) showed that reserving
places for a certain minority results in a better allocation for the minority than
limiting the quota for the majority does. Under the latter policy, both groups
(minority and majority) could be worse off. We evaluate policy design by the
reservation of places for siblings or for families living nearby. In Harku, only
about 20% of children have a sibling, so 20% of the places were set to have a
sibling priority.
The Deferred-Acceptance algorithm can be slightly modified to accommo-
date for reserves and quotas. The priority quotas can be considered as separate
Kindergartens. In this variant, the child is first placed in a quota group high in
the precedence order and, if rejected, the child is then placed lower, etc. Thus,
each child will be placed in the highest possible precedence quota group.
In this study, in order to explore the described aspects, we settled on seven
priority policies (summarised in Table 2) for evaluation:
DA1. Children with siblings always have the highest priority and children
living closer have higher priority. Priority classes would be considered
in the order: 1) siblings; 2) walking distance.
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Table 2: Summary of policies (priority order in parentheses)
Policy Distance (D) Siblings (S) Lottery Quotas (Precedence)
DA1 absolute (2) (1) no no
DA2 walk-zone (2) (1) (3) no
DA3 walk-zone (1) (2) (3) no
DA4 3 closest (2) (1) (3) no
DA5 absolute (2) (1) no [80%, 20%] ([D, S+D])
DA6 absolute (2) (1) no [20%, 80%] ([S+D, D])
DA7 relative (2) (1) (3) no
DA2. Children with siblings always have the highest priority, then children
in the walk-zone have higher priority. The walk-zone is defined as a
10-minute walking distance from home. Additional ties are ordered by a
random lottery for all Kindergartens. The order of priority classes is: 1)
siblings + walk-zone; 2) siblings; 3) walk-zone; 4) the remainder.
DA3. Children in the walk-zone always have the highest priority, then children
with siblings have higher priority. Additional ties are ordered by a
random lottery for all Kindergartens. The order of priority classes is: 1)
siblings + walk-zone; 2) walk-zone; 3) siblings; 4) the remainder.
DA4. Children with siblings always have the highest priority, and children
have higher priority for the three closest Kindergartens. Additional
ties are ordered by a random lottery for all Kindergartens. Priority
precedence order: 1) siblings + one-of-three-closest; 2) siblings; 3)
one-of-three-closest; 4) the remainder.
DA5. Children with siblings have the highest priority for the reserved 20%
of places, otherwise priority is by distance. Precedence order: 1) by
distance up to 80%; 2) children with siblings + distance up to 20%; 3)
remaining places, if any, by distance.
DA6. Children with siblings have the highest priority for the reserved 20% of
places, otherwise priority is by distance. Precedence order: 1) children
with siblings + distance up to 20%; 2) remaining places, if any, by
distance.
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DA7. Children with siblings always have the highest priority, and children have
higher priority in the closest Kindergarten, second highest in the second-
closest, etc. Additional ties are ordered by a random lottery for all
Kindergartens. Priority precedence order: 1) siblings; 2) closest-number.
To demonstrate the effect of policies we construct a simple example. Let
us assume we have four children C = {c1,c2,c3,c4} and four Kindergartens
K = {k1,k2,k3,k4}. In Table 3 we show the distances between homes and
Kindergartens. We have no children with siblings in this example.
Table 3: Distances between homes and Kindergartens (km-s)
km k1 k2 k3 k4
c1 .7 1.2 1.0 1.7
c2 .4 .6 .3 .7
c3 .9 .5 .4 .3
c4 .8 .3 .9 1.0
Assuming that walk-zone distance is ≤ .6 km, the resulting priorities are in
Table 4. We can observe that with absolute distance or walk-zone the child c1
would not have a high priority in any Kindergarten. However with the 3-closest
policy, there is at least some chance of having the highest priority in some
Kindergarten, and with relative distance, each child has the highest priority in
at least one Kindergarten. While this is not always guaranteed with relative
distance, the lottery has lower impact compared to the 3-closest policy.
3.3. Data and initial policy design comparison
From a total of 152 families, 151 ranked all seven Kindergartens and only one
family submitted a single Kindergarten as their preference. Table 5 shows
the number of available places in each Kindergarten. Also 37 (about 24% of)
children have a sibling in one of the Kindergartens.
Table 6 compares the allocations over all the policies with the submitted
preferences. The listed Harku allocation does not exclude those few families
who declined their assigned place. However, many (115, i.e. 76%) of the
families were allocated to their most preferred Kindergarten. Since most
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Table 4: Distance priorities
absolute (DA1) walk-zone (DA2, DA3)
k1 c2 ≺ c1 ≺ c4 ≺ c3 c2 ≺ {c1,c3,c4}
k2 c4 ≺ c3 ≺ c2 ≺ c1 {c2,c3,c4} ≺ c1
k3 c2 ≺ c3 ≺ c4 ≺ c1 {c2,c3} ≺ {c1,c4}
k4 c3 ≺ c2 ≺ c4 ≺ c1 c3 ≺ {c1,c2,c3}
3-closest (DA4) relative (DA7)
k1 {c1,c2,c4} ≺ c3 c1 ≺ {c2,c4} ≺ c3
k2 {c1,c2,c3,c4} c4 ≺ {c1,c2,c3}
k3 {c1,c2,c3,c4} c2 ≺ {c1,c3} ≺ c4
k4 c3 ≺ {c1,c2,c4} c3 ≺ {c1,c2,c4}
families ranked all Kindergartens and there are more places than children, no
children remained unassigned.
For policies that included lotteries, we computed averages over 20 lotteries.
In the parentheses we show the standard error over the lotteries. In addition, we
compared policies using a single (S) lottery for all Kindergartens or multiple
(M) lotteries, one for each Kindergarten.
By using a simpler policy such as the DA1, we saw that there are fewer
families receiving a place at their first choice Kindergarten4 than with the
transitory Harku priority system. Moreover, two children (about 5%) are not
allocated to the same Kindergarten as their siblings with the transitory rule,
but with most other policies all siblings end up in the same Kindergarten.
The only exception to this is DA3, which has siblings as a second priority
over walk-zone, and on average also allocated 95% of siblings in the same
Kindergarten, but fewer children to their first preferences.
It seems that the transitory policy of Harku invoked the so-called vacancy
chains (Blum et al., 1997), where at the expense of one child with a sibling
several others could obtain better places along an augmenting path. In par-
ticular, by denying places for two children in the same Kindergarten as their
sibling, around seven more families could obtain their first choices. This leads
4 A more detailed allocated preference data is available in appendix B
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Table 5: Harku allocation
Kindergarten Number of places
A 20
B 20
C 34
D 18
E 20
F 38
G 5
Total 155
to an interesting trade-off between the goals of satisfying the sibling priority
or granting the first choice of slightly more parents.
In 2016, the allocations based on policies DA5 and DA6 were exactly the
same. This indicates that the gain in allocating more children to their first
preference with Harku’s policy is not due to allocating children to a closer
Kindergarten, but due to application date and age priorities. Therefore, if these
two criteria are not to be used in future policies, we expect that the rotation
scheme based only on siblings and proximity will provide allocations similar
to DA1, DA5 and DA6, assuming that the proportion of children and seats is
similar.
3.4. Policy sensitivity to preferences
When comparing policies, one may wonder how sensitive the results are
to changes in the preferences of parents. This can also be important when
applying our policy recommendations in other applications. In Kindergarten
allocation, and sometimes also in school choice, when the Kindergartens are
more or less of the same quality, the most important factor influencing the
preferences of parents is the location. Therefore, we conducted a comparative
study wherein the intensities of this factor in the preferences of parents is varied.
We evaluated the efficiency and fairness of the alternative policies accordingly.
For the generation of preferences, we use the locations and the information on
the siblings from the 2016 preference data. The detailed description of how
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 2(1), 2017
Andre´ Veski, Pe´ter Biro´, Kaire Po˜der, Triin Lauri 75
Table 6: Year 2016 comparison of policies using reported preferences
Policy
Mean
prefer-
ence
First
Mean
distance
(km)
With
siblings
Harku 1.68 115 4.24 95 %
DA 1 1.76 110 4.26 100 %
DA 2 (M)a
1.85
(0.01)
98.75
(0.61)
4.59
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 2 (S)
1.72
(0.01)
108.05
(0.61)
4.44
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 3 (M)
1.83
(0.01)
98.30
(0.79)
4.51
(0.02)
95 %
(0.25 %)
DA 3 (S)
1.72
(0.01)
107.75
(0.38)
4.45
(0.02)
96 %
(0.3 %)
DA 4 (M)
1.91
(0.01)
89.25
(1.06)
4.53
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 4 (S)
1.75
(0.01)
104.85
(0.7)
4.49
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 5 1.76 110 4.26 100 %
DA 6 1.76 110 4.26 100 %
DA 7 (M)
1.78
(0.01)
107.60
(0.47)
4.30
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 7 (S)
1.76
(0.01)
107.75
(0.47)
4.31
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
a For policies with lotteries, (M) indicates multiple tie-breaking lotteries and (S) single.
The standard errors over lotteries are in parentheses.
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we generate the preferences of parents can be found in the Appendix A.
We characterise preference profiles by the conditional probability of a
family ranking a closer Kindergarten higher (Pr(ri ≻ r j | di < d j), i 6= j) and
ranking a Kindergarten with a sibling higher (Pr(ri≻ r j | si> s j), i 6= j). Where
ri is rank of Kindergarten i, di is distance to Kindergarten i and si is one when
there is a sibling and zero otherwise. In the collected 2016 preference data, the
Pr(ri ≻ r j | di < d j) = 0.81 and the Pr(ri ≻ r j | si > s j) = 1.0, i 6= j.
The main dimensions of the evaluation are the preference rank achieved in
an allocation as well as the effect of the average distance from Kindergartens
and the share of siblings in the same Kindergarten.
For statistical comparison, we generated twenty preference profiles of each
of the parameter values. A total of 200 preference profiles were generated.
For each policy that has a lottery, we ran twenty different randomised lotteries
for each instance. As we saw in Table 6 the standard errors over the twenty
lotteries are small. All the figures of the results show the smoothed5 results of
the ten allocations over policies with a 95% confidence bound. For policies
with lotteries, there are results with a single (S) and multiple (M) lotteries over
Kindergartens.
Each year the number of available Kindergarten positions varies. However,
on average about 20 places should be available in each Kindergarten each
year, as one group of children leaves for school. Occasionally, there might
be more or fewer places. In our experiments, we set the number of available
places at 20 in each Kindergarten. However, this creates additional competition
and the resulting matched ranks will be lower (see Ashlagi et al., 2013a,b)
in these experiments than in the actual data in Table 6. Additionally, in our
interpretations we implicitly assume the effect of the competition will be
similar for all the policies. We discuss here only the Deferred-Acceptance
based results6. In addition we removed policies DA5 and DA6 from the chart,
as these matchings were usually almost the same as DA1.
Figures 1a and 1b demonstrate the average preferences obtained and the
proportion of families getting their first choices for all policies. Policy DA7 is
the most sensitive to changes in the preferences of families. When preferences
are strictly based on distance with conditional probability of Pr(ri ≻ r j | di <
d j)→ 1.0, one of the highest average rank scores is produced, one similar to
5 smoothed with local polynomial regression
6 In Appendix D we also provide for comparison results based on Top Trading Cycles algorithms,
as defined by Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez (2003).
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Figure 1: Conditional probability of distance
other policies such as DA1, DA5 and DA6. Surprisingly, when the preferences
of families are close to random, with conditional probability of Pr(ri ≻ r j |
di < d j)→ 0.5, then DA7 (S) is the policy that has one of the lowest average
ranks and the lowest number of families with a first preference. Policies that do
worse are the ones using multiple lotteries, one per Kindergarten. In addition,
the difference of having a single or multiple lotteries for Kindergartens is not
very significant for DA7, most likely due to lower usage of tie-breaking in this
policy compared to others with a lottery.
At face value, DA7 seems to be the most egalitarian policy as every family
has the highest priority in at least one of the Kindergartens. However, it seems
that families that do not prefer to be in the closest Kindergarten tend to be
rejected more often from their preferred Kindergartens further away where
they have a lower priority. As the matched rank drops more in DA7 than other
policies, when Pr(ri ≻ r j | di < d j)→ 0.5. Since the preferences and priorities
are not aligned, the probability of the family being rejected in some round of
the process is higher. The probability of being rejected at a certain point seems
to be smaller for other policies.
In terms of average matched preference rank, the policies DA2 and DA3
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 2(1), 2017
78 Kindergarten allocation policy design
are almost indistinguishable from each other, most likely because there are
too few siblings in this data. Nevertheless, it is always better to use a single
rather than multiple tie-breaking lotteries for both of these policies. The
average preference achieved is always better with a single lottery and also
there are more families with their first preference (Figure 1b). Policies with
a single lottery, such as DA2 (S), DA3 (S) and DA4 (S) – with the exception
of DA7 (S) – are significantly better for families in most situations. Only
when Pr(ri ≻ r j | di < d j)> 0.9, did policies DA1, DA5 and DA6, which use
absolute distance, turn out to be better than the single lottery policies.
The policies DA1 and DA6 always produce exactly the same matching,
DA5 is occasionally slightly different (for about 2-6 children), but the aggregate
results are still very similar. This is most likely because the selected reserve of
20 % is close to the percentage of siblings in the data.
Interestingly, most policies, with the exception of DA7, are quite robust to
changes in preferences. The same proportion of families almost always receive
their first preferences, about 50% to 60% with DA2, DA3 and DA4 and 60%
to 70% with DA1, DA5 and DA6. There is a slight increase in the average
preference when preferences become determined by distance. With DA7, the
proportion varies widely between 40% and 70%, and families fare better when
preferences are aligned with distance.
Figure 2a shows the average distance between families and Kindergartens.
The average distance is smaller for all policies when the preferences of families
are determined more by distance. As might be expected, the smallest average
distance is always with DA1 (including DA5 and DA6), as these policies are
aimed to minimise distance. The average distance is the largest with DA2 and
DA3, policies based on walk-zones, probably caused by the randomness in
the priorities of Kindergartens. Furthermore, these policies have a slightly
lower average distance with a single tie-breaking lottery, when preferences
are correlated with distance. On the other hand, it is usually the case that if
preferences are random, the multiple tie-breaking lotteries have a lower average
distance than single lotteries. A small improvement in average distance in
policies with lotteries is obtained by not using discretisation by walk-zones
and instead having a higher priority for a fixed number of Kindergartens, as in
DA4.
With random preferences, there is a trade-off between achieved preference
and average distance in the results obtained by DA7 (M) and, DA2 (M) and
DA3 (M), where DA4 (M) is at the middle point among these policies in this
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Figure 2: Average distance and conditional probability of distance in prefer-
ences
aspect. Policy DA7 always achieves the lowest average distance among the
lottery policies, others produce better matched ranking. When preferences are
more correlated with distance, DA7 performs better according to both average
preference and distance.
Figure 2b depicts the probability of children being in the same Kindergarten
as their siblings. When the preferences of families are random with respect
to siblings, most policies place about 40% to 60% of children in the same
Kindergarten as their siblings. When families prefer closer Kindergartens, then
more siblings end up in the same place. This higher percentage is most likely
due to siblings already being in a nearby Kindergarten. We have also added
a 45 degree line, indicating that policies that are below this level have some
children, who would prefer a Kindergarten with a sibling, result in children
being assigned to a different Kindergarten. Multiple lottery policies seem to
be better at placing children in the same Kindergarten with siblings.
In Figures 3a and 3b, the probability of a child being matched to the
family’s first preference in at least one lottery is measured. This is a measure
of fairness, or fair (equal) access to Kindergartens, which is similar to the
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Figure 3: Fairness of access
measure of access to quality used by Shi (2015). We have plotted the fairness
of access for policies DA1, DA5 and DA6, even though there is no sensible
interpretation, since there are no lotteries. However, these policies are still
useful for comparison.
With the lottery policies DA2, DA3 and DA4, with both single and multiple
lotteries, about 60% to 95% of families have about a 10% chance of being
granted a place in a Kindergarten that is their first preference. The DA4 (S) is
the best performer when preferences are aligned with distance and DA2 (S)
and DA3 (S) when preferences only have a Kindergarten effect. Policy DA7
(S) comes close to DA4 (S) only when preferences are almost perfectly aligned
with distance.
However, when we make our fairness notion slightly stronger, i.e. when
there has to be at least a 50% chance of a place in the family’s first choice
Kindergarten, the proportion of families achieving this drops to only about
40%. This is even lower than the case with deterministic policies like DA1.
Therefore, it seems that with lotteries we can give some families a small 10%,
chance of getting their first preference, but as a result, some families lose their
first preferences. With a larger chance, 50%, there are more families losing
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their first preference than those gaining.
In terms of trade-offs, the policy DA4 (S) is better on fairness and average
matched preference, but worse on average matched distance. DA1 and similar
policies do better on average matched rank and distance, however they fare
worse on fairness, i.e. families living far away from all Kindergartens have
a smaller chance of a preferred match. When preferences are not entirely
determined by distance, then these two (DA1 and DA4) are the best options
to choose from. However, with distance-based preferences, DA7 can prove
to be an improvement. In the case of DA7, fairness is almost as good as with
DA4, average distance was a significant improvement over DA4 and average
allocated rank very close to DA1.
4. FURTHER ISSUES
We identify a dozen additional special features that should be further consid-
ered in the (re-)design of the mechanism in Harku. However, many of these
features may pose significant challenges and require additional research. We
describe these issues and give recommendations for possible adjustments in
the allocation mechanism.
Children with special needs. In larger cities, there are schools for children
with special needs, but in smaller municipalities these pupils are mixed with
others. The standard practice is for Kindergartens to reserve places for children
with special needs who require more attention and are thus considered to take
up the space of three children. Usually, it is not known beforehand if there
will be any such cases and the special needs may only become evident later.
However, in most cases the extra places remain free and can be subsequently
allocated to other children. Obviously, this has some effect on the fairness of
the allocation.
A possible solution would be to have this data available before allocation
and to take it into account in the allocation process. However, evaluating all of
the applicants in advance could be very costly compared to the extra efforts
needed for the reallocation process and the potential issues arising from the
extended solution. It would be helpful if the parents of children that are likely
to need special treatment were to register for evaluation. It should then be
guaranteed that their chances of admission to their preferred Kindergartens
would not be worsened, perhaps by giving priority for a number of places in
each Kindergarten to such children.
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Allocation in multiple rounds. Harku currently allocates students in multi-
ple rounds, since two extra places could arise in each Kindergarten to which
no student with special needs is admitted. The proportion of disadvantaged
families is about 10% (PTVRR, 2015) and children with special needs make
up about 3% (Paat et al., 2011). This question is similar to the question of the
design of two-stage allocation mechanisms (Dur & Kesten, 2014) and also to
the design of appeal processes (Dur & Kesten, 2015). The first option is to
allocate the extra places exclusively among the unmatched children. This is a
simple method with no reallocation of children, but it can be seen as unfair to
families who are allocated seats in the main round and would prefer an extra
place in a Kindergarten where they have higher priority than the unallocated
children who get those extra places in the second round. The final solution
could cause justified envy for the families. In addition, the parents might also
act strategically in the main round, perhaps by not accepting an offer from the
Kindergarten listed second, especially if they have information that they are
first in the waiting list and the creation of extra places is very likely. Therefore,
it appears reasonable to let everyone apply for the extra places, as is currently
done in Harku. However, if the process is not centralised, then those who were
assigned a place in the first round but now get a better match, would conse-
quently create new available places. Even if this decentralised process could
be continued until a stable solution was reached, this proposal-rejection chain
would result in a stable matching that is the worst possible stable matching
for the reallocated children, as proved by Blum et al. (1997). Therefore, this
process would not be strategy-proof for the parents either. Hence, the only
possible solution that is strategy-proof for the parents and avoids justified envy
is a centralised second round, where parents can re-apply to all Kindergartens
with the option of keeping their assignment if they wish to do so (technically
this is achieved by putting the children already assigned to the Kindergarten
at the top of the Kindergartens’ rankings). Yet, this solution may affect a
significant number of children, and in theory possibly all of them, which could
result in high reallocation costs. These costs would be accepted by the parents,
since they would always have the option of not changing their assignment, but
could be seen as undesired by the local council and the Kindergartens.
Children with existing places. The parents of some children may request
a transfer. This is especially relevant for children attending a class for 2-3-
year olds who would like to go to a different Kindergarten for the 3-6-year
period, since the classes for children aged 2-3 may not be available in the
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Kindergartens preferred by the families. It is therefore a question of whether
the reallocation of these children should be conducted as part of the yearly
matching round. If so, these children should be guaranteed to get at least as
good a seat in the reallocation, i.e. they should have the highest priority in
their current Kindergarten. This question has been studied in the context of
Danish daycare allocation (Kennes et al., 2014), and also for the reallocation
of French teachers (Combe et al., 2015).
Overlapping admission processes. Some parents may be registered in more
than one municipality, so they are able to apply for a place for their child in
two systems, for example in Harku and in neighbouring Tallinn. This can
lead to inefficiencies due to cancellations. Similar problems arise in some US
cities where state schools and charter schools hold their admissions separately.
Furthermore, the same phenomenon has also appeared in European college
admission programmes, where an increasing number of students are applying
for programmes in several countries disturbing the national matching schemes.
Outside options with subsidies. Somewhat related to the previous issue is
the fact that private Kindergartens operate in Estonia, and some parents also
consider the option of home schooling. However, if a municipality cannot
provide enough Kindergarten places for its resident population, in some cases
it may subsidise parents who choose an alternative option. In Harku, the
local council financially supports parents who do not receive a place in a
Kindergarten, but the council may withdraw their support if the parents do not
accept a place that is offered. This conditional support can lead to strategic
considerations, since some parents may find an alternative home or private
option preferable to a local school, if and only if they receive the financial
support, but this cannot be stated in the application. This special case can
be modelled with the matching with contracts framework. A similar special
feature is found in the Hungarian higher education matching scheme, where
students can study on the same course under two different contracts, either free
of charge or with a tuition fee. Furthermore, US cadets (So¨nmez & Switzer,
2013) also face such a situation when they decide whether or not they are
willing to take on some extra years of service in order to increase their chances
of admission. The recommended solution is to let the parents list the option of
not having a place in the Kindergarten but receiving financial support instead,
when they give their applications to Kindergartens. Thus, all the listed options
are considered preferable to the outside option with no financial support. In
such a case, it is crucial that the parents-optimal stable solution is implemented
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so as to make the parents reveal their true preferences for these outside options.
Lower quotas, opening of new groups. Sometimes Kindergartens are able to
cancel groups or open new ones to fit with the applications. In particular, there
are regulations determining the minimum number of children needed to start a
new group. This feature is similar to the lower quotas used in the Hungarian
higher education matching scheme (Biro´ et al., 2010a), where programmes
may be cancelled if there is a lack of students. This is a natural requirement
that makes the education service economical, but the theoretical model for
college admissions with lower quotas is not always solvable. This means that a
fair solution does not always exist and the problem of finding a fair solution is
NP-hard. The problem becomes even more complicated if new groups can be
created, since both the closures and the openings in a Kindergarten affect the
number of students admitted elsewhere. However, clever heuristics and robust
optimisation techniques, such as integer programming (Biro´ et al., 2014) can
be used to tackle these generalised problems.
Homogeneous age groups and mixed groups. In Estonia, there are both
homogeneous age groups and mixed groups. Having only same age groups
can vary the number of groups opened in a Kindergarten, as a Kindergarten
with five groups could open only one group every three years. This would be
unsatisfactory for the local children in the years when no groups are opened.
When mixed groups are created, the number of children admitted can be
relatively stable if the available places are always filled. However, if there are
some free places left in a year, then the age distribution of the children can be
distorted.
Sharing places. In some Kindergartens, it is possible that some children
only attend part of the week and the rest of the time is taken up by other
children. This possibility again makes the underlying problem challenging to
solve. Specifically, when there is a large number of part-time students then
one might face the same problem as when allocating doctors and couples to
hospitals, which is an NP-hard problem (McDermid & Manlove, 2010).
Historic dependence of preferences. In Harku, the applications of registered
parents are listed on a public website. In Tallinn, the number of applications
already submitted to the Kindergartens is also published. If the registration
date is a criterion for priority and the parents can see the applications or the
number of applications made before their turn, then this can affect their true as
well as their submitted preferences. Potentially, if there are more applications
than places, then parents will find it risky to apply. This can depend on the
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birth date of the child, because if a child was born soon after 1 October, then
the parents could have a good chance of obtaining a place everywhere, and
so be more truthful. We did not find much evidence of significant changes
in the preferences over time in the Harku data. However, in a similar study
for Tallinn or other places where the registration date is important, attention
should be paid to the potentially biased preferences caused by the published
information about past applications.
Smooth transition to a new system. When designing the new mechanism,
it may be important to consider how to engineer a smooth transition between
the old and the final systems. This process is especially challenging in Harku,
since the old priorities were based on registration date, and those parents who
registered early may see it as unfair if this priority that they earned in the past
is suddenly neglected. Therefore, in the 2016 transitory system, the priority of
those who have already registered in the old regime is partly kept, as described
above. Regarding the future years, how long these priorities should be kept, or
whether they should be replaced with some age priority which is in correlation
with the registration dates, is still to be debated.
The role of the heads of the Kindergartens. The heads of the Kindergartens
were actively involved in the allocation system until 2015. The discussions
among the heads and the personal communication with the parents were
crucial in eliciting the true preferences of the parents and finding relatively
good solutions through informal negotiations. In the centrally coordinated
system, the head may fear losing their chance to influence the allocations, and
the same could be true for the employees of the local municipality. It should be
considered whether the heads of the Kindergartens could still have some power
to adjust the priorities, or to make other decisions about their Kindergartens,
for instance whether to open a new group or to create mixed groups.
The fairness of using proximity as a priority. Whether the use of proximity
is fair may depend on the ease and/or cost of registering. Specially circum-
stances may vary, e.g., it is almost costless (as in Hungary); there may be
some significant costs such as renting or having a flat in the area; or the family
truly has to live there (for example in Barcelona, where somebody who is
proved not to live at the stated address can lose their place). When it is easy
to register at an address, then the parents may play a strategic game in which
the first stage is to choose an address. When ownership and actual residency
are required, and the priorities are important for the parents, this can affect
the housing choices of the families, and influence house prices as well as the
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socio-economic distribution of the population.
Restricting the choice of the parents. A simple restriction is to allow
families to only apply to nearby Kindergartens. A more sophisticated method
is to provide personalised choice menus, such as the system proposed in the
Boston school choice mechanism (Shi, 2015). This would potentially provide
parents with a choice of schools close to them where a child’s siblings may
have attended, with a limited number of further options. The advantage of
this method over restricting the number of applications is that the mechanism
remains strategy-proof, and the parents have a simpler task of ranking the
available options. However, the disadvantage is the difficulty of estimating
the preferences of the parents and therefore, there is a risk that some highly
preferred Kindergartens could be missed out from some menus. In general,
this type of restrictive policy can improve the overall quality of the allocation
from the point of view of the municipality, perhaps by reducing the total travel
distance. That was the main motivation in the Boston school choice redesign,
as the bus costs had to be limited. However, the overall welfare of the children
could be badly affected. We do not recommend this policy for Harku, due to
the small size of the municipality, but it is suggested for consideration in larger
cities, like Tallinn.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Kindergarten matching practices in one Estonian munic-
ipality, Harku. Until 2015, the collected preferences were unlikely to reflect
the true preferences of the parents, since the data were out-of-date by the
time of the allocation, the number of applications were limited and the al-
location mechanism was not incentive-proof either. Therefore, the resulting
allocation could create justified envy and it was also lacking transparency.
In 2016, the municipality changed its allocation system mostly based on our
recommendations.
In our study, we first listed well-known practices frommatching mechanism
design that present solutions to some of the problems and also provide policy
tools for the local municipalities. These practices consist of:
• getting complete rather than limited preferences from families,
• using child-proposing stable matching for allocating places,
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• defining clear policies for the local municipality based on a transparent
priority system.
In assisting in the redesign of the allocation mechanism, it emerged that
although the policy goals might be clear, the choice of exactly which imple-
mentation method to use can create significant differences in the results. In
most cases, the goals of the local municipalities are to have siblings in the
same Kindergarten and to provide a place in a Kindergarten close to home,
in addition to the main consideration of providing a place in the most pre-
ferred Kindergartens of the families. We evaluated seven different policies
for implementing the policy goals, first based on data from 2016, and then
based on generated data. The 2016 transitory system that follows our main
recommendations provides a child-optimal stable allocation under a rotational
priority structure based on four factors, such as location, siblings, registration
and birth dates. The limit on the number of applications was also removed, so
the preferences of the families can be considered truthful. Our main findings
regarding the seven policies evaluated on the real data and in the computational
experiments are summarised below.
The simplest policy is to give higher priority to children with siblings and
to families living nearby, which is policy DA1. This was also demonstrated to
be one of the most effective policies. The resulting allocation had, on average,
matched a lot of families with their most preferred Kindergarten, while also
having one of the smallest average distances. This remained true when the
preferences of families were agnostic about distance.
Policy DA1 might occasionally seem unfair, as small differences in dis-
tance might affect whether families are placed in their first preference or a
lower one. Policies DA2, DA3 and DA4 group Kindergartens by distance
within equal priority classes, DA2 and DA3 by defining a walk-zone and DA4
by having high priority in the three closest Kindergartens. Families in the
walk-zone are treated equally and priorities are defined by lottery. It appears
that the multiple tie-breaking rule might create a more egalitarian access to
Kindergartens, however it is not without its cost. The average number of
children who are placed in their most preferred Kindergarten is usually sig-
nificantly lower and the average distance is greater. However, with a single
tie-breaker over Kindergartens, families are on average allocated to their more
preferred Kindergarten, even when compared to deterministic policies like
DA1. Nevertheless, an allocation based on randomness might prove hard to
justify to families. If having more egalitarian access is important, policy DA4
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with a single tie-breaker would be the best of the three. The level of fair access
is the same, satisfaction with average preferences is the best, and distance is
the lowest.
Siblings always being given higher priority might prove another source
of seemingly unfair treatment. If a family already has a child in a particular
Kindergarten, they are almost guaranteed to get a place in the same Kinder-
garten for a sibling, even when there is another family living closer than them.
We considered two policies, DA5 and DA6, which limit the number of places
in a Kindergarten that consider having a sibling a priority at up to 20%. Even
though the number of places reserved for siblings was low, most families still
received a place in that Kindergarten if they preferred it. There is almost no
difference from policy DA1 on any measure, nor between DA5 and DA6, al-
though theoretically DA6 should provide more opportunity to nearby families,
and DA5 to children with siblings.
A clear oddity is policy DA7, which was initially designed to deliver more
equal access to Kindergartens for families who live far away from all Kinder-
gartens. While policy DA1 would give such families low priority everywhere,
DA7 would give them the highest priority in their closest Kindergarten. When
most families have a high preference for nearby Kindergartens and for those
where their siblings are, DA7 results in one of the best policy designs in all
aspects. DA7 gives many families their first preference, it has the shortest
average distance and one of the best results for equality of access. However, the
result is radically different when family preferences are mostly idiosyncratic
and are almost independent from distance. In this case, DA7 is the worst policy
of all for families. On average less than 40% of children get matched to their
first preferences, but the average distance is the one of lowest. Thus the lesson
from policy DA7 seems to be that the policy designer needs to predict the
preferences of the society fairly accurately to select a good trade-off. When
preferences and priorities are aligned, both of the main goals can be met. A
downside of this policy is that it is vulnerable when preferences and priorities
are misaligned, and then the price paid is significant in terms of efficiency and
fairness. If a local municipality aims to minimise the distances between homes
and Kindergartens, then DA1 is the best option. The latter objective recently
turned out to be crucial in Boston, where the local authority became concerned
about the busing costs (Shi, 2015).
Finally, there remain several unsolved issues that we have not tried to
address in the redesign. A dozen issues were listed along with a discussion
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about possible solutions. For example, it would be reasonable to coordinate
the allocation between neighbouring municipalities, but cooperation is usually
hard to achieve. Similarly, it would be best to know about children with special
needs before the allocation, but this is often not feasible.
A potential way to manage the shortage of Kindergarten places is to provide
monetary incentives for parents to stay at home with their children or to
seek a place in private childcare. The question of how to set this monetary
compensation in an optimal manner is also interesting in terms of future
research. Here, optimality could mean minimising the total cost of providing
childcare services in the municipality.
There remain a few interesting aspects related to designing a more flexible
mechanism which might improve the allocation outcome for families. Making
decisions on the size and the age composition of the groups in Kindergartens
and determining this in an optimal way based on the application data could
give an additional boost to the number of families receiving a place at their
most preferred Kindergarten. Some of this research has been done in terms of
lower quotas for opening groups (Biro´ et al., 2010a).
A. GENERATING COUNTER-FACTUAL PREFERENCES
We use the 2016 data for counter-factual policy evaluation. To generate the
counter-factual preferences only we use the distance between homes and
Kindergartens and sibling status in a Kindergarten. The collected preference
data is used to understand which features to use in the ranking function, the
functional form of the utility function and the fixed effects of Kindergartens.
For each family and Kindergarten we know the geographical location from
address lookup from google maps7 and Estonian Land Board (Maa-amet8)
and distance calculations taken from Google maps distance9. We have a rich
dataset for distance, as for each family-Kindergarten pair we know the driving
and walking distances in kilometres and minutes. We also have the direct
distance between the two points calculated with the haversine formula. The
features are described in Table 7.
We fit a multinomial rank-ordered logit model (Croissant, 2011), which
is similar to the model used by Shi (2015). The model assumes that families
7 https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/intro
8 http://inaadress.maaamet.ee/geocoder/bulk
9 https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/distance-matrix/intro
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Table 7: Family’s Kindergarten features
Feature Description
preference rank Families rank of the Kindergarten, be-
tween 1-7
walking distance sec walking time between family’s home and
Kindergarten, based on The Google Maps
Distance Matrix API (2015)
walking distance m walking distance between family’s home
and Kindergarten, based on The Google
Maps Distance Matrix API (2015)
driving distance sec driving time between family’s home and
Kindergarten, based on The Google Maps
Distance Matrix API (2015)
driving distance m driving distance between family’s home
and Kindergarten, based on The Google
Maps Distance Matrix API (2015)
haversine distance m direct distance between family’s home and
Kindergarten
walking distance rank Kindergarten rank by walking distance
driving distance rank Kindergarten rank by driving distance
haversine distance rank Kindergarten rank by haversine distance
sibling 1 if Kindergarten has a sibling already at-
tending, 0 otherwise
log walking distance sec log(walking distance sec)
sqrt walking distance sec
√
walking distance sec
log walking distance m log(walking distance m)
sqrt walking distance m
√
walking distance m
log driving distance sec log(drivingdistancesec)
sqrt driving distance sec
√
driving distance sec
log driving distance m log(driving distance m)
sqrt driving distance m
√
driving distance m
log haversine distance m log(haversine distance m)
sqrt haversine distance m
√
haversine distance m
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have an utility function of the form,
ui j = α j+∑
k
βk · xki j+ εi j (1)
where α j are fixed effect of Kindergartens, βk is the coefficient for feature
k and εi j is the family’s personal unexplained preference. We further use
the utilities to find a probability if a ranking. In a ranked-order logit model
the probability of a ranking is a multiple of a Kindergarten begin is a par-
ticular position, which in our case is Pr(ranking1,2, ...,7) = Pr(ranking =
1) ·Pr(ranking= 2) · ... ·Pr(ranking= 7). The probability of family i ranking
Kindergarten j at some position are,
Pri j(ranking= 1) =
e
ui j
∑
7
r=1 e
uir
Pri j(ranking= 2) =
e
ui j
∑
7
r=2 e
uir
...
Pri j(ranking= 6) =
e
ui j
∑
7
r=6 e
uir
(2)
First our aim is to select one of the distance metrics from Table 7 to include
in the utility model (1). For this we do 100 bootstrap runs with each metric.
In Figure 4 we plot the resulting log-likelihood with its standard error. We
see that the
√
driving distance sec provides the best prediction on average.
We also see that including the sibling status would improve the prediction
accuracy, however the statistical significance of the coefficient is low (Table 8)
in any combination of features. So we select the model (1) from Table 8 as our
final model.
For policy comparison we generate the ranking over all Kindergartens. We
do not model the cut-off levels for outside options, when the family would
rather keep the child at home. We assume they would always rather have a
place in any of Harku’s Kindergartens.
To obtain a full ranking of Kindergartens we use the probabilities from (2).
For counter-factual preferences we vary the coefficient for distance. The
parameter values are in (3). For each combination of parameters we generate
several (7) different preference profiles and evaluate the policies on the average
over all the preference profiles.
β1 ∈ {0.0,0.05,0.1,0.23,0.25,0.5,1,2,4,10} (3)
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Figure 4: Predictive features
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Table 8: Rank-ordered logit coefficients
preference rank
(1) (2) (3)
αB −0.690∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.560∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.150) (0.143)
αC −0.565∗∗∗ −0.540∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.176) (0.145)
αD 0.157 0.185 1.479∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.182) (0.154)
αE 0.476∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.159) (0.146)
αF 0.275 0.351∗ 1.608∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.181) (0.153)
αG −1.769∗∗∗ −1.789∗∗∗ −1.580∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.195) (0.179)
β1 −0.229∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗√
driving distance sec (0.015) (0.015)
β2 20.750 20.812
sibling (2,676.852) (1,651.629)
Observations 906 906 906
Log Likelihood −882.862 −840.256 −958.955
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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To better interpret the results we look at the results by conditional proba-
bilities of a parameter set. We look at two conditional effects: (a) probability
of ranking Kindergarten higher given it is closer and (b)probability of rank-
ing a Kindergarten higher given a Kindergarten has a sibling. Formally the
conditional probability are defined in (4) and (5).
Pr(r1 < r2 | d1 < d2) = Pr(d1 < d2,r1 < r2)
Pr(d1 < d2)
(4)
Pr(r1 < r2 | s1 > s2) = Pr(s1 > s2,r1 < r2)
Pr(s1 > s2)
(5)
The mean conditional probability with fitted regression parameter, β =
0.25, is Pr(r1 < r2 | d1 < d2) ≈ 0.79± 0.0210. This is similar to what we
observe in the 2016 data, where Pr(ri ≻ r j | di < d j) = 0.81, i 6= j. Figure 5a
shows the relationship between the logistic parameters and the conditional
probabilities.
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Figure 5: Coefficients and conditional probabilities
101.96 standard deviations, 95% probability
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B. ALLOCATED PREFERENCES
Table 9: Year 2016 allocated preference comparison DA
Policy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
Harku 115 14 6 3 4 8 2
IA 1 122 8 2 5 8 3 4
DA 1 110 17 3 6 6 9 1
DA 2 (M)a
98.75
(0.61)
19.95
(0.61)
9.65
(0.49)
11.05
(0.78)
7.20
(0.43)
4.85
(0.36)
1.22
(0.15)
DA 2 (S)
108.05
(0.61)
19.90
(0.56)
4.65
(0.41)
4.95
(0.39)
7.70
(0.37)
5.85
(0.36)
1.20
(0.11)
DA 3 (M)
98.30
(0.79)
21.95
(1.09)
8.85
(0.6)
9.9
(0.49)
8.35
(0.3)
3.75
(0.24)
1.5
(0.29)
DA 3 (S)
107.75
(0.38)
20.65
(0.38)
4.79
(0.50)
4.95
(0.29)
6.60
(0.39)
6.2
(0.3)
1.86
(0.25)
DA 4 (M)
89.25
(1.06)
27.2
(0.84)
13.1
(0.88)
9.85
(0.76)
7.7
(0.53)
4.35
(0.43)
1.38
(0.26)
DA 4 (S)
104.85
(0.70)
19.15
(0.70)
7.05
(0.63)
8.15
(0.6)
8.05
(0.46)
4.10
(0.28)
1.63
(0.26)
DA 5 110 17 3 6 6 9 1
DA 6 110 17 3 6 6 9 1
DA 7 (M)
107.6
(0.47)
15.85
(0.52)
5.7
(0.36)
8.9
(0.42)
6.95
(0.33)
5.9
(0.32)
1.47
(0.17)
DA 7 (S)
107.75
(0.47)
16.90
(0.44)
5.20
(0.26)
7.40
(0.36)
8.40
(0.37)
5.15
(0.33)
1.33
(0.14)
a For policies with lotteries in parenthesis are the standard errors
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Table 10: Year 2016 allocated preference comparison TTC
Policy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
Harku 115 14 6 3 4 8 2
IA 1 122 8 2 5 8 3 4
TTC 1 112 16 1 5 9 8 1
TTC 2 (M)
110.25
(0.52)
17.85
(0.49)
4.00
(0.32)
6.55
(0.41)
7.75
(0.45)
4.70
(0.52)
1.38
(0.21)
TTC 2 (S)
110.10
(0.45)
17.50
(0.56)
3.85
(0.33)
6.40
(0.56)
7.95
(0.36)
4.80
(0.35)
2.00
(0.23)
TTC 3 (M)
109.50
(0.54)
18.95
(0.72)
4.55
(0.34)
5.75
(0.37)
7.00
(0.40)
5.20
(0.28)
1.50
(0.25)
TTC 3 (S)
110.55
(0.61)
17.05
(0.51)
4.65
(0.36)
6.20
(0.52)
7.05
(0.39)
5.75
(0.35)
1.25
(0.13)
TTC 4 (M)
109.25
(0.56)
18.65
(0.74)
3.78
(0.33)
7.40
(0.62)
8.80
(0.57)
3.60
(0.36)
1.80
(0.29)
TTC 4 (S)
109.35
(0.38)
18.75
(0.48)
4.47
(0.42)
7.30
(0.37)
7.45
(0.45)
4.05
(0.25)
1.31
(0.17)
TTC 7 (M)
109.40
(0.39)
15.45
(0.37)
3.75
(0.28)
7.45
(0.39)
8.55
(0.36)
5.70
(0.25)
1.89
(0.23)
TTC 7 (S)
109.25
(0.41)
16.00
(0.45)
3.63
(0.34)
7.25
(0.37)
9.15
(0.33)
5.60
(0.29)
1.53
(0.12)
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C. MAP OF THE MUNICIPALITY
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l child
kindergarten
Figure 6: Locations of children and Kindergartens (with walk-zones) in 2016
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D. RESULTS WITH TOP TRADING CYCLES (TTC)
Table 11: Year 2016 comparison of policies using reported preferences
Policy
Mean
prefer-
ence
First
Mean
distance
(km)
With
siblings
Frac.
children
with
JEa
BP per
child
with JE
DA 1 1.76 110 4.26 100 %
DA 2 (M)b
1.85
(0.01)
98.75
(0.61)
4.59
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 2 (S)
1.72
(0.01)
108.05
(0.61)
4.44
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 3 (M)
1.83
(0.01)
98.30
(0.79)
4.51
(0.02)
95 %
(0.25 %)
DA 3 (S)
1.72
(0.01)
107.75
(0.38)
4.45
(0.02)
96 %
(0.3 %)
DA 4 (M)
1.91
(0.01)
89.25
(1.06)
4.53
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 4 (S)
1.75
(0.01)
104.85
(0.7)
4.49
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 7 (M)
1.78
(0.01)
107.60
(0.47)
4.30
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 7 (S)
1.76
(0.01)
107.75
(0.47)
4.31
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
a JE - Justified Envy, BP - Blocking Pairs
b For policies with lotteries, (M) indicates multiple tie-breaking lotteries and (S) single. The
standard errors over lotteries are in parentheses.
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Table 12: Year 2016 comparison of policies using reported preferences
Policy
Mean
prefer-
ence
First
Mean
distance
(km)
With
siblings
Frac.
children
with
JEa
BP per
child
with JE
TTC 1 1.76 112 4.39 100 % 11 % 1.06
TTC 2 (S)
1.71
(0.01)
110.1
(0.45)
4.49
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
9 %
(1.28 %)
1.08
(0.03)
TTC 2 (M)
1.69
(0.01)
110.25
(0.52)
4.51
(0.03)
100 %
(0.0 %)
21 %
(0.82 %)
2.16
(0.03)
TTC 3 (S)
1.7
(0.01)
110.55
(0.61)
4.47
(0.02)
96 %
(0.37 %)
14 %
(1.24 %)
1.27
(0.06)
TTC 3 (M)
1.69
(0.01)
109.5
(0.54)
4.46
(0.02)
95 %
(0.33 %)
22 %
(0.71 %)
2.16
(0.04)
TTC 4 (S)
1.69
(0.01)
109.35
(0.38)
4.6
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
20 %
(1.08 %)
1.86
(0.05)
TTC 4 (M)
1.7
(0.01)
109.25
(0.56)
4.58
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
26 %
(0.52 %)
2.26
(0.04)
TTC 7 (S)
1.77
(0.01)
109.25
(0.41)
4.48
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
22 %
(0.82 %)
1.70
(0.06)
TTC 7 (M)
1.78
(0.01)
109.4
(0.39)
4.51
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
23 %
(0.83 %)
1.90
(0.07)
a JE - Justified Envy, BP - Blocking Pairs
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Figure 7: Conditional probability of distance (TTC)
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Figure 8: Average distance and conditional probability of distance in prefer-
ences (TTC)
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Figure 9: Fairness of access
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Figure 10: Justified envy and blocking pairs (TTC)
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ABSTRACT
In this paper we re-examine the partnership formation problem, which is a
generalization of the classical assignment game. We show that the former
problem can be transformed into the latter one in some sense; more precisely,
we demonstrate that using an equilibrium in an associated assignment game, we
can find an equilibrium in the partnership formation problem if it exists. Based
on this, we devise an algorithm to compute an equilibrium of the partnership
formation problem, and show that the proposed algorithm can be seen as a
variant of the one by Andersson et al. (2014b).
Keywords: Partnership formation, equilibrium, assignment game, adjustment
process.
JEL Classification Numbers: C71, D44.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we reconsider the partnership formation problem as studied by
Talman & Yang (2011). In such a problem, there is a group of agents, and
each agent works alone or works together with another agent. If an agent
works alone, then the agent generates a value for himself, and if an agent
works with a partner, then the agent and his partner generate a joint value,
which is shared by them in an appropriate way. The goal of the partnership
formation problem is to find an equilibrium, where no agent has incentive
to change his partner, to break up an existing partnership to become alone,
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or to form a new partnership. Typical instances of the partnership formation
problem can be found in the professional tennis tournament, pair programming
in software development, etc. (see, e.g., Andersson et al. (2014b); Eriksson &
Karlander (2001); Talman & Yang (2011)). Similar but different models of the
partnership formation are also discussed in Chiappori et al. (2014); Alkan &
Tuncay (2013). The partnership formation problem has been also formulated
as the roommate problem with transferable utility, the matching game, or the
one-sided matching problem (Eriksson & Karlander, 2001; Biro´ et al., 2012;
Klaus & Nichifor, 2010).
The partnership formation problem is closely related to the classical as-
signment game (Koopmans & Beckmann, 1957; Shapley & Shubik, 1971).
The assignment game can be regarded as a special case of the partnership
formation problem, where the set of agents is partitioned into two groups, the
one corresponding to buyers (or firms) and the other to sellers (or workers),
and any two agents in the same group cannot be a pair. An equilibrium always
exists in the assignment game (Koopmans & Beckmann, 1957; Shapley &
Shubik, 1971), and can be found by price adjustment processes (see, e.g.,
Crawford & Knoer (1981), Demange et al. (1986)).
In contrast, the partnership formation problem may not have an equilibrium
(Talman & Yang, 2011). Some sufficient (and necessary) conditions for the
existence of equilibrium are provided by Eriksson & Karlander (2001) and
Talman & Yang (2011). An adjustment process is proposed for the partnership
formation problem by Andersson et al. (2014b), which can always either find
an equilibrium or disprove the existence of an equilibrium. The adjustment
process of Andersson et al. (2014b) computes a certain payoff vector in a
similar way as in the adjustment process by Demange et al. (1986), and
the obtained payoff vector is used to find an equilibrium of the partnership
formation problem.
The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the part-
nership formation problem and the assignment game. As mentioned above, the
assignment game is a very special case of the partnership formation problem.
We show in this paper that the converse is also true in some sense. That is, we
prove that if we obtain an equilibrium in a certain assignment game, then we
can find an equilibrium in the partnership formation problem or disprove the
existence of an equilibrium.
For this, we associate an assignment game with a given partnership for-
mation problem in Section 3.1, and show in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 that the
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associated assignment game has various properties that are useful in finding
an equilibrium of the partnership formation problem. In particular, we show
that an equilibrium in the partnership formation problem corresponds to an
equilibrium in the associated assignment game satisfying a certain condition
(Theorems 3.3 and 3.4). Then, it is shown that using an equilibrium payoff
in the associated assignment game, the problem of finding an equilibrium in
the partnership formation problem can be reduced to the problem of finding
a matching among the agents such that each agent is matched to one of his
favorite agents (Theorem 3.5). Base on this property, we devise an algorithm
for computing an equilibrium of the partnership formation problem.
It is observed that our algorithm is similar to the algorithm by Andersson
et al. (2014b). Indeed, the starting point of our current research is to better
understand the behavior of their algorithm. In Section 4 we discuss the connec-
tion between our algorithm and the one by Andersson et al. (2014b), and show
that our algorithm can be seen as a variant of the algorithm by Andersson et al.
(2014b) with more flexibility.
We finally note that our approach by using an associated assignment game
is not totally new, and similar approach is already used in Biro´ et al. (2012) and
Chiappori et al. (2014). Indeed, Biro´ et al. (2012) and Chiappori et al. (2014)
associate certain assignment games with a given partnership formation problem,
and use the maximum weight of a matching in the associated assignment games
to characterize the existence of an equilibrium in the partnership formation
problem. Based on the characterization, Biro´ et al. (2012) and Chiappori et
al. (2014) propose algorithms for checking the existence of an equilibrium
in partnership formation problem. A drawback of their algorithms is that the
information about the joint values of agents pairs are needed to compute the
maximum weight of a matching.
In contrast, the associated assignment game used in this paper is similar to
but different from the ones in Biro´ et al. (2012) and Chiappori et al. (2014) (see
Section 3.1 for more discussion on the difference of the associated assignment
games). This difference makes it possible to obtain a characterization for the
existence of an equilibrium in terms of demand correspondences of agents.
This characterization is useful in designing an adjustment process for checking
the existence of an equilibrium, which does not require the information about
the joint values of agents pairs.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
We review definitions and fundamental properties for the partnership formation
problem and the assignment game. In the following, we denote by Z+ and R+
the sets of non-negative integers and non-negative real numbers, respectively.
2.1. Partnership Formation Problem
We explain the model of the partnership formation problem in Biro´ et al.
(2012), which is (slightly) more general than the original one in Talman &
Yang (2011).
An instance of the partnership formation problem is given by a tuple
(N,E,v), where (N,E) is an undirected graph and v : E → R+ is an edge
weight function taking non-negative real numbers. The vertex set N represents
a set of agents, where it is assumed that there are n agents and N = {1,2, . . . ,n}.
Each agent works alone or works together with another agent. We consider the
setting where possible partners of agents are restricted for some reasons such
as their skills and/or human relationship, and possible pairs are represented
by the edge set E ⊆ {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. That is, two agents i and j
can work together if and only if (i, j) ∈ E. The original model of Talman &
Yang (2011) corresponds to the case where any two agents can be a pair, i.e.,
E = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. We note that (i, j) ∈ E if and only if ( j, i) ∈ E for
every i, j ∈N. For (i, j)∈ E, the edge weight v(i, j) represents the (joint) value
generated by the two agents i and j. We assume, without loss of generality,
that the value generated by a single agent i ∈ N is equal to zero.
A vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) ∈ RN is called a payoff. A matching is a
function µ : N → N such that for i, j ∈ N, we have µ(i) = j if and only if
µ( j) = i. For i ∈ N, if µ(i) 6= i then agent µ(i) is the partner of agent i in the
matching µ , while µ(i) = i means that agent i has no partner in the matching
µ . Therefore, a matching corresponds to a partition of N into pairs of agents
and single agents.
A pair of a matching µ and a payoff p is called an equilibrium in the
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partnership formation problem (N,E,v) if the following conditions hold:1
pi+ p j ≥ v(i, j) (∀(i, j) ∈ E), (2.1)
pµ(i)+ pi = v(µ(i), i) (∀i ∈ N with µ(i) 6= i), (2.2)
pi ≥ 0 (∀i ∈ N), (2.3)
pi = 0 (∀i ∈ N with µ(i) = i). (2.4)
An equilibrium in the partnership formation problem may not exist (see,
e.g., Chiappori et al. (2014); Talman & Yang (2011)). For example, it is
easy to see that the partnership formation problem with N = {1,2,3}, E =
{(1,2),(2,3),(1,3)}, and v(i, j) = 1 for every (i, j) ∈ E has no equilibrium.
A matching (resp., a payoff) in an equilibrium is called an equilibrium
matching (resp., an equilibrium payoff ). The partnership formation problem is
called the matching game in Biro´ et al. (2012), where the set of equilibrium
payoffs in the partnership formation problem is called the core, while an
equilibrium payoff is called a core allocation.
The conditions (2.1)–(2.4) for an equilibrium can be simply rewritten as
follows:
pi+ p j ≥ v(i, j) (∀(i, j) ∈ E), (2.5)
pµ(i)+ pi = v(µ(i), i) (∀i ∈ N), (2.6)
where
v(i, i) = 0 (i ∈ N), E = E ∪{(i, i) | i ∈ N}.
Note that the pair (N,E) can be seen as an undirected graphs with a self-loop
at each vertex.
The conditions (2.5) and (2.6) can be further rewritten in terms of demand
correspondences. For an agent i ∈ N and a payoff p ∈ RN , we define the
demand correspondence Di(p)⊆ N as the set of agents j ∈ N that maximize
v(i, j)− p j, i.e.,
Di(p) = argmax{v(i, j)− p j | j ∈ N, (i, j) ∈ E}.
We consider the following two conditions, which are shown to be equivalent
to (2.5) and (2.6); the first condition means that the partner of each agent is
one of his favorite agents, and the second condition means that the payoff of
1 The symbol “∀” reads “for all” or “for every.”
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each agent i ∈ N is equal to the maximum of the value v(i, j)− p j among all
possible partners j ∈ N.
µ(i) ∈ Di(p) (∀i ∈ N), (2.7)
pi =max{v(i, j)− p j | j ∈ N, (i, j) ∈ E} (∀i ∈ N). (2.8)
Proposition 2.1. Let µ : N → N and p ∈ RN be a matching and a payoff,
respectively, in the partnership formation problem (N,E,v). Then, the pair
(µ, p) is an equilibrium in (N,E,v) if and only if it satisfies the conditions
(2.7) and (2.8).
Proof. The conditions (2.5) and (2.6) hold if and only if
v(µ(i), i)− pµ(i) = pi ≥ v(i, j)− p j (∀(i, j) ∈ E),
which is equivalent to the combination of (2.7) and (2.8).
So far we consider characterizations of equilibria in the partnership for-
mation problem. We then present necessary and sufficient conditions for
the existence of an equilibrium by using the following dual pair of linear
programming problems:
(P) Maximize ∑
(i, j)∈E
v(i, j)xi j
subject to ∑
j∈N\{i},(i, j)∈E
xi j ≤ 1 (∀i ∈ N),
xi j ≥ 0 (∀(i, j) ∈ E),
(D) Minimize ∑
i∈N
pi
subject to pi+ p j ≥ v(i, j) (∀(i, j) ∈ E),
pi ≥ 0 (∀i ∈ N).
Recall that E is a set of distinct (unordered) pairs of agents in N. Problem (P) is
a linear programming relaxation for the problem of finding a maximum-weight
matching in (N,E,v), where the weight of a matching µ : N→ N is given by
∑i∈N v(µ(i), i). By the duality theorem for linear programming problems, the
optimal value of (P) is equal to the optimal value of (D).
Proposition 2.2 (cf. Talman & Yang (2011); Biro´ et al. (2012)). For the
partnership formation problem (N,E,v), the following three conditions are
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equivalent.
(a) There exists an equilibrium in (N,E,v).
(b) Problem (P) has an integral optimal solution.
(c) The maximum weight of a matching in (N,E,v) is equal to the optimal
value of (P) (or the optimal value of (D)).
From Proposition 2.2, we can obtain the following properties; the last
property (iii) means that a matching and a payoff in an equilibrium can be
chosen independently of each other.
Proposition 2.3 (cf. Talman & Yang (2011)). Suppose that there exists an
equilibrium in the partnership formation problem (N,E,v). Let µ : N→ N be
a matching and p ∈ RN be a payoff.
(i) µ is an equilibrium matching if and only if it is a maximum-weight matching
in (N,E,v).
(ii) p is an equilibrium payoff if and only if it is an optimal solution of the
linear programming problem (D).
(iii) If µ is an equilibrium matching and p is an equilibrium payoff, then (µ, p)
is an equilibrium.
Example 1. To illustrate our results shown in this paper, we will use the
following example of the partnership formation problem (N,E,v) such that
N = {1,2,3,4,5}, E = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j},
and the values v(i, j) for (i, j) ∈ E are given by the following table:
i\ j 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 5 4 1 2
2 5 0 2 4 1
3 4 2 0 3 1
4 1 4 3 0 1
5 2 1 1 1 0
This problem has an equilibrium; indeed, the two matchings µa,µb : N→ N
given by
µa(1) = 2, µa(2) = 1, µa(3) = 4, µa(4) = 3, µa(5) = 5, (2.9)
µb(1) = 3, µb(2) = 4, µb(3) = 1, µb(4) = 2, µb(5) = 5 (2.10)
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are equilibrium matchings. By Proposition 2.3 (i), they are maximum-weight
matchings in (N,E,v) with the weight equal to 8. The set of equilibrium
payoffs is given as
P= {(p1, p2, p3, p4, p5) ∈ RN | 2≤ p1 ≤ 3, p2 = 5− p1,
p3 = 4− p1, p4 =−1+ p1, p5 = 0}.
By Proposition 2.3 (iii), a pair (µ, p) of a matching µ : N→ N and a payoff
p∈RN is an equilibrium in (N,E,v) if and only if µ ∈{µa,µb} and p∈P.
Remark 2.4. Problem (P) is known as the fractional matching problem in the
literature of combinatorial optimization (see, e.g., Schrijver (2003, Chapter
30)). The optimal value of problem (P) as well as an optimal solution can be
computed by solving the maximum-weight matching problem on a bipartite
graph (see, e.g., Nemhauser & Trotter (1975), Pulleyblank (1987), Schrijver
(2003, Chapter 30); see also Biro´ et al. (2012)).
The bipartite graph used for solving the problem (P) is given as follows.
Let N′ be a copy of the set N, and denote by i′ ∈ N′ the copy of i ∈ N, i.e.,
N′ = {i′ | i ∈ N}. Let us consider the bipartite graph (N,N′;F0) with vertex set
N∪N′ and edge set F0 given by
F0 = {(i, j′) ∈ N×N′ | (i, j) ∈ E}. (2.11)
Therefore, for each (i, j) ∈ E with i 6= j, set F0 contains two edges (i, j′) and
( j, i′), and for each i ∈ N, there is no edge between the vertices i ∈ N and
i′ ∈ N′. For (i, j′) ∈ F0, we define the edge weight w(i, j′) by w(i, j′) = v(i, j).
Then, the half of the weight of a maximum-weight matching in the bipartite
graph (N,N′;F0) is equal to the optimal value of the problem (P). Moreover,
for a maximum-weight matchingM ⊆ F0 in (N,N′;F0), the vector x∗ = (x∗i j |
(i, j) ∈ E) given by
x∗i j =

1 (if M contains both of (i, j′) and ( j, i′)),
1/2 (if M contains exactly one of (i, j′) and ( j, i′)),
0 (otherwise, i.e., M contains neither of (i, j′) and ( j, i′))
is an optimal solution of (P).
In the following sections we will use a bipartite graph similar to (N,N′;F0)
to reveal the connection between the partnership formation problem and the
assignment game.
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2.2. Assignment Game
The assignment game is a special case of the partnership formation problem,
where the set of agents N is partitioned into two disjoint sets A and B cor-
responding to sellers and buyers, respectively, and any two distinct sellers
(buyers) cannot be a pair.
In the following, we represent an instance of the assignment game by a tuple
(A,B,F,w), where (A,B;F) is a bipartite graph and w : F → R+ is an edge
weight function taking non-negative real numbers. The vertex sets A and B
represent the sets of sellers and buyers, respectively, and F ⊆ A×B is the set of
possible pairs of sellers and buyers, i.e., buyer i and seller j can be a pair if and
only if (i, j) ∈ F . For (i, j) ∈ F , w(i, j) represents the joint values generated by
pairs of agents i ∈ A and j ∈ B. Note that the original model of the assignment
game coincides with the case with F = A×B= {(i, j) | i ∈ A, j ∈ B}, i.e., any
seller and buyer can be a pair.
For notational convenience, we consider a dummy seller, denote by 0, and
regard each buyer j ∈ B with no partner as a pair (0, j) with the dummy seller.
We assume that the joint value generated by a pair with the dummy seller is
zero (i.e., w(0, j) = 0 for all j ∈ B), and the dummy seller can be a pair with
an arbitrary number of buyers. A matching in the assignment game (A,B,F,w)
is a function η : B→ A∪{0} satisfying the following conditions:
(η( j), j) ∈ F for every j ∈ B with η( j) 6= 0
(i.e., every pair (η( j), j) is “feasible”),
for each i ∈ A there exists at most one j ∈ B with η( j) = i
(i.e., every seller can be a pair with at most one buyer).
Vectors q= (qi | i∈ A)∈RA and r= (r j | j ∈ B)∈RB are called sellers’ payoff
and buyers’ payoff, respectively. A seller’s payoff is sometimes called a price
vector. The pair (q,r) is simply called a payoff.
The concept of equilibrium in the partnership formation problem is special-
ized to the assignment game as follows. The tuple (η ,q,r) of a matching η
and a payoff (q,r) is called an equilibrium in the assignment game (A,B,F,w)
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if the following conditions hold with q0 = 0:
qi+ r j ≥ w(i, j) (∀(i, j) ∈ F), (2.12)
qη( j)+ r j = w(η( j), j) (∀ j ∈ B), (2.13)
qi ≥ 0 (∀i ∈ A), r j ≥ 0 (∀ j ∈ B), (2.14)
qi = 0 (∀i ∈ A\{η( j) | j ∈ B}). (2.15)
Every assignment game has an equilibrium (Shapley & Shubik, 1971).
The conditions (2.12) and (2.13) can be rewritten in terms of demand
correspondences. For a vector of sellers’ payoff q ∈ RA and a buyer j ∈ B, we
define the demand correspondence D˜ j(q)⊆ A∪{0} of buyer j by
D˜ j(q) = argmax{w(i, j)−qi | i ∈ A∪{0}, (i, j) ∈ F ∪{(0, j)}}. (2.16)
We consider the following conditions:
η( j) ∈ D˜ j(q) (∀ j ∈ B), (2.17)
r j =max{w(i, j)−qi | i ∈ A∪{0}, (i, j) ∈ F ∪{(0, j)}} (∀ j ∈ B),
(2.18)
where q0 = 0.
Proposition 2.5. Let η : B→ A∪{0} be a matching in the assignment game
(A,B,F,w), and (q,r) ∈ RA×RB be a payoff. Then, the tuple (η ,q,r) is an
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the conditions (2.14), (2.15), (2.17), and
(2.18).
A matching η and a payoff (q,r) in an equilibrium (η ,q,r) are called an
equilibrium matching and an equilibrium payoff, respectively. Equilibrium
matching and payoff can be characterized as optimal solutions of certain
optimization problems (see, e.g., Shapley & Shubik (1971); Roth & Sotomayor
(1990)). In addition, any combination of an equilibrium matching and an
equilibrium payoff gives an equilibrium.
Proposition 2.6. Let η : B→ A∪{0} be a matching in the assignment game
(A,B,F,w), and (q,r) ∈ RA×RB be a payoff.
(i) η is an equilibrium matching if and only if it maximizes the weight ∑ j∈Bw(η( j), j)
among all matchings.
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(ii) (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff if and only if it is an optimal solution of the
following linear programming problem:
Minimize ∑
i∈A
qi+ ∑
j∈B
r j
subject to qi+ r j ≥ w(i, j) (∀(i, j) ∈ F),
qi ≥ 0 (∀i ∈ A), r j ≥ 0 (∀ j ∈ B).
(iii) If η is an equilibrium matching and (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff, then
(η ,q,r) is an equilibrium.
Define
H0 = {q ∈ RA | (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff
in (A,B,F,w) for some r ∈ RB}. (2.19)
If we regard q ∈ RA as a price vector of sellers’ goods, then H0 can be seen as
the set of equilibrium price vectors in the assignment game. Hence, a minimal
vector in the set H0 is uniquely determined (see, e.g., Shapley & Shubik
(1971)).
It is known that if an equilibrium price vector q ∈H0 is fixed, then the
corresponding buyers’ payoff r in an equilibrium payoff (q,r) is uniquely
determined by (2.18).
Proposition 2.7. Let (q,r) ∈ RA×RB be a payoff in the assignment game
(A,B,F,w). Then, (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff if and only if q ∈H0 and r is
given by (2.18).
An equilibrium matching can be characterized by using demand correspon-
dences.
Proposition 2.8. Let η : B→ A∪{0} be a matching in the assignment game
(A,B,F,w), and q ∈ RA be a vector with q ∈H0. Then, η is an equilibrium
matching if and only if η and q satisfy (2.15) and (2.17).
Proof. We define a vector r ∈ RB by (2.18). By Proposition 2.7, (q,r) is an
equilibrium payoff, and therefore it satisfies the condition (2.14). This fact,
together with Proposition 2.6 (iii), implies that η is an equilibrium matching
if and only if (η ,q,r) is an equilibrium. By Proposition 2.5, (η ,q,r) is an
equilibrium if and only if η is a matching satisfying (2.15) and (2.17).
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Finally, we present a price adjustment process (also known as a dynamic
auction) for computation of a vector inH0. It is known that the unique minimal
vector in H0 can be obtained by an ascending-type price adjustment process,
which is explained below.
For a vector q ∈ RA+ and a set Y ⊆ A, we define
O˜(Y,q) = { j ∈ B | D˜ j(q)⊆ Y},
U˜(Y,q) = { j ∈ B | D˜ j(q)∩Y 6= /0}. (2.20)
The set O˜(Y,q) consists of buyers who only demand sellers in Y at price q,
while U˜(Y,q) is the set of buyers who demand some seller in Y at price q.
Obviously, O˜(Y,q)⊆ U˜(Y,q) holds. A set Y ⊆ A is said to be overdemanded
if |O˜(Y,q)| > |Y |. A set X ⊆ A is said to be in excess demand at price q if it
satisfies
|U˜(Y,q)∩ O˜(X ,q)|> |Y | ( /0 6= ∀Y ⊆ X).
It is known that a maximal set in excess demand is uniquely determined (Mo et
al. (1988); Sankaran (1994)). Moreover, the maximal set X in excess demand
is an overdemanded set that maximizes the value |O˜(X ,q)|− |X | (Murota et al.
(2016)).
An ascending-type price adjustment process due to Mo et al. (1988) and
Sankaran (1994), which is a variant of the one in Demange et al. (1986), is
described as follows. We here assume that the values w(i, j) ((i, j) ∈ F) are
non-negative integers; this assumption implies that the minimal vector in H0
is integral.
Algorithm VICKREYENGLISH
Step 0: Set q ∈ ZA by q := (0,0, . . . ,0).
Step 1: Collect the demand correspondences D˜ j(q) for j ∈ B.
Step 2: If |O˜(S,q)| ≤ |S| holds for every S⊆ A, then output q and stop.
Step 3: Find the unique maximal set S˜∗ ⊆ A in excess demand at payoff q,
update q by qi := qi+1 (i ∈ S˜∗), and go to Step 1. 2
Proposition 2.9. For the assignment game (A,B,F,w), assume that the values
w(i, j) ((i, j) ∈ F) are non-negative integers. Then, the algorithm VICK-
REYENGLISH outputs the unique minimal vector in H0 (i.e., the unique mini-
mal equilibrium price vector).
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For more price adjustment processes for computing an equilibrium price
vector, see Appendix and also Andersson et al. (2010), Andersson & Erlanson
(2013) and Mishra & Parkes (2009).
3. REDUCTION OF PARTNERSHIP FORMATION PROBLEM TO
ASSIGNMENT GAME
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the assignment game is a special case of the
partnership formation problem. Hence, if we can compute an equilibrium in
the partnership formation problem, then we can also compute an equilibrium
in the assignment game.
In this section, we show that the converse is also true in some sense,
i.e., if we can compute an equilibrium in the assignment game, then we can
also compute an equilibrium in the partnership formation problem if it exists.
For this, we associate an assignment game with the partnership formation
problem in Section 3.1, and present its fundamental properties in Section 3.2.
In Section 3.3 we present the main theorems on the relationship between the
partnership formation problem and the associated assignment game. Based on
these theorems, we propose an algorithm for computing an equilibrium in the
partnership formation problem. Proofs are given in Section 3.4.
3.1. Assignment Game Associated with Partnership Formation Problem
For the partnership formation problem (N,E,v), we associate the assignment
game (N,N′,F,w) as follows, where F0 is given by (2.11).
N′ = {i′ | i ∈ N}, where i′ is a copy of i,
F = F0∪{(i, i′) | i ∈ N}
= {(i, j′) ∈ N×N′ | (i, j) ∈ E}∪{(i, i′) | i ∈ N},
w(i, j′) =
{
v(i, j) (if i 6= j),
0 (if i= j).
((i, j′) ∈ F).
We see that the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) is similar to the
bipartite graph (N,N′;F0) in Remark 2.4.
Example 2. To illustrate the associated assignment game defined above, we
consider the partnership formation problem (N,E,v) in Example 1. The
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associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) is given by
N = {1,2,3,4,5}, N′ = {1′,2′,3′,4′,5′},
F = {(i, j′) | i ∈ N, j′ ∈ N′},
and values w(i, j′) for (i, j′) ∈ F are given by the following table:
i\ j′ 1′ 2′ 3′ 4′ 5′
1 0 5 4 1 2
2 5 0 2 4 1
3 4 2 0 3 1
4 1 4 3 0 1
5 2 1 1 1 0
.
The assignment game (N,N′,F,w) has two equilibrium matchings ηa,ηb :
N′→ N given as
ηa(1′) = 2, ηa(2′) = 1, ηa(3′) = 4, ηa(4′) = 3, ηa(5′) = 5, (3.1)
ηb(1′) = 3, ηb(2′) = 4, ηb(3′) = 1, ηb(4′) = 2, ηb(5′) = 5. (3.2)
The set of equilibrium payoffs is given as
P˜= {(q,r) ∈ RN×RN′ | 2≤ q1 ≤ 3, 2≤ q2 ≤ 3,
q3 = q2−1, q4 = q1−1, q5 = 0,
r1′ = 5−q2, r2′ = 5−q1, r3′ = 3−q4,
r4′ = 3−q3, r5′ = 0}. (3.3)
By Proposition 2.6 (iii), a tuple (η ,q,r) is an equilibrium in the assignment
game (N,N′,F,w) if and only if η ∈ {ηa,ηb} and (q,r) ∈ P˜.
Assignment games associated with the partnership formation problem
are also considered in Biro´ et al. (2012) and Chiappori et al. (2014), which
are similar to ours, but different in the use of pairs {(i, i′) | i ∈ N}. In the
following, we discuss the difference among the three assignment games. While
the difference is subtle, it is crucial to our main results.
The associated assignment game in Biro´ et al. (2012) is obtained from
ours by deleting the pairs {(i, i′) | i ∈ N} from F , i.e., the set F is replaced
with F0 given by (2.11). Hence, the assignment game in Biro´ et al. (2012)
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is given by the bipartite graph (N,N′;F0) in Remark 2.4. Biro´ et al. (2012)
use the maximum weight of a matching in the associated assignment game
to characterize the existence of an equilibrium in the partnership formation
problem (N,E,v) (see Proposition 2.2 and Remark 2.4).
The associated assignment game in Chiappori et al. (2014) uses the pairs
{(i, i′) | i ∈ N} as in ours, but for a different purpose. Chiappori et al. (2014)
consider a more general model of the partnership formation problem, where
each i ∈ N corresponds to a type of agents and there are multiple agents of
the same type. Each pair (i, i′) in the assignment game of Chiappori et al.
(2014) is used to represent a pair of agents of the type i ∈ N. In contrast, in our
assignment game, each pair (i, i′) corresponds to a single agent i ∈ N with no
partner. Chiappori et al. (2014) use the associated assignment game to provide
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium in their
general model, in a similar way as in Biro´ et al. (2012).
3.2. Properties of Equilibria in the Associated Assignment Game
The associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) defined in Section 3.1 is “sym-
metric” in the sense that (i, j′) ∈ F holds if and only if ( j, i′) ∈ F , and the pairs
(i, j′) and ( j, i′) have the same weight. Due to the symmetric structure, various
nice properties of equilibria in (N,N′,F,w) can be obtained. In the following
discussion, we often identify the set N′ with N through the natural one-to-one
correspondence, and regard a vector in RN
′
(resp., RN) as a vector in RN (resp.,
RN
′
).
We consider a matching in (N,N′,F,w) such that every agent in N′∪N has
a partner. We call such a matching a perfect matching, following the graph
theory terminology. Note that a perfect matching indeed exists in (N,N′,F,w)
since {(i, i′) | i ∈ N} ⊆ F .
The next proposition shows that the assignment game (N,N′,F,w) has an
equilibrium matching that is a perfect matching. It should be noted that this
property does not hold for general assignment games.
Proposition 3.1. There exists an equilibrium matching η : N′→ N ∪{0} in
the assignment game (N,N′,F,w) such that η is a perfect matching.
Proof. Proof is given in Section 3.4.1.
In the following discussion, we consider a perfect matching whenever we
refer to a matching in (N,N′,F,w). Use of a perfect matching is a key to obtain
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the main results of this paper.
For the assignment game (N,N′,F,w) and a sellers’ payoff q ∈ RN , we
have defined the demand correspondence D˜ j′(q)⊆ N ∪{0} of buyer j′ ∈ N′
by (2.16), i.e.,
D˜ j′(q) = argmax{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N∪{0}, (i, j′) ∈ F ∪{(0, j′)}}. (3.4)
By the definition of the weight w(i, j′), we have
D˜ j′(q) = argmax{v(i, j)−qi | i ∈ N∪{0}, (i, j) ∈ E ∪{(0, j)}}
with v(0, j) = 0, and therefore D˜ j′(q)\{0}= D j(q) holds if D˜ j′(q)\{0} 6= /0
(i.e., max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} ≥ 0).
For the assignment game (N,N′,F,w), we have defined the set H0 ⊆ RN
of equilibrium price vectors by (2.19), i.e., H0 is given as
H0 = {q ∈ RN | (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff
in (N,N′,F,w) for some r ∈ RN′}. (3.5)
We show that the definition and characterizations (Propositions 2.7 and 2.8)
of an equilibrium (η ,q,r) in the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) can
be simplified if we restrict η to a perfect matching. Recall that an equilibrium
in the assignment game is defined by the four conditions (2.12)–(2.15).
Lemma 3.2. Let η : N′→ N and (q,r) ∈RN×RN′ be a perfect matching and
a payoff in the assignment game (N,N′,F,w), respectively.
(i) (η ,q,r) is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w) if and only if the following condi-
tions hold:
qi+ r j′ ≥ w(i, j′) (∀(i, j′) ∈ F), (3.6)
qη( j′)+ r j′ = w(η( j
′), j′) (∀ j′ ∈ N′), (3.7)
qi ≥ 0 (∀i ∈ N), r j′ ≥ 0 (∀ j′ ∈ N′). (3.8)
(ii) (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff in (N,N′,F,w) if and only if q ∈H0 and r
is given by
r j′ =max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} ( j′ ∈ N′). (3.9)
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Hence, the formula (3.5) can be rewritten as
H0 = {q ∈ RN | the pair (q,r) of q and r ∈ RN′ given by (3.9)
is an equilibrium payoff in (N,N′,F,w)}. (3.10)
(iii) Suppose that q ∈ H0 holds. Then, we have D˜ j(q) \ {0} 6= /0 (∀ j ∈ N).
Moreover, η is an equilibrium matching in (N,N′,F,w) if and only if
η( j′) ∈ D˜ j′(q)\{0} (∀ j′ ∈ N′).
Proof. Proof is given in Section 3.4.2.
3.3. Theorem and Algorithm for Partnership Formation Problem
We first present a characterization of equilibria in the partnership formation
problem (N,E,v) in terms of the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w).
For a matching µ : N→ N in (N,E,v), we define a matching ηµ : N′→ N in
(N,N′,F,w) associated with µ by
ηµ( j
′) = µ( j) ( j′ ∈ N′). (3.11)
Note that ηµ is a perfect matching in (N,N′,F,w).
Theorem 3.3. Let µ : N→ N and p ∈ RN be a matching and a payoff in the
partnership formation problem (N,E,v), respectively. Also, let ηµ :N′→N be
the (perfect) matching in the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) given
by (3.11). Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) (µ, p) is an equilibrium in (N,E,v).
(b) (ηµ , p, p) is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w).
(c) (ηµ ,q,r) is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w) for some payoff (q,r) ∈ RN×
RN
′
with (1/2)(q+ r) = p.
Proof. Proof is given in Section 3.4.3.
The next theorem clarifies the relationship between equilibrium matchings
(resp., payoffs) in the partnership formation problem (N,E,v) and equilibrium
matchings (resp., payoffs) in the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w).
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Theorem 3.4.
(i) For a matching µ : N→ N in the partnership formation problem (N,E,v),
let ηµ : N′→ N be the (perfect) matching given by (3.11) in the associated
assignment game (N,N′,F,w). Then, µ is an equilibrium matching in (N,E,v)
if and only if ηµ is an equilibrium matching in (N,N
′,F,w).
(ii) Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in (N,E,v). Then, a payoff p∈RN
is an equilibrium payoff in (N,E,v) if and only if there exists an equilibrium
payoff (q,r) ∈ RN×RN′ in (N,N′,F,w) such that (1/2)(q+ r) = p.
Proof. Proof is given in Section 3.4.4.
We finally show that an equilibrium in the partnership formation problem
(N,E,v) can be obtained by using an equilibrium payoff in the associated
assignment game (N,N′,F,w), provided that an equilibrium exists in (N,E,v).
Theorem 3.5. Let µ : N → N be a matching in the partnership formation
problem (N,E,v), and q ∈ RN be a payoff with q ∈H0.
(i) µ is an equilibrium matching in (N,E,v) if and only if
µ(i) ∈ Di(q) (∀i ∈ N). (3.12)
(ii) Suppose that µ is an equilibrium matching in (N,E,v). Define p ∈ RN by
pi = (1/2)(v(µ(i), i)+qi−qµ(i)) (i ∈ N). (3.13)
Then, p is an equilibrium payoff in (N,E,v).
Proof. Proof is given in Section 3.4.5.
Example 3. To illustrate the statements of Theorem 3.5, we consider the
partnership formation problem (N,E,v) in Example 1. We have
H0 = {q ∈ RN | 2≤ q1 ≤ 3, 2≤ q2 ≤ 3,
q3 = q2−1, q4 = q1−1, q5 = 0}. (3.14)
For every q ∈H0, it holds that
{2,3} ⊆ D1(q) = D4(q)⊆ {2,3,5},
D2(q) = {1,4},
{1,4} ⊆ D3(q)⊆ {1,4,5},
{5} ⊆ D5(q)⊆ {1,3,4,5}.
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It is observed that the (equilibrium) matchings µa,µb : N→ N given by (2.9)
and (2.10), respectively, satisfy the condition µa( j),µb( j) ∈ D j(q) (∀ j ∈ N)
by Theorem 3.5 (i).
For the matching µ = µa and the payoff q= (2,3,2,1,0) ∈H0, the vector
p∈RN given by (3.13) is equal to (2,3,2,1,0), which is an equilibrium payoff
in (N,E,v) by Theorem 3.5 (ii).
Theorem 3.5 implies that an equilibrium in the partnership formation
problem (N,E,v) can be found by the following algorithm. The idea of the
algorithm is as follows. Let q ∈RN be a vector in H0, which can be computed
by finding an equilibrium in the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) (see
Remark 3.6). By Theorem 3.5 (i), there exists an equilibrium matching in
(N,E,v) if and only if there exists a matching µ :N→N in (N,E,v) satisfying
the condition (3.12). Therefore, it suffices to check the existence of a matching
satisfying the condition (3.12), which can be done by finding a maximum-
cardinality matching on a certain undirected graph (see Remark 3.7).
Algorithm COMPUTEEQUILIBRIUM
Step 1: Find a vector q ∈H0.
Step 2: If there exists no matching µ : N→ N in (N,E,v) satisfying (3.12),
then assert that “no equilibrium exists in (N,E,v)” and stop.
Step 3: Find a matching µ : N→ N in (N,E,v) satisfying (3.12), and
let p ∈ RN be a vector given by (3.13).
Output (µ, p) as an equilibrium of (N,E,v).
Remark 3.6. We discuss the computation of a vector q ∈H0 in Step 1. If
the information of the demand correspondences D˜ j′(q) ( j
′ ∈ N′) is available,
then a vector q ∈H0 can be computed by the algorithm VICKREYENGLISH
in Section 2.2 or other price adjustment processes (see Appendix). In the case
where the information of the sets D j(q) ( j ∈ N) is available, a vector q ∈H0
can be computed by an adjustment process by Andersson et al. (2014b); see
Section 4 for details.
Remark 3.7. Computation of a matching µ in (N,E,v) satisfying (3.12) can
be reduced to finding a maximum-cardinality matching in an undirected graph
with vertex set N and the edge set given by {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i ∈ D j(p)} (see
Andersson et al. (2014b)). A maximum-cardinality matching in an undirected
graph can be found in strongly polynomial time, i.e., the time required to find
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a maximum-cardinality matching can be bounded by a polynomial in n= |N|
(see, e.g., Schrijver (2003)).
Remark 3.8. The algorithm COMPUTEEQUILIBRIUM requires the informa-
tion about the joint values of agents pairs only in the computation of an
equilibrium payoff p in Step 3, and other steps can be performed by using
demand correspondences only. This means that the information about the joint
values of agents pairs is not needed when we just check the existence of an
equilibrium and find an equilibrium matching (if it exists).
3.4. Proofs
3.4.1. Proof of Proposition 3.1
We prove the claim by a graph-theoretic argument. Let us consider a bipartite
graph G = (N,N′;F) with vertex set N ∪N′, edge set F , and edge weight
w(i, j′) for (i, j′) ∈ F . Recall that a matching in the graph G is a set M ⊆ F
of edges such that for each vertex i ∈ N ∪N′ there exists at most one edge
in M incident to i. It is easy to see that matchings in the assignment game
(N,N′,F,w) have a natural one-to-one correspondence with matchings in G;
moreover, Proposition 2.6 (i) implies that a matching in (N,N′,F,w) is an
equilibrium matching if and only if its corresponding matching in G is a
maximum-weight matching. Hence, to prove Proposition 3.1 it suffices to
show that there exists a maximum-weight matching in G that is a perfect
matching.
LetM ⊆ F be a maximum-weight matching in G. We assume thatM is not
a perfect matching. Due to the symmetry of the graph G,
M′ = {( j, i′) ∈ F | (i, j′) ∈M}
is also a maximum-weight matching in G.
Using the two matchings M and M′, we define an edge set X as follows.
For a vertex i in the graph G, we denote by degX(i) the number of edges
in X incident to i. We initially set X = M ∪M′. Then, we have degX(i) =
degX(i
′)≤ 2 for i ∈ N. For each i ∈ N, if degX(i) = degX(i′) = 1 then we add
to X (one copy of) the edge (i, i′), and if degX(i) = degX(i′) = 0 then we add
to X two copies of the edge (i, i′). Then, the resulting edge set X satisfies
degX(i) = degX(i
′) = 2 for each i ∈ N. This implies that X can be decomposed
into two perfect matchings, which are denoted as X1 and X2. Moreover, the total
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weight of the edge set X is twice the weight of a maximum-weight matching
since X contains all edges in M ∪M′ and each edge (i, i′) has zero weight.
Hence, both of the matchings X1 and X2 are maximum-weight matchings that
are perfect matchings.
3.4.2. Proof of Lemma 3.2
[Proof of (i)] By definition, the tuple (η ,q,r) is an equilibrium if and only
if it satisfies the conditions (3.6)–(3.8) and an additional condition that qi = 0
holds for all i ∈ N \{η( j′) | j′ ∈ N′}. Since η is a perfect matching, the set
N \ {η( j′) | j′ ∈ N′} is empty, and therefore the additional condition holds
immediately. Hence, the claim (i) holds.
[Proof of (ii)] By Proposition 2.7, (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff in
(N,N′,F,w) if and only if q ∈H0 and r is given by
r j′ =max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N∪{0}, (i, j′) ∈ F ∪{(0, j′)}} ( j′ ∈ N′).
To derive the equation (3.9), it suffices to show that for q ∈H0 we have
max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} ≥ w(0, j′)−q0 = 0 (∀ j′ ∈ N′).
(3.15)
Assume that η is an equilibrium matching in (N,N′,F,w) that is a perfect
matching; such η exists by Proposition 3.1. By Proposition 2.6 (iii), (η ,q,r) is
an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w), and therefore we have (3.7) and (3.8), implying
that
w(η( j′), j′)−qη( j′) = r j′ ≥ 0 (∀ j′ ∈ N′).
Therefore, (3.15) holds.
[Proof of (iii)] By (3.15), the set D˜ j′(q)\{0} is nonempty for all j′ ∈ N′.
It follows from the proof of (i) and Proposition 2.8 that η is an equilibrium
matching if and only if η( j′) ∈ D˜ j′(q) holds for all j′ ∈ N′. Since η( j′) 6= 0,
we have η( j′) ∈ D˜ j′(q) if and only if η( j′) ∈ D˜ j′(q)\{0}.
3.4.3. Proof of Theorem 3.3
We first prove the equivalence of (a) and (b), and then the equivalence of (b)
and (c).
[Proof of (a)⇔(b)] Recall that (µ, p) is an equilibrium in (N,E,v) if
and only if it satisfies the conditions (2.5) and (2.6). By the definitions of F ,
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w, and ηµ , the conditions can be rewritten in terms of the assignment game
(N,N′,F,w) as
pi+ p j′ ≥ w(i, j′) (∀(i, j′) ∈ F), (3.16)
pηµ ( j′)+ p j′ = w(ηµ( j
′), j′) (∀ j′ ∈ N′). (3.17)
The condition (3.16) implies pi ≥ 0 for i∈N since 2pi = pi+ pi′ ≥w(i, i′) = 0
for i ∈ N. By Lemma 3.2 (i), the conditions (3.16) and (3.17) hold if and only
if (ηµ , p, p) is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w).
[Proof of (b)⇔(c)] The implication “(b)⇒(c)” is easy to see by setting
q= r = p. The converse can be shown as follows.
By assumption, ηµ and (q,r) are an equilibrium matching and an equilib-
rium payoff in (N,N′,F,w), respectively. Due to the symmetric structure of
(N,N′,F,w), we can easily observe that the tuple (η̂ ,r,q) with the matching
η̂ : N′→ N given by
η̂( j′) = i if ηµ(i′) = j (∀ j′ ∈ N′)
is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w). Hence, (r,q) is also an equilibrium pay-
off in (N,N′,F,w). By Proposition 2.6 (ii), the set of an equilibrium pay-
offs in (N,N′,F,w) is given as a convex polyhedron. Hence, the payoff
(p, p) = (1/2)[(q,r) + (r,q)] is also an equilibrium payoff in (N,N′,F,w).
By Proposition 2.6 (iii), (ηµ , p, p) is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w).
3.4.4. Proof of Theorem 3.4
The claim (i) can be shown by the following chain of equivalence:
µ is an equilibrium matching in (N,E,v)
⇐⇒ (µ, p) is an equilibrium in (N,E,v) for some payoff p ∈ RN
(by the definition of equilibrium matchings)
⇐⇒ (ηµ ,q,r) is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w)
for some payoff (q,r) ∈ RN×RN′ (by Theorem 3.3)
⇐⇒ ηµ is an equilibrium matching in (N,N′,F,w)
(by the definition of equilibrium matchings).
The claim (ii) can be also shown in a similar way. Let µ : N→ N be an
equilibrium matching in (N,E,v); the existence follows from the assumption
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of the claim (ii). Then, the claim (i) shown above implies that the matching
ηµ : N′ → N in (N,N′,F,w) given by (3.11) is an equilibrium matching in
(N,N′,F,w). Therefore, we obtain the following chain of equivalence:
p is an equilibrium payoff in (N,E,v)
⇐⇒ (µ, p) is an equilibrium in (N,E,v)
(by the definition of equilibrium payoffs and Proposition 2.3 (iii))
⇐⇒ (ηµ ,q,r) is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w) for some payoff
(q,r) ∈ RN×RN′ with (1/2)(q+ r) = p (by Theorem 3.3)
⇐⇒ there exists an equilibrium payoff (q,r) ∈ RN×RN′
in (N,N′,F,w) such that (1/2)(q+ r) = p
(by the definition of equilibrium payoffs and Proposition 2.6 (iii)).
3.4.5. Proof of Theorem 3.5
Let ηµ : N′ → N be the matching in (N,N′,F,w) given by (3.11). By The-
orem 3.4 (i), µ is an equilibrium matching in (N,E,v) if and only if ηµ is
an equilibrium matching in (N,N′,F,w), which is in turn equivalent to the
condition
ηµ(i
′) ∈ D˜i′(q)\{0} (∀i′ ∈ N′) (3.18)
by Lemma 3.2 (iii). Since the set D˜i′(q) \ {0} is nonempty by Lemma 3.2
(iii), we have D˜i′(q)\{0}= Di(q) for i ∈ N. We also have µ(i) = ηµ(i′) 6= 0
for i ∈ N, which implies that the condition (3.18) can be rewritten as µ(i) ∈
Di(q) (∀i ∈ N). This concludes the proof of (i).
We then prove the claim (ii). Define a vector r ∈ RN by
r(i) = v(µ(i), i)−qµ(i) (i ∈ N). (3.19)
We will show below that (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff in (N,N′,F,w). Since
p=(1/2)(q+r) holds, it follows from Theorem 3.4 (ii) that p is an equilibrium
payoff in (N,E,v).
We now show that (q,r) is an equilibrium payoff in (N,N′,F,w). Since
ηµ(i
′) = µ(i) for i ∈ N and v(i, j) = w(i, j′) for (i, j) ∈ E, the equation (3.19)
can be rewritten as
r(i′) = w(ηµ(i′), i′)−qηµ (i′) (∀i′ ∈ N′).
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Since ηµ is an equilibrium matching in (N,N′,F,w), the condition (3.18)
follows from the proof of the claim (i). Hence, we have
r(i′) = w(ηµ(i′), i′)−qηµ (i′)
=max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} (∀i′ ∈ N′).
Since q ∈H0, this equation and Lemma 3.2 (ii) imply that (q,r) is an equilib-
rium payoff in (N,N′,F,w).
4. CONNECTION TO THE ALGORITHM OF ANDERSSON ET AL.
4.1. Theorems
We consider the algorithm by Andersson et al. (2014b) for finding an equilib-
rium in the partnership formation problem, and discuss the connection with
our algorithm COMPUTEEQUILIBRIUM. The difference between the two al-
gorithms is in the choice of a vector q; while q is selected from the set H0
in our algorithm, it is computed by a certain price adjustment process in the
algorithm by Andersson et al. (2014b). In the following, we show that the
vector q used in Andersson et al. (2014b) is the unique minimal vector in H0.
This implies that the algorithm in Andersson et al. (2014b) can be viewed as
a specific implementation of our algorithm. We also discuss the relationship
between the price adjustment process used in the algorithm of Andersson et
al. (2014b) and the algorithm VICKREYENGLISH for the assignment game in
Section 2.2.
We first explain the algorithm by Andersson et al. (2014b). In this section,
we assume that the values v(i, j) are integers, as in Andersson et al. (2014b).
For a payoff p ∈ RN and a set S⊆ N of agents, we denote by O(S, p) the set
of agents j ∈ N such that all of j’s best (possible) partners under the payoff p
are contained in the set S, and byU(S, p) the set of agents j ∈ N such that at
least one of j’s best (possible) partners of j under the payoff p is contained in
S. That is,
O(S, p) = { j ∈ N | D j(p)⊆ S},
U(S, p) = { j ∈ N | D j(p)∩S 6= /0}.
A set S⊆ N is said to be overdemanded if |O(S, p)|> |S|, and underdemanded
if |U(S, p)| < |S|. If some set S ⊆ N is overdemanded, then it is impossible
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to assign distinct partners in S to all agents in O(S, p), implying that there
exists no matching µ : N→ N such that µ(i) ∈Di(p) (∀i ∈ N). Similarly, if an
underdemanded set exists, then there exists no matching µ with µ(i) ∈ Di(p)
(∀i ∈ N).
We say that S is in excess demand at payoff p if the following condition
holds:
|U(T, p)∩O(S, p)|> |T | ( /0 6= ∀T ( S).
It is known (see Andersson et al. (2010, 2013); Mo et al. (1988)) that a set in
excess demand exists if an overdemanded set exists (i.e., |O(S, p)|> |S| holds
for some S⊆ N), and a maximal set in excess demand is uniquely determined.
We describe below the algorithm by Andersson et al. (2014b) in its variant
given in Andersson et al. (2014a). The difference between the algorithm
PARTNERSHIPFORMATION and our algorithm is only in the choice of a vector
q in Step 1.
Algorithm PARTNERSHIPFORMATION
Step 1: Compute a vector q ∈ RN by the algorithm PROCESSAEGHK
given below.
Step 2: If there exists no matching µ : N→ N in (N,E,v) satisfying (3.12),
then assert that “no equilibrium exists in (N,E,v)” and stop.
Step 3: Find a matching µ : N→ N in (N,E,v) satisfying (3.12), and
let p ∈ RN be a vector given by (3.13).
Output (µ, p) as an equilibrium of (N,E,v).
Algorithm PROCESSAEGHK
Step 0: Set q ∈ ZN by q := (0,0, . . . ,0).
Step 1: Collect the demand correspondences D j(q) for j ∈ N.
Step 2: If |O(S,q)| ≤ |S| holds for every S⊆ N, then output q and stop.
Step 3: Find the unique maximal set S∗ ⊆ N in excess demand at payoff q,
update q by qi := qi+1 (i ∈ S∗), and go to Step 1.
We denote by q∗ the output of the algorithm PROCESSAEGHK, i.e., q∗
is the vector q used in PARTNERSHIPFORMATION. We also denote by q̂ the
unique minimal vector in H0. We will show that q∗ = q̂ ∈H0 holds. Hence,
the algorithm PROCESSAEGHK can be seen as a specific implementation of
Step 1 in our algorithm.
Theorem 4.1. The vector q∗ found in the algorithm PROCESSAEGHK is
equal to the unique minimal vector q̂ in H0.
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Proof. Proof is given in Section 4.2.1.
We then show that the trajectory of the vector q in the algorithm PROCES-
SAEGHK is the same as that of the algorithm VICKREYENGLISH applied
to the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w). It should be noted that the
algorithms PROCESSAEGHK and VICKREYENGLISH use different kind of
demand correspondences; the former uses Di(q) ⊆ N, while the latter uses
D˜ j′(q)⊆ N∪{0}.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that the algorithm PROCESSAEGHK is applied to the
partnership formation problem (N,E,v). Then, the trajectory of the vector q is
the same as that of the algorithm VICKREYENGLISH applied to the associated
assignment game (N,N′,F,w).
Proof. Proof is given in Section 4.2.2.
4.2. Proofs
4.2.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Two lemmas are given before we start the proof of Theorem 4.1. We define
H = {q ∈ RN | qi ≥ 0 (∀i ∈ N), |O(S,q)| ≤ |S| (∀S⊆ N)}. (4.1)
This set is used in Andersson et al. (2014b) to prove the validity of their
algorithm. In particular, the following fact is proved.
Lemma 4.3 (Andersson et al. (2014b, Theorem 2)). A minimal vector in H
is uniquely determined and equal to the vector q∗.
We will prove that a vector q is in the set H0 if and only if q is a vector in
H satisfying the additional condition that
max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} ≥ 0 (∀ j′ ∈ N′). (4.2)
This additional condition means that the payoff of every buyer j′ ∈ N′ in
the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) is non-negative under the prices
given by q.
Lemma 4.4. The set H0 ⊆ RN given by (3.5) can be rewritten as
H0 = {q ∈H | q satisfies (4.2)}. (4.3)
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Proof. For q ∈ RN , we define a vector r ∈ RN′ by
r j′ =max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} ( j′ ∈ N′). (4.4)
To prove the equation (4.3), we will show the following equivalence:
q ∈H0 if and only if q ∈H and r j′ ≥ 0 for all j′ ∈ N′.
We first prove the “only if” part of this equivalence, and then the “if” part.
[Proof of “only if” part] Let q ∈H0. Then, the pair (q,r) is an equilib-
rium payoff in the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) by Lemma 3.2 (ii),
and therefore we have
qi ≥ 0 (∀i ∈ N), r j′ ≥ 0 (∀ j′ ∈ N′).
To prove q ∈ H , we need to show that |O(S,q)| ≤ |S| holds for every
S ⊆ N since qi ≥ 0 holds for all i ∈ N. Let η : N′ → N be an equilibrium
matching in the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) such that η is a
perfect matching. Since q ∈H0, we have η( j′) ∈ D˜ j′(q) \ {0} = D j(q) for
j′ ∈ N′ by Lemma 3.2 (iii). Therefore, it holds that
|O(S,q)|= |{η( j′) | j ∈ O(S,q)}| ≤ |
⋃
j∈O(S,q)
D j(q)| ≤ |S|,
where the last inequality is by D j(q)⊆ S for j ∈ O(S,q).
[Proof of “if” part] Suppose that q ∈ H and r j′ ≥ 0 for all j′ ∈ N′.
To prove q ∈ H0, it suffices to show that there exists a perfect matching
η : N′→ N in the associated assignment game (N,N′,F,w) such that (η ,q,r)
is an equilibrium in (N,N′,F,w).
For every j′ ∈ N′, we have D˜ j′(q)\{0}= D j(q) since
max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}= r j′ ≥ 0.
It follows that for every S⊆ N,
U˜(S,q) = { j′ ∈ N′ | D˜ j′(q)∩S 6= /0}= { j ∈ N | D j(q)∩S 6= /0}=U(S,q).
We also haveU(S,q) = N \O(N \S,q). Hence, it holds that
|U˜(S,q)|= |U(S,q)|= |N|− |O(N \S,q)| ≥ |N|− |N \S|= |S|,
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where the inequality holds by q ∈H . By the well-known Hall’s theorem in
graph theory (see, e.g., Schrijver (2003)), the condition |U˜(S,q)| ≥ |S| (∀S⊆
N) implies the existence of a perfect matching η :N′→N in (N,N′,F,w) such
that η( j′) ∈ D˜ j′(q)\{0} (∀ j′ ∈ N′). Then, it is not difficult to see that (η ,q,r)
satisfies the conditions (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8), i.e., (η ,q,r) is an equilibrium by
Lemma 3.2 (i). Thus, we have q ∈H0 by the definition of H0.
We now prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Lemma 4.4, it holds that q̂∈H0⊆H . This implies
that q∗ ≤ q̂ since q∗ is the unique minimal vector in H . Therefore, for every
j′ ∈ N′ it holds that
max{w(i, j′)−q∗i | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}
≥max{w(i, j′)− q̂i | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} ≥ 0,
where the last inequality is by q̂∈H . Hence, we have q∗ ∈H0 by Lemma 4.4.
From the minimality of q̂ in H0, we have q∗ ≥ q̂, implying that q∗ = q̂.
4.2.2. Proof of Theorem 4.2
We assume that the trajectory of the vector q is the same until the k-th iteration
of the two algorithms, and show that q remains the same in the (k+ 1)-st
iteration. For this, we will prove that the set S∗ in Step 3 of the k-th iteration
in PROCESSAEGHK is the same as the set S˜∗ in Step 2 of the k-th iteration
in VICKREYENGLISH. Recall that S∗ and S˜∗ are defined by using demand
correspondences of different kinds.
We consider the vector q at the beginning of the k-th iteration in PRO-
CESSAEGHK (and in VICKREYENGLISH). Since q∗ and q̂ are outputs of
PROCESSAEGHK and VICKREYENGLISH, respectively, we have q≤ q∗ = q̂,
where the equality is by Theorem 4.1.
To prove S˜∗ = S∗, we show that the following conditions hold:
D˜ j′(q)\{0}= D j(q) (∀ j ∈ N), (4.5)
U˜(Y,q) =U(Y,q) (∀Y ⊆ N). (4.6)
O˜(S˜∗,q) = O(S˜∗,q), (4.7)
O˜(S∗,q) = O(S∗,q). (4.8)
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The proofs of (4.5)–(4.8) are given later.
We first show that S˜∗ ⊆ S∗ holds. Since S∗ is the maximal set in excess
demand with respect to the demand correspondences D j(q), it suffices to show
that S˜∗ is a set in excess demand with respect to the demand correspondences
D j(q). For each Y with /0 6= Y ⊆ S˜∗, we have
|U(Y,q)∩O(S˜∗,q)|= |U˜(Y,q)∩ O˜(S˜∗,q)|> |Y |,
where the equality is by (4.6) and (4.7), and the inequality is by the definition
of S˜∗. This shows that S˜∗ is a set in excess demand with respect to the demand
correspondences D j(q). By the maximality of S∗, we have S˜∗ ⊆ S∗.
Since S˜∗ is the maximal set in excess demand with respect to the demand
correspondences D˜ j(q), we can show the inclusion S˜∗ ⊇ S∗ in the same way
as above by using (4.6) and (4.8). Hence, we have S˜∗ = S∗.
To conclude the proof, we show that the conditions (4.5)–(4.8) hold.
We first prove (4.5). Since q≤ q̂, we have
max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}
≥max{w(i, j′)− q̂i | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} ≥ 0 (∀ j′ ∈ N′), (4.9)
where the last inequality is by q̂ ∈H0 and Lemma 4.4. Therefore, we have
D˜ j′(q) = argmax{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N∪{0}, (i, j′) ∈ F ∪{(0, j′)}}
⊇ argmax{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}
= argmax{v(i, j)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j) ∈ E}= D j(q)
for j ∈ N, from which (4.5) follows.
The equation (4.6) can be obtained from (4.5) as follows:
U˜(Y,q) = { j′ ∈ N′ | D˜ j′(q)∩Y 6= /0}= { j ∈ N | D j(q)∩Y 6= /0}=U(Y,q).
We finally prove (4.7) and (4.8). By (4.5), we have D j(q)⊆ D˜ j′(q) for all
j ∈ N, from which follows that
O˜(Y,q) = { j′ ∈ N′ | D˜ j′(q)⊆ Y} ⊆ { j ∈ N | D j(q)⊆ Y}= O(Y,q).
for every Y ⊆ N. Hence, it suffices to show that
O(S˜∗,q)⊆ O˜(S˜∗,q), O(S∗,q)⊆ O˜(S∗,q).
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In the following, we prove the latter only; the former can be proven similarly.
To prove the inclusion O(S∗,q) ⊆ O˜(S∗,q), we show that j′ ∈ O˜(S∗,q)
holds for every j ∈ O(S∗,q).
Let j ∈ O(S∗,q). Then, D j(q) ⊆ S∗ holds by the definition of O(S∗,q).
If 0 6∈ D˜ j′(q), then (4.5) implies that D˜ j′(q) = D j(q) ⊆ S∗, i.e., j′ ∈ O˜(S∗,q)
holds. We assume, to the contrary, that 0 ∈ D˜ j′(q) and derive a contradiction.
Since 0 ∈ D˜ j′(q) and D˜ j′(q)\{0}= D j(q) 6= /0, we have
max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}= 0. (4.10)
Let q¯ ∈ ZN be a vector given by
q¯i =
{
qi+1 (if i ∈ S∗),
qi (otherwise)
(i ∈ N).
That is, q¯ is the vector q in the (k+1)-st iteration in PROCESSAEGHK. Since
q≤ q¯≤ q∗ = q̂, we have
0=max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}
≥max{w(i, j′)− q¯i | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}
≥max{w(i, j′)− q̂i | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F} ≥ 0,
where the equality is by (4.10) and the last inequality is by (4.9). Hence, we
have
max{w(i, j′)− q¯i | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}=max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}.
(4.11)
It holds that
max{w(i, j′)− q¯i | i ∈ S∗, (i, j′) ∈ F}
=max{w(i, j′)− (qi+1) | i ∈ S∗, (i, j′) ∈ F}
=max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ S∗, (i, j′) ∈ F}−1
≤max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}−1. (4.12)
We also have
max{w(i, j′)− q¯i | i ∈ N \S∗, (i, j′) ∈ F}
=max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N \S∗, (i, j′) ∈ F}
≤max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}−1, (4.13)
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where the inequality is by the facts that D˜ j′(q)\{0} ⊆ S∗ and w(i, j′) and qi
are integer-valued. It follows from (4.12) and (4.13) that
max{w(i, j′)− q¯i | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}
=max
[
max{w(i, j′)− q¯i | i ∈ S∗, (i, j′) ∈ F},
max{w(i, j′)− q¯i | i ∈ N \S∗, (i, j′) ∈ F}
]
≤max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F}−1
<max{w(i, j′)−qi | i ∈ N, (i, j′) ∈ F},
a contradiction to (4.11). This concludes the proof of (4.8).
A. APPENDIX: REVIEW OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES
FOR ASSIGNMENT GAMES
We review price adjustment processes for the assignment game (A,B,F,w). A
price adjustment process is an algorithm (a mechanism, more precisely) for
finding an equilibrium price vector of the assignment game (i.e., a vector in
H0) by iteratively updating the price vector, where the information of buyers’
demand correspondences are used. We have already presented the algorithm
VICKREYENGLISH in Section 2.2 as an example of a price adjustment process.
We present some other price adjustment processes based on Lyapunov function
minimization.
For buyer j ∈ B, we define the indirect utility function Vj : RA+→ R by
Vj(q) =max{w(i, j)−qi | i ∈ A∪{0}} (q ∈ RA+).
We also define the Lyapunov function L : RA→ R by
L(q) = ∑
j∈B
Vj(q)+∑
i∈A
qi (q ∈ RA+).
Throughout this section, we assume that the values w(i, j) ((i, j) ∈ F) are
non-negative integers. It is known (Ausubel (2006), Murota et al. (2016)) that
the set of minimizers of the Lyapunov function L coincides with the set of
equilibrium price vectors in the assignment game. Moreover, the integrality of
values w(i, j) implies the existence of an integral minimizer of the Lyapunov
function L; in particular, the unique minimal and maximal minimizers of the
Lyapunov function L are integral vectors. Based on this fact, we can compute
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an equilibrium price vector by finding an integral minimizer of the Lyapunov
function L.
The following ascending-type price adjustment process finds a minimizer
of the Lyapunov function (Ausubel (2006)). For a set S ⊆ A, we denote by
χS ∈ {0,1}A the characteristic vector of S, i.e.,
(χS)i =
{
1 (if i ∈ S),
0 (otherwise).
Algorithm ASCENDMINIMAL
Step 0: Set q := q◦, where q◦ ∈ ZA+ is an arbitrary vector that is
a lower bound of the minimal vector in H0 (e.g., q◦ = (0,0, . . . ,0)).
Step 1: Collect the demand correspondences D˜ j(q) for j ∈ B.
Step 2: Find the unique minimal set S⊆ A minimizing L(q+χS).
Step 3: If L(q+χS) = L(q), then output q and stop.
Step 4: Update q by q := q+χS, and go to Step 1.
It should be noted that computation of a set S⊆ A minimizing L(q+χS) in
Step 2 can be done by using the demand correspondences D˜ j(q) ( j ∈ B) since
it holds that
L(q+χS)−L(q) = |S|− |O˜(S,q)| (S⊆ A).
It is shown in Murota et al. (2016) that the behavior of the algorithm ASCEND-
MINIMAL is exactly the same as the algorithm VICKREYENGLISH in Section
2.2. In particular, the set S computed in Step 2 of each iteration is equal to the
the maximal set in excess demand at payoff q.
We consider a variant of the algorithm ASCENDMINIMAL, called AS-
CENDMAXIMAL, where the initial vector q◦ is chosen to be a lower bound of
the unique maximal vector in H0 in Step 0, and the unique maximal set S⊆ A
minimizing L(q+χS) is used in Step 2.
Each of the algorithms ASCENDMINIMAL and ASCENDMAXIMAL finds
an equilibrium price vector of the assignment game. Moreover, ASCENDMIN-
IMAL (resp., ASCENDMAXIMAL) finds the unique minimal (resp., maximal)
equilibrium price vector.
Theorem A.1 (Ausubel (2006); Murota et al. (2016)). For the assignment
game (A,B,F,w), the algorithm ASCENDMINIMAL (resp., ASCENDMAXI-
MAL) outputs the unique minimal (resp., maximal) price vector in the set H0
given by (2.19).
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We then present a descending-type price adjustment process, where the
price vector decreases monotonically in each iteration.
Algorithm DESCENDMAXIMAL
Step 0: Set q := q◦, where q◦ ∈ZA+ is an arbitrary vector that is an upper bound
of the maximal vector in H0.
Step 1: Collect the demand correspondences D˜ j(q) for j ∈ B.
Step 2: Find the unique minimal set S⊆ A minimizing L(q−χS).
Step 3: If L(q−χS) = L(q), then output q and stop.
Step 4: Update q by q := q−χS, and go to Step 1.
We also consider a variant, called DESCENDMINIMAL, where the initial
vector q◦ is chosen to be an upper bound of the unique minimal vector in H0 in
Step 0, and the unique maximal set S⊆ Aminimizing L(q−χS) is used in Step
2. It is shown in Murota et al. (2016) that the behavior of DESCENDMINIMAL
coincides with that of the descending-type price adjustment process due to
Mishra & Parkes (2009).
Theorem A.2 (Ausubel (2006); Murota et al. (2016)). For the assignment
game (A,B,F,w), the algorithm DESCENDMINIMAL (resp., DESCENDMAXI-
MAL) outputs the unique minimal (resp., maximal) price vector in the set H0
given by (2.19).
We finally present the so-called two-phase algorithms for finding an equi-
librium (see Murota et al. (2016); see also Murota (2016)). A two-phase
algorithm consists of the ascending phase and the descending phase, and the
price vector is increasing in the ascending phase and then decreasing in the
descending phase. That is, a two-phase algorithm is a combination of two price
adjustment processes of ascending-type and descending-type. An important
merit of two-phase algorithms is that any price vector can be used as an ini-
tial vector, which is impossible in ascending- or descending-type adjustment
processes. This flexibility enables us to reduce the number of iterations by
selecting an initial vector that is close to an equilibrium price vector.
By the combination of ASCENDMINIMAL/ASCENDMAXIMAL and DE-
SCENDMINIMAL/DESCENDMAXIMAL, we can obtain four variants of two-
phase algorithms. For example, the combination of ASCENDMINIMAL and
DESCENDMAXIMAL yields the following algorithm (Murota (2016); Murota
et al. (2016)).
Algorithm TWOPHASEMINMAX
Step 0: Set q := q◦, where q◦ ∈ ZA+ is an arbitrary vector.
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Go to Ascending Phase.
Ascending Phase:
Step A1: Collect the demand correspondences D˜ j(q) for j ∈ B.
Step A2: Find the unique minimal set S⊆ A minimizing L(q+χS).
Step A3: If L(q+χS) = L(q), then go to Descending Phase.
Step A4: Update q by q := q+χS, and go to Step A1.
Descending Phase:
Step D1: Collect the demand correspondences D˜ j(q) for j ∈ B.
Step D2: Find the unique minimal set S⊆ A minimizing L(q−χS).
Step D3: If L(q−χS) = L(q), then output q and stop.
Step D4: Update q by q := q−χS, and go to Step D1.
The ascending phase stops at the vector qˆ that is the unique minimal
minimizer of the Lyapunov function in the region {q | q ≥ q◦}, and the de-
scending phase stops at the vector qˇ that is the unique maximal minimizer of
the Lyapunov function in the region {q | q≤ qˆ}, which turns out to be a global
minimizer of the Lyapunov function, i.e., an equilibrium price vector (Murota
(2016); Murota et al. (2016)).
Theorem A.3 (Murota (2016); Murota et al. (2016)). For the assignment game
(A,B,F,w), the algorithm TWOPHASEMINMAX outputs a vector in the set
H0 given by (2.19).
The algorithm TWOPHASEMINMAX has the following characteristics:
• TWOPHASEMINMAX terminates in a smaller number of itera-
tions than the other three variants of the two-phase algorithms.
• The output of TWOPHASEMINMAX is neither of minimal and
maximal equilibrium price vectors in general.
We finally discuss bounds for the number of iterations required by the
algorithms explained above. It can be shown that the worst case bound for the
number of iterations required by the algorithms explained above is proportional
to max{w(i, j) | i∈ A, j ∈ B} (see, e.g., Andersson & Erlanson (2013); Murota
(2016); Murota et al. (2016)). This means that the number of iterations required
by the algorithms is pseudo-polynomial in the terminology of algorithm theory.
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ABSTRACT
A coordination game is repeatedly played on a graph by players (vertices) who
have heterogeneous cardinal preferences and whose strategy choice is governed
by the individualistic asynchronous logit dynamic. The idea of potential driven
autonomy of sets of players is used to derive results on the possibility of
heterogeneous preferences leading to heterogeneous behavior. In particular,
a class of graphs is identified such that for large enough graphs in this class,
diversity in ordinal preferences will nearly always lead to heterogeneity in
behavior, regardless of the cardinal strength of the preferences. These results
have implications for network design problems, such as when a social planner
wishes to induce homogeneous/heterogeneous behavior in a population.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the classic treatment of Lewis (1969), game theory has concerned
itself with the behavior of individuals and groups within societies when inter-
actions between individuals take the form of a coordination game. One area of
this literature has studied perturbed adaptive dynamics (Freidlin & Wentzell,
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1984; Foster & Young, 1991) and looked at long run behavior (Young, 1993;
Kandori et al., 1993; Blume, 1996; Peski, 2010; Neary, 2012; Staudigl, 2012)
and the speed of convergence of behavior (Young, 2011; Ellison, 2000; Monta-
nari & Saberi, 2010; Newton & Angus, 2015) in binary-choice coordination
games under different interaction structures, which can be represented by
graphs, with players represented by vertices and interactions between players
represented by edges.
A set of players is said to be autonomous if predictions can be made about
the behavior of players within the set without considering the behavior of
players outside of the set. Young (2011) shows how one concept of autonomy,
potential autonomy,1 associated with the maximization of a potential function,
is related to graph structure, and uses this connection to derive results on the
speed of convergence of a population to homogeneous behavior under log-
linear dynamics when interactions are identical, symmetric coordination games.
Here, it is shown that when interactions are non-identical and asymmetric, these
ideas can be used to make statements about the long run behavior of players,
in particular about the possibility of convergence to states in which different
players play different strategies. Specifically, there is heterogeneity in players’
raw preferences for one action over another, and the strength of any given
player’s preference is given by an individual-specific preference parameter.
Conditions under which heterogeneous preferences lead to heterogeneous
behavior are given. In particular, a class of graphs, corpulent graphs, is
identified such that, for large enough graphs in this class, random diversity
in ordinal preferences will nearly always lead to heterogeneity in behavior,
regardless of the cardinal strength of the preferences.
When preferences are homogeneous, long run behavior under log-linear
dynamics is independent of interaction structure (Blume, 1996). However,
when preferences are heterogeneous, modifying the graph of interactions can
affect long run behavior. Consequently, our results have design implications.
For example, a planner may wish to design a network of interactions that leads
to a particular pattern of behavior, such as the universal adoption of a new
technology. Alternatively, a planner may be faced with a given interaction
structure but have limited scope to influence the preferences of some of the
individuals. We conclude Section 3 with a discussion of such issues.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives the basic model. Section
1 Terminology introduced by Newton & Sercombe (2017) to distinguish potential autonomy
from other forms of autonomy.
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 2(1), 2017
Philip R Neary, Jonathan Newton 143
3 links heterogeneity and potential autonomy. Section 4 considers random
preferences.
2. MODEL
The model is a standard one and we follow the notation of Newton & Sercombe
(2017), which builds on that of Young (2011). Consider a simple, finite,
connected graph Γ = (V,E). The vertex set V represents a set of players.
The edge set E, consisting of unordered pairs of elements of V , represents
connections between players. If two vertices share an edge they are said to
be neighbors. The number of neighbors of a vertex i ∈ V is the degree of i.
For S⊆V , S 6= /0, denote by d(S) the sum of the degrees of vertices in S. For
T,S ⊆ V , denote by d(T,S) the number of edges {i, j} ∈ E such that i ∈ T
and j ∈ S. For notational convenience we write d({i}) as d(i) and d({i},S) as
d(i,S). We write V \S for the complement of S in V .
Let {A,B} be the (binary) set of strategies available to the players. A
strategy profile σ is a function σ :V →{A,B} that associates each player with
one of the two strategies. Let σS, σ−S denote σ restricted to the domains S
and V \ S respectively. Let σA, σB be the strategy profiles such that for all
i∈V , σA(i) = A, σB(i) = B. Denote byVA(σ)⊆V the set of players who play
strategy A at profile σ and byVB(σ)⊆V the set of players who play strategy B
at profile σ . Given the strategies played by i and j, an edge {i, j} ∈ E generates
payoffs for i and j as determined by the game in Figure 1. The payoff of player
i ∈ V at profile σ is then the sum of these payoffs over the edges he shares
with each of his neighbors on the graph. Formally, player i’s payoff at σ is
pii(σ) =
{
γi d(i,VA(σ)) if σ(i) = A
(1− γi)d(i,VB(σ)) if σ(i) = B
. (1)
This basic setup is identical to the model of Newton & Sercombe (2017)
except for two differences. First, every pairwise interaction is restricted to have
zero payoffs off-diagonal. Given that only individual agency is considered in
the current paper (i.e. the unit of decision making is always a single player), this
is without loss of generality (see the cited work for details). Second, payoffs are
allowed to differ between players, whereas the cited work considers symmetric
payoff matrices. We refer to γi as player i’s type, which is the (threshold)
fraction of i’s neighbours required to play strategy B in order for i’s payoff
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Figure 1: For {i, j} ∈ E, for each combination of A and B, entries give payoffs
for i ∈V and j ∈V respectively. Both γi,γ j ∈ (0,1).
from playing strategy B to be at least as high as his payoff from playing strategy
A. Hence the appellation threshold model (Granovetter, 1978).
We note that this specification admits an exact potential function (Monderer
& Shapley, 1996) given by
Potential(σ) = ∑
{i, j}∈E:
σ(i)=A
σ( j)=A
(γi+ γ j)+ ∑
{i, j}∈E:
σ(i)=A
σ( j)=B
γi+ ∑
{i, j}∈E:
σ(i)=B
σ( j)=B
1 (2)
The potential function aggregates information from the game in a way that
retains information on the incentives of players under individual agency. Specif-
ically, if we adjust the strategy of any single player, the change in his payoff
equals the change in the potential function.
In the current context, the potential function is important in determining
long run behaviour under a dynamic process of strategic adjustment. Specif-
ically, we consider the individualistic asynchronous logit dynamic. Let σ t
denote a strategy profile at time t ∈N. At time t, a single vertex i∈V is chosen
uniformly at random and with probability
e
1
η pii(A,σ
t−1
−i )
e
1
η pii(A,σ
t−1
−i )+ e
1
η pii(B,σ
t−1
−i )
, η > 0,
we let σ t(i) = A. Otherwise we let σ t(i) = B. For j ∈ V , j 6= i, let σ t( j) =
σ t−1( j).
This process has a unique invariant probability measure µη on the state
space {A,B}V . Blume (1993) shows that as η → 0, all mass under µη accumu-
lates on the states σ that globally maximize Potential(σ). That is, the global
maximizers of Potential(·) are the stochastically stable (Young, 1993) states
of the process.
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3. FIXED PREFERENCES AND AUTONOMY
Adapting the terminology of Newton & Sercombe (2017), in turn inspired by
Young (2011), a set of players S is autonomous if there is some reasonable
expectation that players in the set will come to play a subprofile of strategies
σS regardless of the behaviour of those outside of S. Young (2011) discusses
autonomy in terms of potential maximization. Newton & Sercombe (2017)
refer to this form of autonomy as potential autonomy to distinguish it from
agency autonomy driven by collective agency. Here we only deal with potential
autonomy. A set of players S is σ∗S -autonomous if, for any strategies played by
players outside of S, a higher potential is attained when players in S play σ∗S
than when they play any other strategies.
Definition 1. S⊆V is σ∗S -autonomous if, for all σ such that σS 6= σ∗S ,
Potential(σ∗S ,σ−S)> Potential(σ).
Autonomy will be used to examine the possibility of heterogeneity in
preferences leading to heterogeneity in behavior, specifically the possibility of
multiple strategies being played at stochastically stable states. Let SA be the
set of players who, all else equal, have a preference for strategy A, and let SB
be the set of players who have a preference for strategy B. That is,
SA := {i ∈V : γi > 1/2} and SB := {i ∈V : γi < 1/2}.
Let σP be the state at which each player plays his preferred strategy. That is,
σP(i) =
{
A if i ∈ SA
B if i ∈ SB .
We now state our first result.
Lemma 1. Fix a graph Γ = (V,E) and a set of types {γi}i∈V .
[1a] σP is the unique stochastically stable state if and only if SA is σA
SA
-
autonomous and SB is σB
SB
-autonomous.
[1b] σA is a stochastically stable state if and only if there does not exist S⊆V
such that S is σBS -autonomous.
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S
CK(S) = minS′⊆S
d(S′,S)
d(S′) =
3
8
Pl(S) = d(S,S)
d(S) =
9
22
i
j k
Figure 2: A graph Γ = (V,E) and a subset of vertices S ⊂ V that illustrate
aspects of Lemmas 1, 2, 3. See text for discussion.
[1c] σB is a stochastically stable state if and only if there does not exist S⊆V
such that S is σAS -autonomous.
The “if” part of [1a] and the “only if” parts of [1b],[1c] follow immediately
from the definition of σS-autonomy. The “only if” part of [1a] follows from
complementarity of the arguments in the potential function, specifically the fact
that if SA is not σA
SA
-autonomous, then σSA = σ
A
SA
cannot uniquely maximize
potential given σSB = σ
B
SB
. The “if” parts of [1b],[1c] are proved by showing
that if, from σA or σB, potential can be increased by changing the strategies of
a set of players, then some subset of this set must be autonomous for their new
strategies.
If the conditions of neither [1b] nor [1c] are met, that is there exist S,S′⊆V
such that S is σBS -autonomous and S
′ is σAS′-autonomous, then any stochastically
stable state will be heterogeneous. However, such a state will only involve
each player playing his preferred strategy if the condition in [1a] holds. If
neither [1a] nor [1b] nor [1c] holds, then any stochastically stable state will
be both heterogeneous and involve some players playing their less preferred
strategy.
Considering Figure 2 and ignoring terms that shall be defined later in the
paper, we can, for example, state by [1b] that if the subset of vertices S is
σBS -autonomous, then σ
A is not a stochastically stable state. Conversely if
there exists no such σBS -autonomous set (over all subsets of vertices), then σ
A
is stochastically stable.
Young (2011) shows that potential autonomy depends on the graph the-
oretic property of close-knittedness, which measures how well integrated
each subset of a group of players is with the rest of the group. Our precise
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definition of close-knittedness follows Newton & Sercombe (2017).2 The
close-knittedness of a set S⊆V is given by
CK(S) :=min
S′⊆S
d(S′,S)
d(S′)
.
Young (2011) links potential autonomy and close-knittedness to discuss the
speed of convergence to homogeneous strategy profiles. Under heterogeneous
preferences, these connections can be used to make statements about the
stochastic stability of heterogeneous strategy profiles. Similarly to Proposition
2 of Young (2011), we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Fix a graph Γ = (V,E) and a set of types {γi}i∈V . Then, for any
nonempty S⊆V,
[2a] If CK(S)>maxi∈S 1− γi, then S is σAS -autonomous.
[2b] If S is σAS -autonomous, then CK(S)>mini∈S 1− γi.
[2c] If CK(S)>maxi∈S γi, then S is σBS -autonomous.
[2d] If S is σBS -autonomous, then CK(S)>mini∈S γi.
That is, sets S with highCK(S) are more likely to be potential autonomous
and vice versa. The min and max operators enter because of the heterogeneity
of the values of γi for i ∈ S. High values of γi make i ∈ S more amenable to
playing A, and low values do the opposite. As, by definition,CK(S) ∈ [0, 1/2]
and γi ∈ (0,1), it can never be the case that bothCK(S)> 1−γi andCK(S)> γi,
so the conditions in [2a] and [2c] never hold simultaneously.
Returning to Figure 2, we see that CK(S) = 3/8. Consequently, by [2c],
if every l ∈ S has type γl < 3/8, then S is σBS -autonomous. Conversely, [2d]
tells us that if S is σBS -autonomous, then at least one player l ∈ S has γl < 3/8.
The reason that the converse does not imply the inequality for all players in S
is that the subset S′ ⊆ S that determines the value of CK(S) need not include
all of the players in S. In Figure 2, we see that the minimum over d(S′,S)/d(S′)
is attained when S′ = {i, j}. The constraints on type that σBS -autonomy of S
places on vertices such as k which lie outside of this subset are less tight.
If we restrict the set of types, {γi}i∈V , so that there are two types of player,
those with γi = γA > 1/2 who prefer strategy A, and those with γi = γB < 1/2
2 Young (2011) refers to a set S as ‘r-close knit’ ifCK(S)≥ r.
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a1
a4
a2
a3
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
SA SB
CK(SA) = 310
γA =
?
?
CK(SB) = 38
γB =
1
5
Figure 3: A graph Γ = (V,E) and a subset of vertices S ⊂ V . As per the
assumptions of Corollary 1, there are two types, γA and γB, with γB < 1/2 < γA.
Consequently, for i ∈ SA = {a1, . . . ,a4}, γi = γA and for i ∈ SB = {b1, . . . ,b7},
γi = γB. In the text we use this example to illustrate the use of Lemmas 1, 2
and Corollary 1 in the design of interaction structures.
who prefer strategy B, then we have a network version of the Language Game
of Neary (2012). Under this restriction γA =maxi∈SA γi =mini∈SA γi and γB =
maxi∈SB γi = mini∈SB γi, so Lemma 2 and Lemma 1[a] can be used to give
necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic stability of σP in terms of
close-knittedness of SA and SB. This is captured in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Fix a graph Γ = (V,E) and a set of types {γi}i∈V , such that for
all i ∈V, γi ∈ {γA,γB}, γB < 1/2 < γA. Profile σP is the unique stochastically
stable state if and only if CK(SA)> 1− γA and CK(SB)> γB.
Consider a social planner who wishes to use Lemmas 1, 2 and Corollary 1
to induce a particular pattern of behavior. Suppose the planner is faced with
the interaction structure and type profile in Figure 3.
As CK(SB) = 3/8 > 1/5 = γB = maxi∈SB γi, we have, by [2c] of Lemma
2, that SB is σB
SB
-autonomous. Consequently, all players in SB play B at any
stochastically stable state.
It remains to determine the behavior of players in SA. We find the values
of γA such that SA is σASA-autonomous. Note that γi = γA for all i ∈ SA. Conse-
quently, mini∈SA γi =maxi∈SA γi = γA, so [2a] and [2b] of Lemma 2 imply that
SA is σA
SA
-autonomous if and only ifCK(SA)> 1−γA. Computation yields that
CK(SA) = 3/10, so we have that SA is σA
SA
-autonomous if and only if γA > 7/10.
Therefore, if γA > 7/10, then σP is the unique stochastically stable state, as
predicted by Corollary 1. Further, it can be checked that if γA ≤ 7/10, then not
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only is SA not σA
SA
-autonomous, but no subset S⊂ SA is σAS -autonomous, so by
[1c] of Lemma 1, σB is stochastically stable.
Now consider the case of a social planner who wishes to induce σP but is
faced with γA < 7/10. To overcome this problem, she would like to increase the
close-knittedness of SA to obtain a lower threshold value of γA. Assume she
has the resources to make one of three kinds of amendment: she can add an
edge, delete an edge, or change the type of a player.
Adding an edge between players in SB will increase CK(SB) while leaving
CK(SA) unaffected. Adding an edge between a player in SA and a player in
SB will decrease CK(SA) and CK(SB). Adding an edge between players in SA,
for example {a1,a3}, will increase CK(SA) to 1/3, which in turn lowers the
threshold on γA to 2/3. If γA > 2/3, then σP will become uniquely stochastically
stable. Conversely, if γA < 2/3, then no single additional edge can make σP
stochastically stable.
Suppose instead that the planner deletes an edge. For this deletion to
increase CK(SA), it must be an edge from a player in SA to a player in SB,
for example {a2,b1}. This also increases CK(SA) to 1/3 and so lowers the
threshold on γA to 2/3.
Finally, consider the planner changing the type of a single player. If she
converts either a1 or a4 to type γB, then CK(SA) is reduced to 2/9, whereas if
she converts either a2 or a3, then CK(SA) is reduced further to 1/6. Such a
conversion might be useful if the planner were trying to encourage uniform
adoption of strategy B.3 In the other direction, if the planner were to convert
b4 to type γA, thenCK(SA) would increase to 1/3 andCK(SB) would decrease
to 5/14, which is small enough that SB would still be σB
SB
-autonomous.
4. RANDOM PREFERENCES
In this section we consider random preferences and give conditions under
which we can usually expect any stochastically stable state to exhibit het-
erogeneity in strategies. Specifically, we show that as long as there is some
diversity in ordinal preferences, then there will usually be diversity of behavior
on sufficiently large graphs within a specific class.
First, we shall give conditions under which homogeneous states cannot
3 It should be remarked that in some contexts, the switch of a player from type γA to type γB
could increaseCK(SA).
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be stochastically stable when preferences are fixed. This shall depend on the
plumpness of sets S⊆V , which we define as
Pl(S) :=
d(S,S)
d(S)
.
To use terminology from Young (2011), plumpness measures the area
d(S,S) of a set S relative to its perimeter d(S,V \S).4
It is immediate from their definitions that CK(S) ≤ Pl(S) ≤ 1/2. The
difference in their definitions relates to potential as follows. From profile σB,
if S is sufficiently plump relative to maxi∈S 1− γi, then potential increases if
we switch S to play σAS . In contrast, Lemma 2 shows that, if S is sufficiently
close-knit, then σAS maximizes potential given σ
B
V\S. In both cases, σ
B is not
stochastically stable.
Lemma 3. Fix a graph Γ = (V,E) and a set of types {γi}i∈V . Then, for any
nonempty S⊆V,
[3a] If Pl(S)>maxi∈S γi, then σA is not stochastically stable and there exists
S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is σBS′-autonomous.
[3b] If Pl(S)>maxi∈S 1− γi, then σB is not stochastically stable and there
exists S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is σAS′-autonomous.
Returning to Figure 2, we see that Pl(S) = 9/22 > 3/8 =CK(S). Thus, for
example, if maxi∈S γi = 2/5, we have that Pl(S)>maxi∈S γi >CK(S). Conse-
quently, we cannot use [2c] to state whether S is σBS -autonomous. That is, we
do not know whether potential is always maximized when players in S play
B. However, we can use [3a] to infer that potential is higher when all players
in S play B than when all players in S play A. Furthermore, we know that S
contains a subset S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is σBS′-autonomous. It can be checked by
calculation that the subset S′ ⊂ S comprising the rightmost 4 vertices of S is
indeed σBS′-autonomous when maxi∈S γi = 2/5.
Consider a sequence of graphs {Γk}k∈N+ , Γk = (Vk,Ek). We say that such
a sequence is corpulent if, for any target level of plumpness, there is a growing
4 To see this, note that
Pl(S) =
d(S,S)
d(S)
=
d(S,S)
d(S,V \S)+2d(S,S)
which is increasing in the ratio of area to perimeter.
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number of non-intersecting sets of bounded size which are at least as plump as
the target level.
Definition 2. A sequence of graphs {Γk}k∈N+ is corpulent if, for all φ ∈ (0, 1/2),
there exists l ∈ N+, such that for all n ∈ N+, there exists k¯, such that for all
k ≥ k¯, Γk = (Vk,Ek) contains subsets {Sm}m=nm=1, Sm ⊂ Vk, such that |Sm| ≤ l,
Sm∩Sm′ = /0 for m 6= m′, and Pl(Sm)≥ φ for all m.
It follows from the definition that any corpulent sequence will be increasing
in size so that limk→∞ |Vk|= ∞. Some examples of corpulent families of graphs
are square lattices with von-Neumann neighborhood or Moore neighborhood,
the Kagome lattice, and the ring (see Figure 4).
The idea of a corpulent sequence of graphs is that as the graphs in such a
sequence increase in size, they include an arbitrarily large number of arbitrarily
plump subsets. To illustrate this, consider the case when Γk is the k by k
square lattice with von-Neumann neighborhood. Assume some target level
of plumpness, φ ∈ (0, 1/2). Consider a subset S of such a Γk, such that S is
composed of a
√
l by
√
l block of vertices so that |S|= l, and d(i) = 4 for all
i ∈ S (see Figure 5). Then d(S,S) = 2√l(√l−1) and d(s) = 4 l, so Pl(S) =
(
√
l−1)/2√l. This implies that if we choose l large enough, then Pl(S)> φ . For
any positive integer n, we can then choose k large enough that Γk includes n
such sets S1,S2, . . . ,Sn that do not intersect one another, thus satisfying the
definition of corpulence.
Now, let each γi, i ∈V , be independently drawn according to a probability
measure P on the Borel sets of (0,1). We say that preferences are ordinally
diverse if there is nonzero probability of a given player i ∈V having an ordinal
preference for A over B and vice versa.
Definition 3. Preferences are ordinally diverse if P[γi ∈ (0, 1/2)]> 0 and P[γi ∈
(1/2,1)]> 0.
For a given graph Γ = (V,E), abuse notation to let P[H |Γ] be the prob-
ability that one of the two homogeneous states, σA or σB, is stochastically
stable when the types {γi}i∈V are determined according to P.
We can now state the main result of this section. When preferences are
ordinally diverse, large corpulent graphs will nearly always have heterogene-
ity in strategies at stochastically stable states. That is, ordinal diversity in
preferences implies diversity in behavior for large graphs within these families.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4: Examples of corpulent families of graphs include (a) square lattice
with von-Neumann neighborhood; (b) square lattice with Moore neighborhood;
(c) Kagome lattice; (d) the ring.
Theorem 1. If {Γk}k∈N+ is corpulent and preferences are ordinally diverse
then limk→∞P[H |Γk] = 0.
The intuition behind the theorem is that large graphs in corpulent sequences
have large numbers of very plump sets of vertices. Indeed, for an arbitrary
target level of plumpness it is possible to choose a graph large enough that
it has an arbitrary number of non-intersecting sets that are at least as plump
as the target level. Ordinal diversity ensures that, usually, at least some of
these sets will be composed solely of players with an ordinal preference in
favour of strategy A and some will be composed solely of players with an
ordinal preference for strategy B. These preferences may be cardinally very
weak, but this does not matter as the target level of plumpness can be adjusted
to take account of this. Consequently, large corpulent graphs under random
preferences will usually contain sets of players with homogeneous ordinal
preferences that are plump enough, per Lemma 3, to destabilize homogeneous
behavior in the population.
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S1
S2
Figure 5: Non-intersecting sets S1, S2 such that l = |S1| = |S2| = 16 and
Pl(S1) = Pl(S2) = 3/8. Arbitrarily large square lattices with von-Neumann
neighborhood can include arbitrarily large numbers of such sets.
A. APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1[a].
(⇐) Assume that SA is σA
SA
-autonomous and SB is σB
SB
-autonomous. As SA is
σA
SA
-autonomous, any state σ∗ that maximizes potential and is thus stochas-
tically stable must, by Definition 1, have σ∗
SA
= σA
SA
. Similarly, σ∗
SB
= σB
SB
.
Therefore, σ∗ = (σA
SA
,σB
SB
) = σP.
(⇒) Assume that σP is uniquely stochastically stable and thus uniquely maxi-
mizes potential. If SA is not σA
SA
-autonomous, then, by Definition 1, for some
σ , σSA 6= σASA ,
Potential(σA
SA
,σ−SA)≤ Potential(σ). (3)
Note that, by (2), edges between vertices playing different strategies give lower
potential than edges between vertices playing the same strategy. Therefore, (3)
implies
Potential(σA
SA
,σB−SA)≤ Potential(σSA ,σB−SA). (4)
but as σP = (σA
SA
,σB−SA), inequality (4) implies that σ
P does not uniquely
maximize potential, so σP is not uniquely stochastically stable. Contradiction.
Therefore, SA must be σA
SA
-autonomous. Similarly, SB must be σB
SB
-autonomous.
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Proof of Lemma 1[b] (and by analogy, [c]).
(⇒) Assume that σA is stochastically stable and thus maximizes potential. If
there exists S⊆V such that S is σBS -autonomous, then by Definition 1,
Potential(σBS ,σ
A
−S)> Potential(σ
A), (5)
contradicting σA being a potential maximizer. Therefore, there does not exist
S⊆V such that S is σBS -autonomous.
(⇐) Assume that there does not exist S⊆V such that S is σBS -autonomous. If
σA is not stochastically stable then it does not maximize potential. Amongst
all maximizers of potential, choose one, denoted σ∗, such that, denoting
S = {i ∈ V : σ∗i = B}, for any S′ ⊂ S, σ ′ = (σBS′ ,σA−S′) does not maximize
potential. Then we have that for all σS 6= σBS ,
Potential(σ∗) = Potential(σBS ,σ
A
−S)> Potential(σS,σ
A
−S). (6)
Note that by (2), edges between vertices playing different strategies give lower
potential than edges between vertices playing the same strategy. Therefore, (6)
implies that for any σ , σS 6= σBS ,
Potential(σBS ,σ)> Potential(σ), (7)
which is the definition of S being σB-autonomous. Contradiction. Therefore,
σA is stochastically stable.
Proof of Lemma 2[a] (and by analogy, [c]).
Assume that CK(S) > maxi∈S 1− γi. Note that as, by (2), edges between
vertices playing different strategies give lower potential than edges between
vertices playing the same strategy, S is σAS -autonomous if and only if for all
S′ ⊆ S,
Potential(σAS ,σ
B
V\S)> Potential(σ
A
S\S′ ,σ
B
S′ ,σ
B
V\S). (8)
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Substituting from (2),
Potential(σAS ,σ
B
V\S)−Potential(σAS\S′ ,σBS′ ,σBV\S) (9)
= ∑
i∈S′
d(i,V \S)(γi−1)+ ∑
i∈S′
d(i,S\S′)(γi)+ ∑
i, j∈S′
(γi+ γ j−1).
> d(S′,V \S)
(
min
i∈S′
γi−1
)
+d(S′,S\S′)
(
min
i∈S′
γi
)
+d(S′,S′)
(
2min
i∈S′
γi−1
)
.
Now,
CK(S)>max
i∈S
1− γi = 1−min
i∈S
γi, (10)
so by definition ofCK(S), we have, for all S′ ⊆ S,
d(S′,S)
d(S′)
> 1−min
i∈S
γi (11)
=⇒ d(S′,S)−d(S′)
(
1−min
i∈S
γi
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S′,S)−d(S′)
(
1−min
i∈S′
γi
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S′,S\S′)+d(S′,S′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d(S′,S)
− (d(S′,V \S)+d(S′,S\S′)+2d(S′,S′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d(S′)
(
1−min
i∈S′
γi
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S′,V \S)
(
min
i∈S′
γi−1
)
+d(S′,S\S′)
(
min
i∈S′
γi
)
+d(S′,S′)
(
2min
i∈S′
γi−2
)
> 0.
So (9) and (11) together imply that for all S′ ⊆ S,
Potential(σAS ,σ
B
V\S)−Potential(σAS\S′ ,σBS′ ,σBV\S)> 0, (12)
which implies (8), so S is σAS -autonomous.
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Proof of Lemma 2[b] (and by analogy, [d]).
Assume that S is σAS -autonomous. Then for all S
′ ⊆ S, (8) holds, so
Potential(σAS ,σ
B
V\S)−Potential(σAS\S′ ,σBS′ ,σBV\S)> 0 (13)
=⇒ ∑
i∈S′
d(i,V \S)(γi−1)+ ∑
i∈S′
d(i,S\S′)(γi)+ ∑
i, j∈S′
(γi+ γ j−1)> 0
=⇒ d(S′,V \S)
(
max
i∈S′
γi−1
)
+d(S′,S\S′)
(
max
i∈S′
γi
)
+d(S′,S′)
(
2max
i∈S′
γi−1
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S′,S)−d(S′)
(
1−max
i∈S′
γi
)
> 0 [by similar algebra to (11)]
=⇒ d(S′,S)−d(S′)
(
1−max
i∈S
γi
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S
′,S)
d(S′)
> 1−max
i∈S
γi,
which implies that
CK(S)> 1−max
i∈S
γi =min
i∈S
1− γi. (14)
Proof of Corollary 1.
Note that
min
i∈SA
γi = γA =max
i∈SA
γi, min
i∈SB
γi = γB =max
i∈SB
γi. (15)
Therefore, by Lemma 2[a,b], SA is σA
SA
-autonomous if and only if CK(SA)>
1− γA.
Similarly, by Lemma 2[c,d], SB is σB
SB
-autonomous if and only ifCK(SB)> γB.
So SA is σA
SA
-autonomous and SB is σB
SB
-autonomous if and only if CK(SA)>
1− γA andCK(SB)> γB.
By Lemma 1[a], SA is σA
SA
-autonomous and SB is σB
SB
-autonomous if and only
if σP is the unique stochastically stable state.
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Proof of Lemma 3[a] (and by analogy, [b]).
We have
Pl(S) =
d(S,S)
d(S)
>max
i∈S
γi (16)
=⇒ d(S)max
i∈S
γi−d(S,S)< 0.
Now the potential difference between σA and (σBS ,σ
A
V\S) equals
Potential(σA)−Potential(σBS ,σAV\S) (17)
= ∑
i∈S
d(i,V \S)γi+ ∑
i, j∈S
γi+ γ j−1
≤ d(S,V \S)max
i∈S
γi+d(S,S)
(
2max
i∈S
γi−1
)
= (d(S)−2d(S,S))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d(S,V\S)
max
i∈S
γi+d(S,S)
(
2max
i∈S
γi−1
)
= d(S)max
i∈S
γi−d(S,S)
<︸︷︷︸
by (16)
0.
Therefore, σA does not maximize potential and is thus not stochastically stable.
Consider σS that maximize potential given σV\S = σAV\S. Consider such a σS,
denoted σ∗S , such that, denoting S
∗ = {i ∈ S : σ∗i = B} ⊆ S, for any S′ ⊂ S∗,
σ ′ = (σBS′ ,σ
A
−S′) does not maximize potential. Then we have that, for all
σS∗ 6= σBS∗ ,
Potential(σBS∗ ,σ
A
−S∗)> Potential(σS,σ
A
−S∗). (18)
Note that by (2), edges between vertices playing different strategies give lower
potential than edges between vertices playing the same strategy. Therefore, (6)
implies that for any σ , σS∗ 6= σBS∗ ,
Potential(σBS∗ ,σ)> Potential(σ), (19)
which is the definition of S∗ being σB-autonomous.
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Proof of Theorem 1.
As preferences are assumed to be ordinally diverse, by Definition 3, there
exists φ < 1/2 such that P[(0,φ)] =: ρ > 0.
As {Γk}k∈N+ is corpulent, by Definition 2 there exists l such that for all n∈N+,
there exists k¯(n) such that for k ≥ k¯(n) we can choose non-intersecting sets
{Sm}1≤m≤n, |Sm| ≤ l such that Pl(Sm)≥ φ .
For given Γk, S
m, as |Sm| ≤ l, the probability that all i ∈ Sm have γi < φ , and
hence φ > maxi∈Sm , is bounded below by ρ l > 0. The probability that this
holds for at least one such Sm is thus bounded below by 1− (1−ρ l)n for k≥ k¯.
This probability approaches one as n→ ∞.
So, with probability approaching one as k→ ∞, there exists Sm ⊆Vk such that
Pl(Sm)≥ φ >maxi∈Sm γi, and by Lemma 3, σA is not stochastically stable. A
similar argument holds for σB.
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